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This dissertation has two aims: to suggest four things which
may contribute to moral progress by helping individuals love better,
and to defend such suggestions against standard moral theory.
Positively, the study suggests: overcoming narcissism enables a
person to love: the basic element of love, clear and compassionate
attention to individuals, can be practiced; a vision of love, given
through narrative, can direct the moral pilgrim; and
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communities can help would-be lovers.

Doctor of Philosophy

to be taken

December 1991

healthy

Negatively, the study argues:

some of these positive suggestions would be classed as a non-central
adjunct to moral philosophy by most rational.istic moral philosophers;
this (mis)classification of these suggestions reveals that standard
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moral philosophy is deficient; these deficiencies flow from the wrong
use of the "myth of autonomous reason;" and rationalistic moral
theories are rooted in an untenable picture of human nature as

Dr. William Davie

essentially rational.

Further, questions surrounding the concepts of

pluralism of goods and relativism are discussed in one chapter.
Love is a crucially important notion in morals.

Moral

philosophy, then, should give attention to this notion, and some of
that attention should be concerned with how people might develop
or improve as lovers.

However, when the author tried to think

through some rather obvious suggestions relating to love and
becoming a lover, it became clear that much moral theory gives love
short shrift.

Assumptions inherent in rationalistic moral theory

prevent most moral philosophers from letting love be the central
concept in their work.
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It may be hoped that this book will find some readers who ask
for more detail.

The body of the text, of course, conveys at least

some of those details, as many as my thought, time, and energy
allowed.

Between these extremes--the sentence which pleased the

barber and the whole book, which I hope pleases the reader--lies a
shorter description, the introduction.
. This study hopes to show that moral progress is possible, in
particular, that progress in love is possible.
advanced to support this main idea.

Four theses are

First, narcissism hinders love,

therefore progress against narcissism is a means of growth in love.
Second, the root of love is accurate and compassionate attention,
which we can gain by practice, even though it is hard.

Third, as

moral pilgrims we pursue visions of love, so the stories by which we
gain such visions are tools in learning to love.

Fourth, healthy

communities can help would-be lovers along the way.

These themes

are taken up, respectively, in chapters I, II, VI, and VIII.

3
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The positive claims of the book do not fit well with much,
perhaps most, ethical theory.
this problem.

Chapters III, IV and V examine

Chapter III tries to recognize objections to the sort of

moral philosophy exemplified in the first two chapters, trace those
objections to basic assumptions of rationalistic moral theory, and call
those assumptions into question.

Chapter IV examines Immanuel

Kant's moral theory, as a representative of rationalistic theory, shows
that it is rooted in a myth (the "myth of autonomous reason") and a
certain view of human nature, and rejects the myth (at least as
applied to ethics) and the view of human nature.

Chapter V

examines a modern application of rationalistic theory in anc-ther
field--Lawrence Kohlberg's moral development psychology--and
shows how its rationalistic assumptions render it an example of "how
not to think about moral progress."
Does my assertion, in chapter VI, that we need a vision of love
to grow as lovers, entail that I disbelieve i.n the incommensurability
of goods, a topic in some recent philosophic literature?
possibility is explored in chapter VII.

This

(The answer is complicated.

No, the views of chapter VI do not entail a rejection of
incommensurability.

On the other hand, I do not believe goods are

ultimately incommensurable.

On still another hand, the ultimate

unity of good shows up only imperfectly in a penultimate world.)
Obviously, the book is not merely a philosophical exercise for
the author.

Progress in love is not just a mode of moral progress

(though there are others); it is the most important one.

The subtext

of importance--standard ethical theory gives its attention to things of
lesser importance, while giving little attention to love--runs
throughout the book.

It is to be hoped, however, that the author has

not substituted conviction for a substantive philosophical
investigation.

4
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philosophers' work.

CHAPTER I

Nevertheless, the main contentions of this study

appear, when compared to much modern moral philosophy, to be
"strange talk," i.e. not so much denying what others write, but talking

TIIB ABILITY TO SEE: TWO TIIBSES

about a different topic entirely.

OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Rather than defend this assertion, this chapter will instead
offer an example of moral philosophy, saying something which needs
to be said.

I will discuss narcissism, saying what I mean by it,

Two theses:

showing why it is morally deadly, asking how someone could become

1.

aware of it, and suggesting what might be done about it.

Narcissism is morally deadly; it can so deaden the soul as to

make moral progress impossible.
2.

If this

chapter's project is successful, my claim will have been

Thesis #1, and many other statements of its sort, ought to be

considered proper expressions of ethical theory.

demonstrated, for the reader will be able to see how different the
project is from much philosophical writing on moral topics.

Later, I

will address an opinion which some of my readers, especially those
The neophyte philosopher in modern times who wishes to
think and write about morality faces a daunting problem.

Some

who are trained in philosophy, may have about my discussion of
narcissism.

Specifically, philosophers may object that it should be

things which need to be said seem unsayable from within the

classed as a piece of moralism, not moral philosophy.

framework of ideas accepted by many philosophers.

that this opinion is misguided and unnecessary.

One can look

long and far before finding an approach to ethics which allows

Philosophy really ought to be more interested in the first thesis
(and, of course, many others like it) than in the second.

certain things to be said philosophically.
What could be meant by such a charge?

I will suggest

Philosophy is a

state of modem ethical theory,

Given the

thesis 2 must be made explicit so

notoriously many-sided discipline, in which basic assumptions are

that thesis 1 might be granted philosophic respectability.

often challenged.

many will accept thesis 2 unless the discussion of thesis 1 is

How could any philosophical position, if well

presented, fail to be heard?

As will become clear, I am not

suggesting that the positions argued in this book have not been aired
at all; much of what is written here has antecedents in other

convincing.

Still, not

7
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solved; but as the succession historian briefly notes: "The thing David

Narcjssjsm and the Death of Love

had done displeased the LORD." (2 Samuel
"In the spring, at the time when kings go off to war, David sent

Surely David knew that he had sinned.

11:27)
Or did he?

Readers of

Joab out with the king's men. . . " Thus begins the succession

the text, separated from the action, can list his crimes, including

narrative of Solomon, found in the Bible, begun in 2 Samuel

adultery, murder, abuse of governmental authority, conspiracy,

(chapters 11-23) and concluded in 1 Kings

duplicity, etc.

(chapters 1,2).

This

But can you imagine David's mind on the day he

magnificent piece of historiography tells how the hastily contructed

married Bathsheba?

Israelite empire, put together entirely within David's lifetime, passed

wisely in a tight spot.

not to his many older sons. but to Solomon.

knew better.

For the purposes of this

I can suppose him to consider himself as acting
Yes, the initial affair was a mistake and he

The king in a theocratic state like Israel was supposed

chapter, we direct our attention to that most famous part of the

to be a moral exemplar; if his deed became known his moral

narrative, the story of David and Bathsheba.

authority would be lessened, though probably not enough to weaken

David, no longer the young warrior of other Bible stories but

his political power.

So the matter had to be hushed up, either by

the firmly established king of Israel, did not go out to war with his

Uriah thinking the child his own or--given Uriah's expression of

general Joab.

military loyalty--by Uriah's death.

Secure in his power, he remained in the capital,

David might well have thought he

Jerusalem, to administer his growing dominions and (we may

had done well enough to protect the honor of the throne and Uriah as

suppose) to enjoy a settled life.

a state hero.

bathing and desired her.

While there he saw a young woman

"But what David had done displeased the LORD."

Ancient despots usually had their way in

In the second

such matters; though David discovered th~ beautiful Bathsheba was

act of the drama, the prophet Nathan arrived in court to tell the king

married, he took her anyway.

a story.

child.

She soon reported that she carried his

To cover the matter David summoned her .husband, a military

man named Uriah, to Jerusalem.

But Uriah would not take advantage

It seemed that a wealthy man in Israel, blessed with ample

flocks and herds, lived next to a poor man with only one sheep.
friend arrived to feast with the rich man.

A

But instead of butchering

of his "leave" for conjugal purposes as long as Joab and the army

from his own herd, the man had stolen his neighbor's lone sheep and

were in the field.

offered that to his guest.

So David sent Uriah back to the front carrying his

death sentence, a secret command to Joab to expose Uriah to enemy

what should be done?

attack.

asked.

Uriah died and David married the grieving widow.

Problem

Obviously, an injustice had occured, but

What did the king say to the story? Nathan

Indignant at such misuse of power, David said that the man

9
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insight and self-evaluation are internal to a person's life, as are our

really ought to die, that he would be required to restore to his
neighbor four times what he had taken.
are the man!" (2 Samuel

And Nathan replied, "You

12:7) If, as I have supposed, David had

rationalized his actions, the rationalization was now smashed.
said, "I have sinned against the LORD."

David

(2 Samuel 12:13, cf. Psalm

narcissistic or non-narcissistic reactions to them.
Note that the upshot of this discussion is that our internal
reactions to certain internal events are morally significant.

may feel threatened by apparent conflicts between what she is and
what she thinks she should be.

51)
I have retold the story in this way, including my suppositions

about David's state of mind, so that the story will illustrate the
following point.

In spite of his many crimes in this affair, David at

A person

Feeling threatened, she may not

acknowledge that she has been anything less than perfect.

Both the

feeling of threat and the resulting repression may be unconscious.I
They are, nevertheless, matters of morality.

least had the virtue that when confronted with his sins he was
willing to see them as the evils they were.

He was willing to admit to

the world, but most importantly to himself, that his actions were just
as unjust as those of the rich man in Nathan's story.

He faced up to a

difference between the way he was and the way he knew he ought
to be.
Narcissism is marked by the unwillingness or inability to do as
David.

A narcissist rationalizes his behavior and being, both to other

people and to himself.

The narcissist values himself for "making it,"

for living up to his standards.

So the narcissist cannot admit that he

has not lived up to his standards without tearing at his self-esteem,
even when (as is frequently the case) the narcissist's standards are
unrealistic.

Of course, most confrontations between what a person is

and what he thinks he should be are not public affairs like the
confrontation between Nathan and David.

Most opportunities for

1 With this sentence I go from the realm of morality to that of psychological
theory, a move which warrants extended side comment.
.
First, a leading interest of this book, which will resurface repeatedly, is the
mterpl~Y. ?f psychology and morality.
For example, in chapter five I explore
and cnt1c1ze moral development research. I think that both the moral
philosopher and the psychologist do well to pay attention to the other's work.
Second, ideas from theoretical psychology have so entered our everyday
language that we need to make special effons to be aware of them and the
ways they shape our thinking about morality. "Both the feeling of threat and
the resulting repression may be unconscious.• Note that both 'repression' and
'unconscious' are stock items of psychological theory. Even if I suspect, as I
do, that people repress many of their feelings and that much of their mental
activity is unconscious, I should recognize that these ideas are hypothetical
constructs.
Third, psychological theories often can be read as attempted explanations of
how people come to think and feel the way they do. One can reject a proposed
explanation or theory and still agree that people think and feel in the ways
described. For instance, this chapter will present a psychoanalytic etiology of
narcissism; the reader could regard the proposed etiology as unfounded and
still accept the fact of narcissism. Specifically, some people are unable or
unwilling to face their moral shortcomings. I do not, in fact, want to endorse
psychoanalysis, though' I suspect it gives insight (another theoretically
tinged word) into how we produce narcissists.
Fourth, the usefulness of psychological theory for the moralist consists
partially in its ability to let us admit things we might not like. Narcissism is
ugly and unrealistic; I don't like the thought that I am narcissistic. But an
explanatory theory which shows that my narcissism is part of the natural
order of things allows me to admit its existence in me as something less than a
totally arbitrary stroke of evil.

10
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T.hey a~e too .busy proving their worth--or more properly,
dispr?vmg their worthlessness--to feel the love, appreciation,
and JOY of human connectedness which their good works could
potentially stimulate in themselves and others. These people
are not character disordered. They are people tortured by
narcissistic injury and crippled by developmental arrests in
functioning which rob them of the richness of life they deserve.
(Johnson 3)

Ample psychological literature discusses the narcissistic
personality disorder (Adler 430), with examples of extremely selfcentered, deceptive, and manipulative characters providing the grist
for the analytic mill.

Perhaps the first and most imponant thing to

do in regard to these people is to protect others from them.

It is

easy to see that the narcissistic personality disorder disrupts moral
Psychoanalytic theory traces various personality disorders to

progress--except that one hesitates to call these people "immoral";
they are sick.

I want to talk not about extreme cases but less

unresolved issues in early development of an individual. (Johnson

virulent infections of this moral disease which are found readily in

27-32) In the case of the narcissistic personality disorder, analytic

everyday life, in the lives of ordinary people.

theory looks at a period a few months after a person has learned to

These people, living

what Stephen M. Johnson calls the "narcissistic style," often cause as

walk.

much pain to themselves as to others. (Johnson 3)

reality," roughly the period from 15 to 24 months of age.

Johnson tells of "Martin," a client who had been severely
abused as a very young child. (Johnson 201-203)

Rejected by his

M.S. Mahler has labeled this period the "rapprochement with
The child

has been through the manic, joyful stage of having acquired walking
skills, when she explored everything and seemed invincible; no

parents at an age when parents seem almost godlike to a child,

number of falls could keep her from bouncing back up and trying

Martin felt he was worthless unless he could earn the approval and

again.

respect of other people.

As an adult, Martin sought fulfillment

through success and achievement in business.

A driven and

But now new, more challenging realities force their way into

her world -- seperateness, vulnerability, and limitation.

The child

must come to grips with the facts that mother is not just an extension

intelligent man, Martin "succeeded"; he had the career, the house,

of herself, that the world holds dangers as well as wonders, and that

everything.

there are some things she cannot do no matter bow many times or

unhappy.

He reached every goal he set--and was desperately
He had internalized the message of his abusive parents

that he was worthless.
injury he had suffered.

No amount of achievement could heal the
Martin is typical of the garden variety

narcissists I am concerned with, people of whom Johnson says:

how hard she tries.

In healthy development, a child learns these

lessons bit by bit and gradually overcomes her natural defenses
against these unpleasant truths.

But if the child is not "optimally

frustrated,"--repeatedly, gently, with gradually increasing severity

l3
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exposed to seperateness, vulnerability, and limitation--she may get

131) Phil grew up in a home with an alcoholic, abusive father and a

"stuck" in a pattern of infantile consciousness.

mother who failed to protect him from the father.

According to analytic theory, three defenses typically appear in
the patterns of the narcissistic mind.
grandiosity of the new walker.

Or he may idealize some mother-substitute, giving the substitute the
"I can be nothing without the

perfect other to direct and guide and make my life meaningful."

For Phil, the

narcissistic dictum. "I am nothing unless I am perfect," meant that he

The adult may retain the

"I am nothing unless I am perfect."

godlike qualities mother used to have.

and shamed repeatedly throughout his childhood.

He was humiliated

Or.

was nothing.

He came to therapy at thirty-eight suffering from

severe depression, alcoholism, and chronic pain.

Phil's alcoholism

and feelings of worthlessness united in alcoholic binge episodes,
during which he would disappear for days at a time.

Like Martin's,

in a slightly more advanced stage, he may split himself and alternate

Phil's false self was grandiose; unlike Martin, Phil generally felt the

between being the all-conquering walker and the worthless baby

demands of the false self as a crushing, impossible burden.

who cannot do anything right, a feeling internalized when the child

calls problems like those Phil presented when he entered therapy

experiences limitation in a crushing way.

the "symptomatic self."

Fixation in primitive defenses produces a "false self."
the false self is the narcissist; it is real in that sense.

Certainly.

But a realistic

sense of self can only be gained by gradual neutralization of a
person's grandiosity and idealization.

So long as the narcissist lives

in the emotional world of a toddler, he is bound to hurt and be hurt.

Johnson

Narcissists may alternate between the

"successful" false self and the depressed, isolated symptomatic self
for most of their lives.

In spite of his depression and feelings of

worthlessness and guilt, Phil had managed a long term marriage and
employment.
Phil was, I suggest, a relatively ordinary person; though his life

The adult narcissist has his normal intellectual and productive

brought him little joy and much unhappiness, he met the minimal

capacities; he can "get on" and contribute in the world fairly

requirements of the social contract.

effectively.

But his production is likely to be of the driven kind, like

It is important to see that unlike

the full-blown narcissistic personality disorder or the cool, calm

Martin's, and it will not repair the damage done to that inner child

sociopath, Phil wanted to be a "good" person and regretted the pain

for whom separation, vulnerability and limitation are unfinished and

he caused others.

frightening business.

especially after binges.

How does the narcissistic style prevent moral progress?
Consider a case like "Phil," again given by Johnson. (Johnson 129-

If anything, he was too self-recriminating,
And yet, because of his narcissism, Phil

caused heartache and pain for himself. his family, and others around

15
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Don is imaginary but date rape is not.
him.

Phil could not get better in a moral sense unless he got better

in a psychological sense.

raped by close acquaintances while virtually no university males

Don's girlfriend, Sara, feels humiliated and

Attracted to him first by his good looks and sense of humor,

furious.

Sara came to admire Don's political views and intelligence; she still
does.

the phenomenon, repeatedly confirmed in studies, in which
significant percentages of university women report having been

Consider an imaginary case, which illustrates disturbing
statistics, of a date rapist.

They enjoyed mutual friends and some good times together.

But last night, after seeing the latest Woody Allen film, she had
invited him to her apartment for a drink and to talk.
talk, but not about the movie, it seemed.
physical intimacy; she said no.

admit being rapists?

The women perceive rape where the men

imagine love-making.

(Clearly, there is no attempt here to be neutral

between the perceptions of the women and the misperceptions of the
In this case, the women know what's going on while the men

men.

do not.)

Don wanted to

He pressed Sara for

Sexism, deeply embedded in our culture, must be part of

any explanation of date rape.

I doubt, though, that this societal

reality adequately explains the sincere responses from university

And he took her clothes off and raped

her.

men in date rape studies.

In many cases the university men are

living from a narcissistic false self.
If we couid ask Don, though, he would say that they made love.

He had to push her a little bit, of course, but she wanted it.
are like that sometimes.

How can we understand

Rape?

they have raped; their sense of self demands that they not be

Women

Don would deny it vehemently.

He

Like Don, they cannot admit that

criminal.

They rationalize not because they fear legal responsibility,

but because they fear the internalized message of the parent to the
must; it would destroy his picture of himself to admit the label
"rapist."

He would insist that he does not hate or want to hurt his

girlfriend--isn't that what rapists are like?
his girlfriend (now lover) than ever.

Indeed, he feels closer to

He would not be surprised if

toddler, "You are not good enough."2 Like Don, if they do not
overcome the pressure to rationalize they may continue to use
women as objects without ever seeing that that is what they are
doing.

they end up married.
If Don and Sara were not imaginary, I would not be surprised if
they married either. it happens often.
relationship.

But I would fear for their

As long as Don is unable to see the pain he caused her,

he will continue to use Sara. He will not grow in love until he
recognizes her as an autonomous person.

Narcissism comes in milder forms than the examples I've
mentioned

might suggest.

Johnson writes of "Chuck." a normally

~
These remar~s ignore the .Pr?bability that sexism in our culture is massively
mterconnected with male narcissism. I would not argue against anyone who
wan~ed. to .make that connec~on.
I would insist, though, that an individual's
narc1s.s1sm is not .the same thtD:g as. societal sexism. Date rape is not adequately
explained by saying many umvers1ty men are sexists.

l7
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high-functioning, capable person with a fairly realistic sense of self.

death and reaffirmed their love for each other.

(Johnson173-189) Chuck grew up in a wealthy, upper-class family.

friends, talked and had fun.

His father and older brother, though nurturing and supportive in

He looked up old

We should say that by becoming aware of and to some degree

some ways, communicated a clear demand that Chuck live up to

emerging out of his narcissism, Chuck did more than make

family standards of achievement, distinction and social grace.

therapeutic progress.

The

He made moral progress.

By learning to accept

youngest child in the family, Chuck was allowed a little more

himself, not for measuring up but for being himself, Chuck found it

freedom than his siblings, but he still grew up worried whether he

easier to be honest about his opinions and feelings when speaking

could live up to the family image.

with others.

Chuck spent a number of years

trying to prove his worth with successes in business or dating

He was able to love them better.

Here is a summary of what has been said to this point.

physically attractive but emotionally hard and financially

Narcissism prevents moral progress in a number of ways; especially,

independent women.

narcissism keeps us from learning to be lovers.

Neither sort of success satisfied his need to feel

Sometimes, as in the

case of a date rapist, the grandiosity of the false self gets connected

worthwhile.
Johnson relates how, in a comparatively short course of
therapy, Chuck gained insight into his narcissistic false self.

He

with some rule of morality, internalized as (for example), "If I am a
rapist I am a really bad person."

The resulting need to deny that one

learned to feel fears which he had long suppressed, which Johnson

has broken the rule leads to rationalization and the ability

connects, in accord with analytic theory, to Chuck's interior child, still

repeatedly to break the rule while approving it.

stuck in defenses against vulnerability.

a grotesque example of this in "The Case of Bobby and His Parents" in

Then Chuck took a vacation

M. Scott Peck gives

among family in the midwest in which his newly developed self-

People of the Lie. (Peck 47-59)

acceptance and openness to feelings contrasted sharply with the tight

younger of whom, Bobby, was hospitalized for depression.

self-control of his brother and sister-in-law.

son, Stuart, had committed suicide with a small gauge rifle.

Chuck was able to

spend time with his nieces and nephews simply playing.

He told his

rigid brother that he loved him, but that he was no longer willing to
devote his life to business success.

He took a long drive with his 82-

year-old grandmother; she reminisced and they talked about life and

Bobby's parents had two sons, the
The older
For

Christmas, the parents made a present of that very rifle to Bobby.
They did not see anything wrong with this.
'Did you think how that present might seem to Bobby?' I
asked.
'What do you mean?'
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'I mean that' giving him his brother's suicide weapon was like
telling him to go out and kill himself too.'
'We didn't tell him anything of the sort.'
'Of course not. But did you think that it might possibly seem
that way to Bobby?'
'No we didn't think about that. We're not educated people
like y~u. We haven't been to c~llege. and learn ~ll kinds of
fancy ways of thinking. We're 3ust simple working people. We
can't be expected to think of all these things.' (Peck 57)

interests of others.

"I, too, am a human being"; far too often, we take

the virtue of self-love for granted.
To the extent that narcissism keeps me from loving and caring
for myself, it stops my moral progress.
So far attention has been concentrated on individual examples
of narcissism.

The narcissistic style can also infect groups, from

small ones like families and clubs to huge corporations and nationTo the extent that narcissism keeps me unconscious of the
ways I hurt other people, it stops my moral progress.

I do not want to speculate about the etiology of group

narcissism, questioning whether it originates in group processes or

For other narcissists, like Martin and Chuck's brother, the needs
of the false self consume a person's time and energy.

states.

In our culture,

whether it comes from the joining of the narcissism of the
individuals in the group.

It seems clear, though, that many groups

these peopI e o f ten are maten.ally rewarded for their drivenness, but

are marked by narcissistic qualities, especially denial of knowledge

they have little to give emotionally.

that would threaten the group self-image.

worth, time and energy.

Learning to love takes, and is

Since learning to love takes time and

For example, Martha (not her real name) came to my office

energy, it will not do, as some of us are tempted to do, to make "Thou

with great hesitation.

shalt love" into a rule which a rational person may simply fulfill at

time, not since her

will.

That just adds another requirement to the image of the false

Martha had not been to a church for a long

~eens.

She felt out of place, and wondered if a

church could have any place in her spiritual pilgrimage.

self.

Martha grew up in a traditional family in the Midwest with
To the extent that narcissism keeps me from learning to love, it

stops my moral progress.

strong values of family love, community responsibility, church
attendance, and conservative sexual mores.

Sometimes, as for Johnson's "Phil," the grandiose false self is
crushed repeatedly, leading to intense depression.

We easily see, in

She had happy

memories of her childhood, memories marred by what happened
after.

At fifteen, she became pregnant and her parents threw her

his case, the moral implications of his suffering because his binges

out.

brought anguish to his wife and others.

to a major city where she supported herself and her child through

We should observe, though,

that the pain he caused himself was a moral issue, leaving aside the

With no one to turn to in her church or community, she drifted

prostitution.

Somehow Martha overcame all this.

When she came to
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me she had a husband, a house and a conventional lifestyle.

Now

that survival was no longer the primary issue in her life, Martha
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self-image they could not tolerate her continued presence.
rationalized their behavior or simply repressed the

sensed a need for spiritual growth, thus her visit to a pastor's office.

acknowledgement that it was evil.

But memories of rejection filled her with apprehension.

acts much like the narcissistic individual.

people in her past had hurt and deserted her.
done it?

Religious

How could they have

How could people who talked about love and loyalty prove

Indeed, how could they?

Were Martha's parents and the

people in the church conscious hypocrites?

Probably not.

Having

The narcissistic group thinks and

Group narcissism can be on a "small" scale, as in a single
congregation, or on a massive, institutional scale, like that of many
white South Africans.

so vindictive and judgmental?

They

These people consider themselves democrats

and defenders of freedom.
to the black majority?

How, then, can they deny political rights

Once again, one may doubt that they are

observed other, similar situations, I suggested that her parents acted

conscious hypocrites.

out of a combination of embarrassment (what would they tell their

or that most blacks are happy with the status quo or that blacks can

friends?), anger (how could she do this to them?), and misguided

be given their due within the system of homelands citizenship.

righteousness (she had broken the rules and set a bad example).
They rationalized forcing Martha from the house by thinking that she
had chosen her course and they were only respecting her decision
(she wanted to be an adult; let her live as one).

The church folk did

not press Martha's parents too closely for an explanation of Martha's
"runaway" from home because they were embarrassed too.
Martha conceded all this; she had concluded long before that
her parents actually thought they had treated her properly.
I

Instead, they believe that blacks are inferior

To

admit that white rule is raw unjustifiable oppression would be
intolerable, so they avoid the admission.
Group narcissism is marked by commitment to an unrealistic
group identity, "the lie."
silently.

The lie may be spoken publicly or assumed

Anyone in the group who exposes the lie or acts in violation

of the group self-image may be ostracized by the group.
Consider the American experience of the Vietnam War in the
1960's.

President Kennedy defined South Vietnam as a democracy,

Martha's parents and church were not conscious of the gap, which

worthy of American support.

certainly seemed obvious to Martha, between the values they

hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers were committed to the war

· actions
·
toward Martha• Th1's group valued itself
preac he d and their
as being righteous; if Martha broke their rule-bound definition of

against North Vietnam and the "Vietcong," supposedly a small
revolutionary communist faction in the South Vietnamese population.

righteousness, she broke the group's self-image.

President Johnson's main political interests lay in the combination of

Within this group

Under the Johnson administration,
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social programs he called the great society, programs under attack
from his political opponents.

In order to build the great society and

prosecute the war at the some time in the face of this opposition,

If narcissism, both in individual and group life, is morally

deadly, what can be done about it?

Johnson repeatedly denied the costs, human and material, which
military people said the war required.

Again and again

Individually, how can I become aware of the places in my life
where narcissistic rationalization prevents me from seeing the

administration spokesmen, sometimes even military officers, assured

changes I need to make?

I may see clearly in one matter and yet be

the public that "the corner has been turned" and "the end is in sight."

self-deceived in another.

How do I discover my moral blind spots?

In the last two years of the Johnson administration the lies
multiplied.

People who questioned the lies--were we really

defending a just government in South Vietnam?
insurgency really about to collapse?

Corporately, how can we identify the places where our group selfimage moves us to repress knowledge which would undermine it?

Was the communist

Was the weekly "body count" of

One dare not claim a definitive answer to this problem.
suggestion may be found in the David story.

But a

Change became possible

enemy casualties at all realistic?--were attacked by administration

for him in the comparison between a clear matter (Nathan's story)

spokesmen as being disloyal to "our boys in Vietnam."

and his own.

If the false group self-image had been confined to the White

Of course, David had the advantage on us; a prophet

came to confront him.

But "prophets" of other sorts come to us and

House, Vietnam would not have caused the painful divisions in

give us opportunities to see the world differently.

American society that it did.

picture (virtually all my readers have seen it), a black and white

Many Americans--in the beginning,

Think of the

nearly all Americans--thought of their country as democratic and

news photograph, which helped end US involvement in the Vietnam

just, a supporter of justice and freedom all over the world.

war.

We were

A naked little girl runs, screaming at the camera, others fleeing

in Vietnam for good reasons; we were defending a democratic ally

the napalm with her, terror on their faces.

against the threat of international communism.

photograph, and other images like it seen on television, served as a

Later, when millions

came to question the administration line, society was disrupted at a
basic level.

Ostracism of the dissidents was expressed in the familiar

bumper-sticker slogan: "America, love it or leave it."

These slowly

healing divisions are still present in our society, despite many
political calls to "put Vietnam behind us."

prophetic confrontation.

For many Americans that

The official rationalization, that we were

defending democracy in South Vietnam, was confronted by the vision
of a little girl with her back on fire and the rationalization lost.
(General Westmoreland complained that the picture was a fake, that
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shame or guilt--they would not have to repress knowledge.3 Perhaps
the girl probably had been burned in a hibachi accident.

The need to

avoid/repress/not see can be overwhelming.)

emotions like shame and guilt.

The world probably provides us with such confrontations quite
often; at least. that is my guess.

But if our need not to know is great

enough, like General Westmoreland we will cling to the flimsiest
rationalizations--and believe them.

If, like Martin, we are high

achievers, we can live in our false selves for long periods.

Phil, we then feel the awful weight of our worthlessness.

This is a utopian proposal, since it

would require that all children be parented in radically different
ways than they are.

But utopian proposals have their value not in

practicality but in their vision.

We could at least work toward the

abolition of guilt and shame.

For most

of us, though, our false selves crack at least some of the time; like
Either way,

the energy put into protecting our unrealistic self-image robs us of

Another voice could respond that it is just that discomfort
which we feel when we see our moral failure which motivates us to
change.

This side could agree that people often suffer from neurotic

guilt or destructive shame and still hold that guilt or shame felt for

joy and keeps us from learning to love.

We need to somehow reduce our need not to know. Thus it is
that therapists must often help narcissistic patients to accept and
believe in themselves for nothing more than the persons they are.
Behind the false self is the lie we have internalized, "I am nothing
unless

narcissism would disappear if we could banish self-destructive

" No matter how someone finishes the sentence, it is not

the right reasons is a good thing.

The shameless person may be none

other than the sociopath.
In this debate I tend to side with those who argue that some

guilt is good guilt,

~at

we ought to be ashamed of some things.

I

think, though, that guilt has value only if it motivates change; guilt
has no value of its own, as if somehow feeling bad were a payment

true.
"I am somebody, but I can get better."

Moral progress is

for wrongdoing.

Whichever side is right, often the way forward lies

possible when an individual values herself and yet also has ideals to

in strengthening a person's sense of worth in face of the threat posed

admire and be stretched by.

by the pain of shame or guilt.

The person "on the way" is free to see

the gap between her goal and her performance and let that
knowledge motivate her.
An interesting debate can occur at this point.

Someone could

suggest that narcissistic denial stems from pain the individual feels
when the false self is threatened.

If people felt no pain--call it

3 Cf. John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress." Kekes calls the pain someone
feels when she sees the gap between what she is and what she thinks she
should be "shame" and sees it as destructive of self image. He agrees that moral
progress requires self examination and the willingness to see that we fall
short of our ideals. But he thinks that we can react to this failure in positive
ways, i.e. without shame. (Kekes 291-295)
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unwillingness to see, for it prevents growth.
Prevention is better than cure.

We ought to let our children

There may be pain

involved in seeing my failure, but I need not flee it.

know that they can feel the feelings they have and express them and
we will still accept them.

They don't have to be perfect.

have to fix life for mother and father.

They don't

Most of all. they are worth

}!thical Theory and Real Life

being loved just the way they are.
At the time in my life when I first wrote this chapter, I had the
privilege of spending many mornings at home with my five-year-old
adopted son.

I managed to get some study done because he watched

"Sesame Street" and "Mr. Rogers" almost every day.

I developed

admiring gratitude for the ministry of Fred Rogers to children.

When

I heard a certain song start, I stopped what I was doing, picked up
Jamie and mouthed the words:

Put bluntly, the issue is this: who are moral philosophers and
what do they do?

What should we expect something written by a

philosopher about ethical matters to be like?

I want to say that the

first part of this paper is an example of moral philosophy, even
though it is unlike and has different ambitions than many things
written by ethical theorists.

I say this even if, against my strong

hope, my work in the first half of this paper turns out to be bad
philosophy, that is, bad in the sense that in it I am plainly wrong

"It's you I like;
It's not the things you wear.
It's not the way you do your hair
But it's you I like.

about narcissism.
What should moral philosophy do?

Three broad responses to

this query can be discerned in modem philosophy.

It's you I like;
Every part of you. . ·"

First, in the

standard theory approach, the philosopher searches for a normative
or justificatory theory which a) gives a sympathetic explanation and

I don't know the whole song.

We always collapsed in laughter

before it ended.

decide current problem cases, where serious persons disagree about

Undoubtedly, other clues or cues could be given to the wouldbe lover, showing how to become aware of and overcome narcissistic
blindness.

But for now, enough has been said.

confirmation of widely held moral judgements and. b) can be used to

Since moral growth is

both possible and worthwhile, I want to do away with my

the right thing to do.

The main living varieties of normative ethical

theories are utilitarianism and (modified) Kantianism, though college
ethics classes also acquaint students with hedonism, the theory of
natural law, divine command theory, and others.
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The constructors and repairers of standard ethical theories
often think of themselves as scientists in the field of ethics.

They are

laying bare the underlying theory which makes sense of billions of
fundamentally sound, but theoretically inchoate, moral judgements
made by everyday people.

Correct theory is then able to help

everyday people in their quandaries.

But it does not work that way;

everyday people do not seem to get much help from theories.
why should they?

And

Why should someone who, it is admitted, almost

always "gets it right" without a theory suddenly turn to the theorist
for help in the pinch?

By analogy, we go to doctors when we are

sick, but also when we are well so that we won't get sick. Do
normative theorists even imagine that they have something to offer

function.

This and other forms of non-cognitive4 meta-ethical

theories have been sufficiently promulgated in places of higher
education that one can find the basic ideas expressed by nonphilosophers.
(I

a~

not suggesting that college ethics classes, in which

students read Ayer, Stevenson or some other non-cognitivist
philosopher, produce a society enamored with non-cognitive metaethical theory.

Rather, it is the other way around.

ethical relativism of our society powerfully predisposes us to such
philosophy.)
The standard ethical theorist and the meta-ethics theorist
probably would have in common that both would label the first part
of this paper as "moralism."

the ordinary person who is not in a quandary situation?
Second, in the meta-ethics answer (to the question, what
should moral philosophy do?), the moral philosopher steps back from

I imagine that the

In it the author unabashedly says "we

need" and "we ought"; he makes a moral appeal.
Standard theorists will object that the author makes his appeal

various projects of moralizing and moral theorizing and philosophizes

without grounding it in any normative theory.

about them.

Regan make moral appeals, but at least they do the necessary

theories?
dilemmas?

What are the common assumptions of nonnative

What happens when people argue rationally about ethical
How do moral concept words like good or just function in

comparison to other kinds of speech, e.g. scientific speech?

These,

and other like questions, define the field for the meta-ethics
philosopher.
Historically, perhaps the most important meta-ethical approach
to moral philosophy has been emotivism, the doctrine that normative
ethical speech is not about anything; it just fulfills an expressive

theoretical work to back it up.

Peter Singer and Tom

A non-cognitivist meta-ethical

theorist will object that the author ought to show some awareness
that the judgements he makes are culturally derived.

As written,

they sound like honest-to-God facts.

4 A big question in meta-ethics concerns claims to moral knowledge. "Noncognitivitism" holds that moral "knowledge" is of a radically different sort
than scientific knowledge. We use fact stating language to say something
about the world which may be true or false. We use moral language to say
something about a separate area of inquiry, where questions of truth or falsity
don't apply.
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Well, narcissism is

morally deadly. We don't need a moral

theory to know that, and any good moral theory ought to make sense
of it.

And if (I cannot imagine how) this chapter were wrong about

narcissism, it would be wrong because some other position was right.
There are moral facts after all.

"generous" and "considerate," an inquiry which may reveal that we
do have knowledge of morals.

3) Rather than define ethics by

reference to action, moral philosophy ought to include motivations
(conscious and unconscious), desires, hopes, and ideals--in short, all
matters of character and virtue--as its field of inquiry.

The third response (to the question, what should moral
philosophy do?) is more a hodgepodge than an identifiable position. 5
Some thinkers have become dissatisfied with the state of moral
philosophy, especially standard rationalistic theory, in recent years.
They are united in being anti-theorists, but little else.

Some write

simply to question the helpfulness of current standard theories.
Some question the value or possibility of any ethical theory.
say moral philosophy can be done without theory.

Some

Some want to

reframe the field of ethical theory by re-examining virtues.
In questioning the moves made by standard theory, some of
these philosophers have made attractive suggestions.

Here are three.

These suggestions stem from one basic assumption, that there
really is a world of morality about which the moral philosopher
ought to be concerned.

Compare: when philosophers of science

discuss their theories, a trenchant critique is sometimes made against
a position, that it has nothing to do with the way real scientists work.
Supposedly, it is the practice of real scientists which provokes the
questions and theories of philosophers of science.

Philosophy does

not assume the task of directing science; rather, the goal is to
understand science.

I do not suggest that moral philosophy will

parallel philosophy of science in all respects (I still have not
completely given up the dream that the ethical theorist might make

1) Rather than devise a theory for a nonspecific rational person, a

helpful comments to ordinary people), but at least they are alike in

theory which necessarily must address the minimum requirements

that the first task is to understand a human activity which goes on

of morality since it applies to everyone, moral philosophy ought to

independently of philosophy.

pay attention to real people in real situations.
in

2) Rather than engage

discussions of abstract words like "good" and "just" (discussions

which inevitably degenerate into debates over non-cognitivism),
moral philosophy ought to ask about concrete moral terms like

For a short survey of literature, see Stanley Clarke and Ev~ Simpso~,
"Rationalistic Moral Theory Pro and Con: A Guide to Recent Literature.

5

Of course, the "human activity" we call morality cannot be
sharply differentiated from other activities.
mistake if we

try

We make a category

to add morality to a list of activities like sleeping,
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dieting, working, or philosophizing. 6

Theological Afterword

Moral concerns spread

themselves through all of life.
Socrates is often quoted approvingly as giving a definition of

Historically, religious ethical theorists have asked the same

morality: ". . .and on what subject should even a man of slight

questions as unbelieving theorists.

intelligence be more serious? --namely, what kind of life one should

Aquinas spoke for most Christian moral philosophers when he taught

live ... " (Gorgias 500c). It's a good definition, but we should

the theory of natural law, according to which the right thing is the

remember that we are talking about real people with real options;

reasonable thing.

Socrates and Callicles argued over whether one should be a

looked for a rationalistic justificatory theory like everyone else, but

rhetorician or a philosopher.

Socrates, of course, wanted to apply the

In the Christian tradition, Thomas

Christian philosophers in modern times have

with the added intention of justifying certain moral judgements (e.g.

question in an abstract way to any rational person anywhere, but

the highest duty is to love God) in which unbelieving philosophers

this just shows that wrong moves have a long lineage.

had no interest.

If ethical theorists pay attention to the real ground of moral

life they will find ample material for wonderment and careful
thought.

For example, I think that psychological matters and

questions of ideals play enormous roles in morality.

Thus, I have

I see no reason why Christian thinkers should be tied to the
goal of standard theory.

(I do not think a Christian could consistently

be a non-cognitivist, so I will not address that possibility.)

Why

should we think that the search for rational moral rules consitutes

written about narcissism, interested in how it plays out in the

the only approach to moral philosophy?

idealistic question, "How can I be a lover?"

Church Fathers taught, a new law.

Christianity is not, as some

Modern studies of New Testament

theology make it clear that for most of the early Christian movement
ethical matters were pneumatological; believers were guided by the
Spirit and the fellowship, not by formal rules. 7
Pastoral experience suggests that treating ethics as rules can
have disastrous results in congregational life.
Martha's home church.
6 Speculation: this category mistake makes much mischief in moral
philosophy.
Specifically, it may account for philosophers' attraction to
"acting" as the prime category for ethical reflection. "Acting" fits into list of
activities better than "morality" does.

Think again of

Group narcissism is undoubtedly a

1 Of course, this statement oversimplifies matters. Cf. Herman N. Ridderbos,
Paul: An Outline of His Theology. especially the sections entitled, "The New
Life" and "The New Obedience." (Ridderbos 205-325)
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complicated affair, but preaching morality as law can only compound
the problem.
Instead of thinking that Christian dogma sets us the theoretical
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How naive and unphilosophical!

CHAPTER II

The reader may smile; surely

we do not need to answer an objector who confuses romance with all
love.

LEARNING TO SEE: 'IENDING

But this objection helpfully raises the issue of the various kinds

of love. If I propose to talk of love, and how it is learned, what is my
subject? Erotic love, friendship, love of God, or something else?

THE SEEDS OF LOVE

I

will return to this subject, and try to make clear the target of this
book, in the section below, "Love and Loves."

1. Can people learn to love?

Second, some philosophers might object that a claim that one

2. If so, how?
This chapter is written in the conviction that people can learn
(if that is the right word) to love each other.
suggest how we might go about it.

I will presume to

can learn love requires an account of how.

They would say such a

claim stands or falls with the explanation.

But a satisfying account

might be hard to find.
Take, for example, Plato's doctrine in the Symposium. There,

More precisely, I will agree with

certain philosophers that a large part of love is accurate vision, try to

Socrates relates how Diotoma taught him the course of the candidate

give examples of what accurate vision involves, and suggest ways we

lover.

can achieve it.

the beauty of one body.

Consider as a way to jump into our topic, reasons why people
might think that we do not

learn love.

introduce points I want to make.

First, she said, the would-be lover ought to fall in love with
Then he "mounts the heavenly ladder" by

learning to love the beauty of two, then multiple, bodies.

From

Here are three which

bodily beauty the lover moves to loving the beauty of institutions

First, someone might object that

and laws; from institutions he rises to the beauty of learning; from

learning to love implies that lovers (at least some of them) make

learning in general to the special knowledge which pertains to "the

progress; they become better lovers as time goes on.

beautiful itself''; and finally the lover comes to know what beauty

contradicts experience, our objector says.

But this

Lovers love best at the

beginning, when first under the spell of the beloved.

Later, the

really is.
This story carries enormous philosophical baggage, the whole of

harsh realities--or harsh banalities--of life sap the strength of love

Platonic idealism.

Plato thought that love was basically desire, desire

and leave the lovers in an exhausted or bored routine.

for something the lover did not have and yet admired: beauty.

Since

beauty is a form in which things participate to a greater or lesser
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degree, progress in love consists in learning to admire and desire the

explanation of how it is true."

beauty of higher and better things.

premise.

"And if, my dear Socrates,

Diotima went on, man's life is ever worth the living, it is when he has
attained this vision of the very soul of beauty." (Symposium, 21ld)
Will Plato's story do as a justifying explanation for the claim
that we can learn love?

Not for anyone who does not accept his

metaphysical and epistemological doctrines.

But this logical point does not reckon with the power of
curiosity.

Cartesian dualism has not been proved false, but few if

any philosophers believe it.
explanations for beliefs.

To non-idealists, the

No one would want to defend such a

At a very deep level, we want

If we cannot get them, even after serious

search, we tend to reject the beliefs.

(Of course, this tendency is not

idea of climbing the ladder of love sounds ridiculous, a fairy tale

absolute.)

unconnected to real life.

strictly depend on explaining how, this chapter will give most of its

Other courses of education for would-be lovers might fall
victim to similar critiques.

attention to such an explanation.

(I suspect that any explanation of how to

learn love will be shot through with metaphysical assumptions.
you reject the metaphysics, you can attack the explanation.
certainly true of what will be said in this chapter.)

So, though the contention that we can learn love does not

If

This is

Perhaps we will

In a sense, the present chapter is

yet another footnote to Plato, this time an attempt to give a better
account of the school of love.
Later, in the sixth chapter, we will examine admiration for and
pursuit of good; Diotima's doctrine does have something right, though

find no satisfying explanation to justify the claim that we can learn

we need not adopt Platonic idealism as our vision of the good. Plato

love.

was right, too, that desire is part of love.

Does this second objection then defeat the contention that we

But love is not at bottom

desire; its basic component is accurate vision.

can?
It does not.

The objection, if we take it as a refutation of the

In order to love well--really, to love at all--1 must see myself

proposition "Human beings learn to love," argues in this fashion. "We

and others with some degree of accuracy.

have no explanation of how people learn to love, . therefore they do

cloud my vision, so that I see myself as worthy only if I am perfect

not learn to love."

or as unworthy without the perfect other to guide me, then my false

The conclusion of this argument simply does not

follow from the premise.

We might as well argue that since we have

self comes between me and anyone I might love.

no explanation of how immaterial minds can affect material bodies,

only offer ersatz love.

Cartesian dualism is false.

hardly love them.

Each argument needs an extra premise,

something like "No proposition can be true if we do not have an

If narcissistic defenses

False selves can

Further, if I don't see others accurately, I can

Instead, I love fantasy objects, a love which is

just as artificial as the love offered by false selves.

40
A third kind of objector to the thesis that we can learn love
speaks up at this point.

This objector could agree with virtually

everything said in chapter one about narcissism.

The wounded child

41
more like a given--by happenstance one can see better, another less
well--than like a skill which might be learned.
On the whole, I agree with this objector.

I accept the picture of

in us and the narcissistic defenses we throw up to cover our wounds

the human soul given us by modern psychology, in which the

hinder or prevent us from loving.

conscious and rational activities of our minds lie like a sheet of water

We can try, through therapy or

preventive parenting, to remove these boulders in the road of love.

on a bog; on the surface are waves and much else that interest us,

But that is a different thing, this objector claims, from learning to

but far more complicated structures exist in the mirky mud which

love.

the wind sometimes stirs to the top.
Do we learn

to be narcissists?

Of course not, the objector says.

However, this does not

contradict the claim that people can learn to see themselves and

The wounds of childhood happen to us; they come from without like

others accurately and thus gain the basic component of love.

forces of nature.

objection only shows that learning to see is hard, and harder for

According to psychoanalytic theory, narcissistic

defenses are simply natural, though dysfunctional, responses to our
wounds.

Narcissism is an inability

to love, similar to some people's

some of us than for others, not that it does not happen.

The

However

complicated and various the forces which make up my character, my

inability to sing on key or others' inability to recognize spatial

practice of life must be included among them.

relationships in two-dimensional drawings.

understand the things a person does, both externally in the public

This third objector might agree that love is basically accurate
perception.

But, he claims, the ability to see well in this moral sense

(By "practice of life"

world and internally in her mental world; implicit is a rejection of
behaviorist definitions of action.)

I have no easy control over what I

is as much a natural gift as the ability to see drawings or flowers or

see morally or other aspects of my character, but by my practice of

spinning baseballs well.

life I have some control, and that is reason enough to launch into the

Put another way, this objection says that

moral vision can only be understood as part of a complex, mysterious

work of learning to love.

something called "character."

another verb might be better.

We do not learn our character.

Put no premium here on the word "learn";
It is important to recognize, though,

External events, unconscious needs and fears, chance meetings,

that some .Y.ru:!!.--an action word--will describe my target, the activity

forgotten words from authority figures, and countless factors

of gaining the ability to love.

produce a person's character.

Moral vision, the objector concludes, is
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Seejn g Otherness
Later, in accordance with the Ship's rigid policy, Mia undergoes
"trial."

An example first.
The principle character in Alexei Panshin's science fiction novel

This rite of passage requires all children to spend a month on

their own on a colony planet shortly after their fourteenth birthday.

Rite of Passage, Mia Havero, an intelligent thirteen year old girl,

Some die or otherwise fail to signal for pick up at the end of thirty

lives in a huge spaceship made in a hollowed out asteroid.

days, thus weeding out stupid or unlucky candidates for Ship

On a dare,

Mia agreed to join some friends on an "adventure," to go through one

citizenship as well as providing a check against population growth on

of the airlocks to the outside of the ship. To do this, Mia and a friend,

the Ship.

Jimmy Dentremont, kept a technician named Mitchell busy with a

century Earth, which eventually destroyed the planet, dominate the

project (firing ceramic name pins) while the other conspirators took

utilitarian and democratic Ship political ethos.)

unauthorized possession of three space suits.
Once outside the ship, Mia and a third friend were quickly
overcome by vertigo; only with difficulty did Mia and Jimmy pull the
retching Riggy back through the airlock.

Disaster was averted, but

Mia and Jimmy were apprehended while returning the suits.
The aftermath I don't care to go into detail about. Mr. Mitchell
was quite genuinely hurt to think he had been used. I could
tell that he was hurt when he handed each of us our pins, both
of which turned out very nicely indeed.
That was at a meeting in Daddy's office...
I could see that Mr. Mitchell had been hurt, but I didn't really
understand why. It was spelled out for us. I had been looking
at it from my point of view, that he was in our way and might
have stopped us if we had just tried to ask for the suits. I
hadn't seen things from his angle at all. That we had used him
the way you use a handkerchief. I've always thought more in
terms of things than of people, and I'm sometimes slow to put
myself in somebodys else's shoes. When I did, I wasn't happy
about what I'd done--which I think was Daddy's intention.
(Panshin 142-143)

(Memories of overpopulation and scarcity wars on 21st

are returned to the Ship as adults.

Those who survive

In the course of their trial, Mia

and Jimmy encounter various perils which include people being shot.
'I've always wondered what it would be like to be a spear
carrier in somebody else's story. A spear carrier is somebody
who stands in the hall when Caesar passes, comes to attention
and thumps his spear. A spear carrier is the anonymous
character cut down by the hero as he advances to save the
menaced heroine. A spear carrier is a character put in a story
to be used like a piece of disposable tissue. In a story, spear
carriers never suddenly assert themselves by throwing their
spears aside and saying, 'I resign. I don't want to be used.'
They are there to be used, either for atmosphere or as minor
obstacles in the path of the hero. The trouble is that each of us
is his own hero, existing in a world of spear carriers. We take
no joy in being used and discarded. I was finding then, that
wet, chilly, unhappy night, that I took no joy in seeing other
people used and discarded.'
(Panshin 222)
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Mia's coming of age story records her moral development.

Here is another example, set forth by Diogenes Allen to

Told in the first person by an ingenuous teenager. the morals of the

illustrate what he calls "the experience of perfect love."

story (a phrase with two senses, both intended) lie on its surface.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "The Rhyme of the Ancient Mariner."

Her experiences enable her to include more and more outsiders in

(Allen 8-11)

her world of people who matter.

In the end she fiercely announces

He finds it in

In Coleridge's poem, an old man practically forces himself on a

her conclusion, "If you want to accept life, you have to accept the

party of wedding guests; he must make a confession to them.

whole bloody universe.

Eventually one stays behind to hear his tale.

The universe is filled with people,

and there

is not a single solitary spear carrier among them." (Panshin 252)
Mia learned. . .what?

Did she learn a Kantian proposition,

The ancient mariner confesses a strange crime.

While

surrounded by fog and ice in the South Atlantic, he and his

"Every person is an end in himself," or a folk platitude, "Walk a mile

crewmates were cheered by the emergence from the fog of an

in my shoes before you judge me"? No.

albatross, which seemed to join itself to the crew.

Even this fairly

straightforward story shows more than it tells.
differently.

Mia learned to see

At one point she saw Mr. Mitchell as an obstacle; later,

as a person with feelings.

Before trial,

in her eyes colonists were

"Mudeaters": smelly, backward, provincial free birthers.

A break in the

weather and clear sailing followed the bird's appearance.
this, the mariner shot the albatross with a crossbow.

In spite of

After some

quibbling, his shipmates praised his deed.

Afterward,

Then the ship was becalmed while sailing north into the Pacific.

she saw them as individuals; some as sensitive and generous, others

Now the mariner's shipmates cursed him for killing the albatross and

as loutish thugs.

bringing them bad luck.

Love requires that we see people as they are.

As long as we

as punishment.
The waters around the ship teemed with sea creatures, "slimy

see people as things--spear carriers, pieces of tissue, mudeaters--we
cannot love them.

Things are objects in my world.

is the subject in his own world.

But every person

In order to love, I must come to see

They hung the dead carcass around his neck

things" and "water snakes," objects of disgust and .horror.

"The very

deep did rot: 0 Christ!ffhat ever this should be!/Yea, slimy things

this, that what appears to be an object in my world is really a center

did crawl with legs/Upon the slimy sea." (Coleridge 242, lines 123-

of subjectivity on her own.

126)

others.

Love requires that I see the otherness of

Thirst and strange evils visited the becalmed ship.

A ghost

ship sailed by, and all the crew died except the ancient mariner.
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Alone on a still ship with dead bodies about. bedecked with the
albatross, the mariner tried to pray but could not.

"My heart as dry

as dust."
After seven days enduring the stares of dead men, a night
came in which the mariner observed the sea creatures by moon light.
Something in him changed.
Within the shadow of the ship
I watched their rich attire:
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black,
They coiled and swam; and every track
Was a flash of golden fire.

the experienc~ of perfect love is the loss of self-concern. It
to stop worrying about how useful things may be to us, and
instead to pay attention to them as separate centers of reality.
Usually we are aware only of ourselves as centers of reality
a?d. forget that each of us is but one reality among billions and
?Ilhons of others. We experience others not as centers of value
m themselves, but as beings in orbit around ourselves. . . .
W_hen ~e ancient mariner suddenly felt grateful for the slimy
t~tngs m the sea, even though they were of no particular use to
him, the dead albatross fell from his neck of its own accord
The ship suddenly left the becalmed waters and was
·
transpo~ed t~ safety.
The mariner had found his redemption
by finding his way out of a self-defined world into a world of
other realities.
(Allen 10-11)
~s

But this is a commonplace, someone mig.ht say. Of course we

0 happy living things! no tongue

ought to pay attention to other people and even, as Allen suggests, to

Their beauty might declare:
A spring of love gushed from my heart,
And I blessed them unaware:
Sure my kind saint took pity on me,
And I blessed them unaware.
(Coleridge 246, lines 277-288)

animals.

Why all these words? What is the point?

The point is that Coleridge's mariner is everyman and
everywoman.

Even more clearly than in Mia Havero's story, the old

sailor's moral progress consists in coming to see differently rather
than accepting some general truth.

With this change, the mariner's deliverance began.
albatross fell from his neck and he could pray.

The

He continued to do

penance, though, in the form of periodic depressions, which he could
only overcome by telling his story to someone else.
Allen uses the mariner's change of heart to illustrate the
"experience of perfect love."
However strange this tale may be and hvwever trivial the act
of killing a bird may seem, Coleridge has shown us what
enables us to have an experience of perfect love. Fundamental

He does produce a general truth,

reduced to a couplet, "He prayeth well, who loveth well/Both man
and bird and beast." (Coleridge 254, lines 612-613)

But the mariner

could not have learned love from such a platitude, however true.

He

learned love--or came to love or was given the ability to love--by, as
Allen says, becoming aware of centers of reality outside himself.
This awareness came from experience, not from a proposition.
Iris Murdoch makes a similar point.

If the Freudian picture of

human beings is at all correct, then coming to see anything outside
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ourselves as centers of reality will be difficult indeed.

"Objectivity
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they were real.

My girlfriend was just as much a center of desires

and unselfishness are not natural to human beings." (The Sovereignty

and plans as I was.

of Good 51) That we ought to pay attention to others is a

was "another

commonplace; the ability to do so is a rare skill. The "ought" by itself

my girlfriend in a different way, not as a thing in my life but as a

does not produce the ability; indeed, for some narcissists the ought

center of subjectivity on her own.

only increases their need to polish their false self.

If we want to be

reality.'~

In Allen's terms, I had discovered that my friend
For a short while, in a flash of insight, I saw

Even then I realized that what

was true of my friend must be true of everybody.

I did not see them

lovers, we need, like the ancient mariner, to find our way, as Allen

as real; I only knew in an abstract way that each person had an

put it, "out of a self-defined world into a world of other realities."

"inside" as I and my girlfriend did.

In my teenage years I a had a girlfriend who lived in a town
more than an hour's drive away.

This distance prevented us from

seeing each other as much as I would have liked.

Fortunately, we

attended churches of the same denomination, which brought us
together whenever the youth groups of the area had joint outings.
I fancied myself to be romantically attached to this girl.
"in love"?

I don't know.

(Was I

Teenage minds hold complex, unrealistic,

and constantly changing charts of the territory of love.

My friend

My flash of insight did not last.

I soon reverted to viewing

people as objects, the furniture of my world.

As an adult--as a

pastor and a philosopher--! see most people most of the time as
things, despite practiced efforts to pay attention to them.
I do not tell this story in order to make confession or to paint
myself as a particularly selfish person.

My story simply provides

another example of someone living in a self-defined world.

We all

begin in self-defined worlds, and some of us never leave them.

probably held different positions on my internal "love chart" at

(Murdoch: ". . .modern psychology has provided us with what might

different times.

be call a doctrine of original sin ..." The Sovereignty of Good 51) I

She was important to me.)

I remember looking

forward eagerly to one youth group gathering in particular.

We

suspect that for many who do momentarily break free of their

would be in a forest camp setting for a weekend;. I anticipated time

egocentricity, it comes as a shock, as my vision of my girlfriend

and place for private walking and conversation.

surprised me.

I remember, in the midst of my musing, a strange and new
thought.

She is not me.

not match my friend's.

Perhaps my ideas for the weekend would
Suddenly her feelings and ideas mattered,

not because they might thwart or complicate my plans, but because

Further, I suspect that for virtually all of us the

insights we are given, in which the alien reality of another person
breaks in on us, fade.

The reader may consult her own experience.

How hard it is to see a person accurately, not as an object of desire,
reproach, avoidance, or utility!

Murdoch emphasizes the almost
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Sisyphean character of the attempt to become good.

"The difficulty is

to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it

avail? Such prayer would have to be the continuous insertion
into each of these multifarious units of one recurring pellet of
anti-egoistic concern. (This has, of course, nothing to do with
'God.') (Black Prince 157-158)

from returning surreptitiously to the self with consolations of selfpity, resentment, fantasy and despair."

(The Sovereignty of Good

91)

To each of these quotes compare Murdoch's positions in The
1. The ego and its defences prevent us from

Sovereignty of Good.

A Murdoch novel, The Black Prince,
theme of the difficulty of accurate vision.

brilliantly illustrates this .
The action, related in first

51) 2. In morals, the orientation

seeing moral reality. (Sovereignty

of attention is more important than willing. (Sovereignty 55) 3. The

person by Bradley Pearson, a frustrated novelist in his sixties,

enemy of excellence in both morality and

happens in the few weeks before the death of Bradley's friend,

(Sovereignty

Arnold Baffin.

arrived the quality of attention has probably determined the nature

As he tells his tale, Pearson muses ·on philosophical

problems: what is good art?
nature of love?

How does it tell truth? What is the

Murdoch allows Pearson to espouse many of her

ideas given in The Sovereignty of Good.

For example, in a brief aside

to "P. Loxias," his mysterious editor, Pearson says:
1-The natural tendency of the human soul is towards the
protection of the ego. (Black Prince 152)
2-I dare say human wickedness is sometimes the product ~f .a
sort of conscious leeringly evil intent. . ..But more usually 1t :s
the product of a semi-deliberat~ inattention, a sort of swoonmg
relationship to time. (Black Prince 156-57)
3-Most artists, through sheer idleness, weariness, inability to
attend, drift again and again and again. . .This is o~ course ~
moral problem, since all art is the struggle to be, 1~ .a p~rt1cular
sort of way, virtuous. There is an analogous trans1s~1on m the
everyday proceedings of the moral agent. (Black Prince 157)
4-. . .how can one change the quality of consciousness? Around
'will' it flows like water round a stone. Could constant prayer

art

is personal fantasy.

59) And, "By the time the moment of choice has

of the act." (Sovereignty

67) 4. Non-theistic prayer--that is, attention

focused on the good--might be a tool for moral improvement.
(Sovereignty

55-56)

More examples could be adduced; Murdoch has

given Bradley Pearson many of her own insights into
morality.

art

and

Surely, the reader thinks, here is Murdoch's picture of a

good character, one who makes some progress in the school of love.
As one reads the story, though, doubts begin to creep in.
Pearson's friend Arnold Baffin is a popular novelist.

Pearson, though

he has been commercially unsuccessful, claims to be unthreatened by
Arnold's success, especially since he
failures.

judge~

Arnold's works as artistic

But Pearson repeatedly reminds his readers of this.

Why?

At the beginning of the story, Pearson's ex-wife, Christian,
returns to London from America.

Pearson says he left her because

she clung too close and choked off his creativity.
that she not visit him.

He angrily demands

He wants nothing to do with her, he says.
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Why does he deny what seems obvious, that he thinks about her

makes love to Julian.

often?
Pearson believes in artistic inspiration.

of him when she finds out that Priscilla died that day?
He has published little,

because he wants only to put out great work.

He wants to boil his

thinking down, nearly to aphorisms.
enough.

Then he falls in love with Julian Baffin,

Arnold's daughter, though he is thirty-eight years her senior.
lies to Julian, reducing his age by twelve years.)

(He

Surely this love is

the force that will carry him through to greatness!

What will she think

Arnold Baffin arrives to interrupt the lovers' sleep, demanding
that Julian come home.

She refuses at first, but after considering his

message (Arnold tells her about Priscilla, and Pearson's true age), she

Great literature says only

He feels, in an unmistakeable and mysterious way, that his

breakthrough lies just ahead.

Does he really see Julian?

The reader

leaves Pearson.

Pearson returns to London, only to find the complete

works of Arnold Baffin, which he had ordered earlier in the story, on
his doorstep.

He tears the books to shreads.

Twice in his tale, Pearson relates how he was called to the
Baffin house to help because Arnold and his wife, Rachel, were

wonders whether Pearson really understands love and art, or

fighting.

whether he is just self-deceived.

claims that he and Rachel very nearly became lovers.

Pearson's sister, Priscilla, an unlovely, unloved, and severely

After his first intervention, early in the book, Pearson
The second

time, late in the story, Rachel phones him to come again, even though

depressed woman, comes to him, fleeing her broken marriage.

she disapproved of his involvement with Julian.

Pearson claims to understand her pain, but acts in every way as if he

enters the Baffin house, the police also arrive and arrest him for the

wishes she would disappear.

murder of Arnold Baffin, whose body lies battered in the living room.

She complicates his life.

Since the story

is written some years after the events recorded, the reader wonders

Shortly after he

In an postscript, Pearson gives us his version of his trial and

if Pearson really saw his sister as clearly at the time as he describes

conviction.

Not wanting to accuse anyone else, he changed his story

her in his book.
While at a romantic hideaway with Julian, Pearson learns by

repeatedly.

When he told "the truth," that Rachel had killed her

phone that Priscilla has committed suicide.

writes as one serenely happy, in the quiet seclusion of the prison, his

Rather than return to

husband accidentally in an argument, no one believed him.

He

London, he reasons that having left his sister in her depression, he

cloister.

might as well carry through his tryst with Julian; he will break the

Though now cut off from Julian, his love for her will never fade.

rules of duty for the sake of his love.

He returns to the cottage and

He offers his whole tale as a "celebration of love," a comedy.

Unfortunately, my summary of the plot doesn't do justice to
Murdoch's deft touch.

I have too greatly emphasized the
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inconsistencies in Bradley Pearson's story; someone who has not read
The Black Prince

deluded.

could conclude that Pearson was obviously self-

Do not think that.

sounds lucid, observant, and good.

Through his eyes we see each

character as flawed but admirable.

He seems to be really trying to

We can begin, Allen says, with those short-lived flashes of

justly.
Allen reminds us of Dante's experience with Beatrice.

For

several days after seeing her, Dante felt so full of love he could

pay attention to people.

forgive anyone.

The book concludes with postcripts by other important
characters, written at the invitation of P. Loxias, who might be a
literary agent, a fellow convict Pearson met in prison, or even "the
These postscripts paint four rudely

different pictures of Pearson (posthumously, since he has died in
prison) than the one we get from his narrative.

The postscript views

of the other characters do not agree perfectly with each other.

At no

point does Murdoch make it clear who killed Arnold Baffin or, more
importantly, whether Bradley Pearson was a warped, self-obsessed,
sad failure or a laconic, penetratingly observant, and loving artist.
Readers must judge for themselves.
I speculate that Murdoch intended this result.

Of course, this feeling went away, as did my

appreciation of the otherness of my girlfriend.
But Dante did something unusual with this experience. For
him, the experience showed him the goal of his life: to seek to
remain always the way he had been for the short time when
inspired by Beatrice's beauty. . . .
All of us have had moments, like Dante, when falling in love,
we seem to float on air. . . .For a while, we simply seem to be
able to love anyone--to love our neighbor--without any effort
at all.
These momentary occasions can be simply that. But they can
also giv~ us a glimpse of what it would be to love our neighbor
all the time. To that extent such moments can be like little
seeds, which if planted and nurtured, can grow and affect our
character. (Allen 28-29)

Achieving clear
I think Allen says a bit too much when he claims all of us have

moral vision requires more than a thorough reading of The
Sovereignty of Good

progress.

insight, like my vision of my teenage girlfriend, when we see people

Most of the time, Bradley Pearson

invention of a minor novelist."

Nevertheless, both Allen and Murdoch think we can make

and the ability to repeat its doctrines.

Murdoch

had moments like Dante.

The psychological histories of some

writes sympathetically of theological and philosophical views which

individuals seem to indicate that they have never "attached." or

hold that "goodness is the almost impossible countering of a powerful

made any significant emotional bond to anyone. ("Narcissistic

egocentric mechanism. . . " (The Sovereignty of Good 54) Bradley

Personality Disorder" 315-317, Answorth and Bowlby 333-340)

Pearson may be intended as a case in point.

These extreme cases do not invalidate Allen's point.

Most of us, in
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starting out to become lovers, have already been graced with insights
into the otherness of others.

Like Mia Havero, the ancient mariner,

and the teenager I was, we have already been given some seeds of
love.
Openings to accurate vision may come in a variety of guises.
Besides insights into other people (Mia Havero) or seeing the
otherness of sea creatures. (the ancient mariner), Allen and Murdoch
suggest several.

most important technical study, but Murdoch thinks learning a
language would do too.
If I am learning, for instance, Russian, I am confronted by an
~uth?~tative structure which commands my respect.
The task
is ~1fftcult and the go'.11 is distant and perhaps never entirely
att~mable:
~y work is a progressive revelation of something
which exists mde~endently of me. Attention is rewarded by a
knowledge of reality. Love of Russian leads me away from
mysel~ towards something alien to me, something which my
consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny or make
unreal. (The Sovereignty of Good 89)

-Traumatic experiences, death and other losses, often provoke
only self pity.

But sometimes, Allen suggests, they strip away our

duplicity and pettiness so that we can see.

(Allen 30)

-Artistic insight can lift us out of our selves to see the world
accurately.

(Allen 31, Murdoch The Soveriegnty of Good 64-65: "The

appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only (for all its
difficulties) the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a
completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good
life, since it is

the checking of selfishness in the interest of the real.")

-Religious ritual, Allen says, can also help.

It portrays

ultimacies and thus calls us from ourselves to the huge real world
outside us.

(Allen 31)

Murdoch would warn that such rituals may

also tempt us with consolatory myth.

school studies--technical work--as a tool to direct our attention to
(Allen 31-32)

with, a similar view in Plato.

as another seed of love.

In her "Spiritual Autobiography," Weil says

that in saying the Our Father with absolutely pure attention she was
repeatedly freed from the constraints of individual perspective and
point of view.

Christ himself was present with her. (Weil 17-18)

Murdoch, as noted above, thinks that prayer need not be orthodox
according to any religion to be a real help in moving attention away
from self.

Religious believers expect to receive help when they pray.

Though she does not believe in God, Murdoch grants that believers
do receive help (sometimes, when their prayer is not just selfconsoling fantasy, but a true attention directed outward).

In

attending to God, believers receive grace, the unlooked-for ability to

-Influenced by Simone Weil (Weil 44-52), Allen points to

what is not ourselves.

-In different ways, Simone Weil and Murdoch point to prayer

Murdoch finds, and agrees

Plato thought mathematics was the

attend better.

Nonbelievers may have the same benefit by attending

to the good. (The Sovereignty of Good 55, 83)
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-One may find a seed of love in the beauty of the world of
nature.

To stop and really see this plant or animal or waterfall keeps

me from imagining the whole universe as centered on me.

Murdoch

links this experience of nature with the attention required by great
art. (The Soveriegnty of Good

85) I conjecture that biologists,
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someone, or simply going outside and looking. In any case, the main
thing is just that, to look,

and when we have some insight into the

otherness of things or people, to keep looking.
Third, be humble and grateful for every seed of love.

extent that I see any individual reality rightly, I am reminded that I

botanists, and ecologists have a special opening to goodness here, in

am only one center of subjectivity among multiplied billions.

that they can combine thl"'ir technical study with an appreciation of

universe is a very big thing, full of wonders!

nature's beauty.

amazement.

Non-scientists may speculate that scientific interest

might hinder appreciation of a tree's beauty, but my friends in the
scientific community report no difficulty in that direction.

Knowing

about the thing does not prevent them from feeling wonder.
Readers should think of these suggested seeds of love as just
that, suggestions.

You may never experience some of them as

openings to accurate vision.

To the

The

Humility goes with

Fourth, determine to try to really attend to people.

Try.

Like

Simone Weil's daily effort to say the Our Father without her attention
wandering, learning to pay attention involves struggle, discipline.

I

am convinced the effort is worth while, but proof can only be found
in a person's own experience.

You may find other ways to overcome
Love and Loves

the vision warping pull of the self.
I have only a few comments on how to nurture seeds of love.
First, expect them.

Be ready for them; learn from them.

Remember,

and give some time to contemplation of, times when you have seen

I may have unavoidably commingled two distinct, though
closely related, ideas in the section just finished.

the otherness of things.
Second, look for truth rather than gratification or utility in
studies, prayer, art, or ritual.

Accuracy is not enough.

Sometimes we experience the seeds of

love as thrown at us, pure gifts.

They surprise us.

Other times we

I tried, by example

and suggestion, to explain the concept of accurate vision, wherein we
see truth, the otherness of others.

The second idea, which clings to

the first, is the requirement that we see people compassionately.

I

can put ourselves in the way by working at a technical study, giving

believe that clear vision must ultimately always include compassion,

ourselves to great art or literature, praying, attentively listening to

else it will not be clear.
separate discussion.

But this second element of love deserves a
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David Hume, in Section IX of An Inquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals,

affirms that in every human being resides

"some spark of friendship for humankind."
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loving
Good

34, my emphasis)
Love, then, requires imagination.

This bit of benevolence

may be too weak to show in a man's actions, but it must be there.

gaze directed upon an individual reality." (The Sovereignty of

As a cynic could remind me,

a person can never "really" cross the chasm between himself and

When we make moral judgments (as in calling someone depraved or

someone else.

vicious) we appeal to a universal sentiment.

even a moment; he has no knowledge of what it would be like to be

"And though this

He cannot stop being himself, the cynic would say, for

affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as

someone else.

vanity or ambition, yet being common to all men, it can alone be the

feeling for the ocean's "slimy things."

foundation of morals or of any general system of blame or praise."

a charicature only), I take the imagination to be a real moral power.

(Hume 228-229)
Hume is partially wrong in this.

And the cynic would pour scorn on the idea of fellowAgainst this cynic (admittedly

True, one person is not another; but he can imagine what it would be
Some people, as indicated

above, suffer complete freedom from benevolence.

like to be the other.
Observe what I will call a simple fact.

Further, some

We can, and sometimes

people who have experienced affection or benevolence toward others

do, ask ourselves, "What must it be like to be her?"

can so completely bury it in self-seeking (e.g. by overmastering

we enter into the life of someone else.

pursuit of career) as to kill it.

judge a person's actions and thoughts more justly.

That is, as I believe in moral progress,

I also believe in degeneration, to the point of moral death.
But Hume is right about the importance of fellow feeling.

Imaginatively,

As a result, we are able to
We are able to

feel and act in ways better for the person and ourselves.
fact that I cannot be

From the

someone else, the cynic argues that I can not

her vulnerability.

This conclusion not only does not follow from

When we see the otherness of people, we need to see them with

feel

compassion.

the premise (ignoring, as it does, the power of imagination), it

Diogenes Allen: "To love perfectly is not simply so see

that all else is independent of oneself and so ought to be loved as it
is.

Perfect love of a living thing is the recognition that it has an

inside. To love it is to recognize what it is like to be

that object.

From the outside it looks gloriously radiant; inside, it is fragile and
suffering." (Allen 12)

"Attention," writes Iris Murdoch, is "a just and

contradicts the facts of our experience.

The reader may judge by his

own.
Love, then, is accurate vision and compassion.
But what is this love I write about?

Christian writers have

often taken pains to differentiate between different kinds of love.
In The Four loves

:c.s.

Lewis identified familial love, erotic love, the
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love of friendship, and agape, divine love.

It is likely that Lewis was

love, complete with indexes to motion pictures, novels, music and

indebted to Anders Nygren's study, Agape and Eros, which has had

how-to sex manuals.· An older book on the love of friends stands

an enormous influence on twentieth century pastoral theology.

next to a modern text which explores the idea of non-romantic

Nygren made a radical distinction between the love of God (in both

friendships between men and women.

senses, God's love for creatures and creaturely love for God) and the

shelf tries to extablish the claim for another sort of love, that of the

loves of people, which he lumped together under the name eros.

community.

To

Nygren, divine love is "disinterested" love; entirely self-sufficient, it
does not attach itself to any feature in the beloved.
eros always flows from need or desire.

Neither friendship nor familial, this love borrows from

both, binding together guilds, therapy groups, and congregations.
Nygren and company want to place another book, on the love

By constrast,

Divine love gives with no

A pamphlet at the end of the

of God, on the same shelf. They think of agape as if it were one love

thought of receiving; human loves always include an element of

among many, distinguished from the others by ~_€) its objects

desire.

(everybody) and its nature ("disinterested").

Perhaps following Nygren's line of thought, philosopher

Irving Singer, in volume one of The Nature of Love, has written that
agape is unconnected with love between persons.

Contrasted with human

loves this way, agape comes to be seen as opposed to them.
Following Allen (24-26), I think agape is no more a love among

Only God can be

Nygren glories in the gospel command

loves than a college is a particular building to be found among the

that Christians are to love/agape God and their neighbor, a command

buildings on campus. (Cf. Ryle 15) We have dozens of buildings on

which defines the ideal of Christian ethics and can be fulfilled only

campus, but the college is an entity of a different order.

by God's love flowing into and through us.

Love/agape should be thought of as on a different level from human

the source or object of agape.

Singer, on the other hand,

dismisses Christianity, since it leaves no room for human loves in the

loves.
The loves are not unrelated to Love.

ideal. (Allen 68)
Nygren and those influenced by him have made a kind of
category mistake.

With the reader's indulgence, I imagine the titles

Similarly,

Murdoch's "just and

loving gaze," accurate vision combined with compassion, and Simone
Weil's "attention" both well describe agape.

But if, against Nygren

on a "bookshelf of love."

Here is familial love, a slender volume

and company, we see agape as accurate vision plus compassion, then

given too little attention.

Next to it stands courtly love, an addition

we will see agape as the one indispensable ingredient in all the loves.

to the library invented by medieval troubadours (according to some

What Allen says of friendship and romance applies to all human

experts).

loves.

Then we have the two volume set, romantic love and erotic
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The ingredient of respect for "otherness" enables us to receive
the love of others in friendship and romantic love, to be free of
selfishness. To receive from another requires profound
respect. In fact, it takes exactly the same kind of respect to
receive as it does to give. Unless another human being is
respected as a reality independent of oneself, the act of giving
becomes patronizing and insulting. Agape is not to be
characterized as always giving and never receiving, or as
freedom from even the desire to receive. Rather, agape is the
profound respect for the reality of others, a respect which
makes it compatible both with giving and receiving. When
agape is present as an ingredient in friendship and romantic
love, these relations in which we give and receive can be
unselfish. (Allen 26)

lifelong commitments in marriage, we should practice Love, which
can make up for the shortcomings of romance.
In this study, then, when we ask how one can learn love, we
mean how one can learn Love/agape.

However, to the extent that

anyone learns Love, she will also be a more able lover in any of the
senses of love.

So I try to take examples of love from all sorts of

relationships and I have not bothered to sort out the kinds of love
until now, late in this second chapter.
Here is a summary of my theses to this point.
moral progress, specifically by learning to love.

I) We can make

2) In order to grow

in love we need to overcome our narcissistic need not to see
Love/agape undergirds the loves.

In a community drawn

together by common interests, e.g. a religious congregation, mutual
If community love were

admiration may well fade for a time.

ourselves and others.

3) W...... Iearn 1ove by nurturing the "seeds of

love" which enable us to see other realities, especially people,
accurately.

entirely dependent on mutual admiration, the community couid
dissolve when people tire of others' irritating habits.
happens.

This often

Metaphors for the Moral Life

But Love can step in to carry the community over rough

places.

Return now to the unfinished discussion of chapter one.

Similarly, the heightened emotions of romance make a poor
foundation for a permanent marriage.
exhibits two minds about marriage.

Modern western culture

On one hand, many of our social

practices and forms of speech still affirm the ideal of lifelong
commitment in marriage; on the other hand, romance has come to be
widely accepted as the proper basis of marriage.

But romance, as

many have observed, rarely lasts, and individuals change, so the fact
that marriages do not last surprises no one.

If we wish to practice

should moral philosophy do?

What

I suggested that philosophers ought to

puzzle about and wrestle with a real part of human life; we ought to
pay attention to actual moral struggles.
So, in these first two chapters I hope to have shown, more by
example than by argument, that an important obstacle to
improvement in love is selfishness.

I don't mean by "selfishness" a
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grasping, clutching attempt to have people and things, but rather

contribute to the moral life of ordinary people.

concentration of attention on the self, a concentration which reduces

concentrates on quandaries because of its basic assumptions.

rest of the universe to small objects orbiting around a central,
enormously important consciousness.

Murdoch suggests that foundational issues in philosophy are

(Of course, the first sort of

selfishness can grow out of the second.)

often addressed by "metaphors" rather than by argument.

I approve of the role

(Sovereignty of Good

assigned to moral philosophy by Iris Murdoch:

Or rather, when

Kant, for example, would classify the

whole matter as "practical anthropology." 1 Why?

between holders of incompatible images are often inconclusive, or
worse, unspeakable--the opposing sides never hear each other.

Murdoch thinks some things, including moral concepts, necessarily
present themselves to us as metaphors.

chapter.)

(More on this in the next

But standard theory does not focus so heavily on

quandaries in order to be helpful, as if philosophers had ever
bracketed their theories and asked themselves what they could
l We will return to this discussion in the next chapter.

Philosophers who try to

distill these metaphors into neutral language fail; something is lost in
When dealing with moral issues, philosophers' talk

cannot be neutral any more than psychologists' talk can.

objectivity and reason, are deeply metaphorical.

metaphor of action.
to

do--we struggle with confficts of rights, incompatible goods, etc.--so
there is a place for standard theory.

But

Utilitarian, Kantian,

or other, typical rationalistic moral philosophers live and breathe the

Standard rationalistic moral theory aims to tell us what we
And it is true that sometimes we do not know what

Some

Standard rationalistic ethical theories, for all their emphasis on

rationalistic theorists do address the problem of egoism, it is a

ought to do.

By metaphors she means images,

philosophers resist philosophy-as-image-play because disagreements

the distillation.

decidely secondary question.

77-78)

complexes of interrelated ideas which cannot be pulled apart.

The problem is to accommodate inside moral philosophy, and
suggest methods of dealing with the !act that so much of
human conduct is moved by mechanical energy of an
egocentric kind. In the moral life the enemy is th~ fat
relentless ego. Moral philosophy is properly, and in ~he past
has sometimes been, the discussion of this ego and of the
techniques (if any) for its defeat. (The Sovereignty of Good 52
My emphasis)
Rationalistic ethical theory does not do this.

Standard theory

Thirteen year old Mia Havero, assigned readings

in ethics by her tutor, quickly summarizes the field in a way which
could fairly describe most standard theory:
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that concerns itself with
conduct, questions of good and evil, right and wrong. Almost
every ethical system--and there are a great many of them,
because even people who supposedly belong to the same school
don't agree a good share of the time and have to be considered
separately--can be looked at as a de'scription and as a
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prescription. Is this what people actually do?
people ought to do? (Panshin 148)
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Is this what
modern ethical theories, utilitarianism as much as Kantianism, appeal
to rationality as the moral LCD.
Third, the ethics as action metaphor denies or ignores (as

Against ethics as action, Murdoch proposes that a more
accurate metaphor is ethics as vision.
world I can see,

"I can only choose within the

in the moral sense of 'see' which implies that clear

37)

A person may have it as a

goal to become gentle; she may even be gentle.
count this as an important moral fact about her.

vision is a result or moral imagination and moral effort."
(Sovereignty of Good

morally unimportant) private behavior.

Obviously, this chapter has been written

in the conviction that Murdoch is right.
First, and

A philosopher in the

grip of the ethics as action metaphor will ask what this gentleness
amounts to if it does not show up in her choices.

Observe the results of the ethics as action metaphor.

I would want to

publicly observable choices: actions.

By this he means

Since he assumes he knows the

most obviously, morality gets defined narrowly as what people do,

answer to his rhetorical question (gentleness which does not show up

right or wrong.

in action is nothing, a mirage), the philosopher will label gentleness

Motivation, character, virtue, psychological

wounding, and societal advantage or disadvantage are reduced to

as a propensity to act in certain ways which may or may not be

factors (dispositions, contingent situational details) which influence

overruled in certain situations by other propensities.

action.

The ethics as action metaphor also narrows the field in terms

In this case the metaphor has simply closed down the area of

of which actions are significant; only actions in which an agent

discussion.

chooses seem worthy of attention.

I would suggest that gentleness is a habit of vision, the habit of

Second, in a fight against relativism. the ethics as action picture
inevitably leads to "lowest common denominator" (LCD) rules.

As in

What is gentleness?

looking at someone's woundedness before and while forming
judgments about him.

Is this habit an action? I think it is well

arithmetic problems in which the student tries to find a denominator

described as an inward

for his fractions which fits them all, the ethics as action philosopher

action metaphor ignores.

tries to find a moral requirement which will fit every agent.

Against

A propensity to act in certain ways?

action, just the sOrt of thing the ethics as

Murdoch should not be read to suggest--and I do not mean to

the proponent of relativism, then, the philosopher responds, "Here,

suggest--that ethics has nothing to do with choices and actions.

you see, we have a action incumbent on any rational agent in the

live a good life a person must act; he must make and keep promises,

relevant circumstances.

Therefore relativism is wrong."

Of course,

lcd's other than rationality could be imagined, but the dominant

To

pay debts, give to the needy, oppose injustice, rescue the drowning,
vote {or not vote) for this or that party, and all the other examples of

7l
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morally significant choices loved by philosophers under the spell of
the ethics as action metaphor.

But to live a good life a person must

also see the world accurately, a thing not done in a day.

develop habits of attention, humility and compassion or else his
choices and actions will be ill-made, defined by a backdrop of selfish
fantasy.
We should abandon the attempt to describe morality in value
neutral terms. The metaphor of ethics as vision is loaded with
values, for instance, that truth (and knowledge of it) is intimately
connected with humility and compassion.
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can make moral progress.

Specifically, we can learn to love, first by

overcoming our need not to see the truth about ourselves, and
second by tending the opportunities we are given to see others
accurately.

While making these suggestions, I have made critical

remarks about modem ethical theory, much of which has little room
for such theses.

In this chapter we will explore a little more deeply

the issues which divide this study from the main streams of ethical
theory.
Since offering the criticisms so far, it might be instructive to
turn the tables (at least in imagination) and ask how an exponent of
standard rationalistic moral theory would respond to what has been
said in chapters one and two.

Obviously, since I intend to defend my

affirmations against the rationalist's critique, this procedure runs the
risk of degenerating into an attack on a straw man.

I hope to avoid

that unhappy fate, because the "defense" of my position against that
of the rationalist, here and in the next chapter, will consist mostly in
trying to clarify the differences between the position offered in this
book and that of standard rationalistic theory.

The reader will have
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to judge for herself whether the rationalist opponent receives fair
treatment.
We can allow Immanuel Kant, in particular the author of The

Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (hereafter, Groundwork),
to speak for rationalistic moral theory.

Why this author?

For two

said focuses on results, e.g. narcissism prevents love while learning
to see enables love.
All this contrasts sharply with the Groundwork. At the
beginning, in his preface (Groundwork

iii-ix), Kant insists that moral

philosophy needs a base in "pure philosophy."

Every field, he argues,

reasons: first, because Kant presents the rationalist approach to

benefits from division of labor; ought not the same be true of

ethics with such rigor, and second (and more importantly), because

philosophy?

the Groundwork

empirical ethics, which Kant would prefer to call "practical

clearly illustrates several main features of

Surely we only ask for confusion when we mix

Of course, Kant does not rest his

rationalistic ethics, points which moral philosophers who are often

anthropology," with rational ethics.

thought to disagree with Kant, e.g. utilitarians, share with him.

argument on this analogy with industry.

Additionally, in the Groundwork

a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid

Kant actually does discuss the

failings of moralists whose works he would surely say are similar to

morally . . . " he says.

"Every one must admit that

Obligation is the central moral concept which

must be explained and grounded by practical philosophy.

this study in important ways.

No theory

tinged with the contingency of empirical knowledge can hope to
Kant's Critique of Chapters One and Two

carry what Kant sees as the most basic load of morality.

Kant's own

project in the Groundwork, which explains the little book's title, is to
The author of the Groundwork

would probably observe that

this study, so far as it has gone, is an example of "popular practical
philosophy." (Groundwork 30) In particular, he could point out three
characteristics of this sort of philosophy.

First, what Kant called

"material" knowledge is mixed with "formal" knowledge; empirical
considerations are interspersed with logical points.

Second, Kant

would note my heavy reliance on examples, which displace abstract
arguments.

Third, though perhaps to a lesser degree, what has been

give a solid foundation to the concept of obligation.

Pure a priori

reason must show us the conceptual framework of ethics.
Kant holds that obligation, if it is to be a real ought and not just
a counsel of prudence, must be universal obligation; it must hold for
all rational beings, not just people, and it must hold with absolute
necessity.

So he deliberately turns away from the use of examples.

". . .no experience can give us occasion to infer even the possibility of
such apodeictic laws.

For by what right can we make what is

perhaps valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity into
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an object of

unlimi~ed
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produce good results, but he holds that this does not affect the value

reverence as a universal precept for every

rational nature?" (Groundwork

28-29)

of the good will itself.

Many of the examples used

Since results are often subject to chance, Kant

in chapters one and two are rooted in psychology and describe

refuses to countenance consequences as a factor determining the

human nature.

value of moral decisions.

Kant explicitly rejected such a move, since other

rational beings might have different psychologies than ours.

Moral

in chapters one and two strictly on their consequences as did the
utilitarianism which Kant despised.

laws must determine the will of a rational being as such.
Further on the subject of examples, Kant says that to derive

Now, I did not try to defend my positions

Still, we may suspect that Kant

would be leery of the whiff of results oriented thinking in the

morality from examples actually destroys morality. (Groundwork

argument that some narcissistic people need less moral law, since it

29-30)

By what principle, he would ask. did I select the examples I

feeds their false selves.

used?l

The principle which justifies the choice of examples cannot

Comparing chapters one and two to Kant's conception of pure

itself be justified by means of those examples without engaging in

morality, I think he would conclude that they are--at best--a

vicious circularity.

secondary sort of moral philosophy, better termed practical

By eschewing examples, the pure moralist would

help his readers more readily recognize that reason alone justifies

anthropology.

the moral law. (Groundwork

could become a lover.

33-34, the footnote reply to Professor

At no point does it defend the idea that

someone ought to become a lover.

Sulzer)
Just as obligation must be universal and necessary, for Kant the
truly good must be an unconditioned good.

After: all, the goal in this study is to ask how someone

According to Kant, only a

If a philosopher could show, as

Kant believed that it could be shown, that love of others is a dictate
of the moral law, then the practical question of how to become a

good will is unqualifiedly good, since virtues of character such as wit

lover could be appended to the a priori

or resolution and gifts of fortune such as power or health could be

morality .2

rational framework of

But without a grounding in pure philosophy, a study like

turned to evil uses if combined with a bad will. (Groundwork 1-3)
Kant readily admits the objection that a good will by itself does not
1 It seems that Kant had in mind moral writers who justified their claims by
reference to moral heroes--hence, his statement that even Christ could not fill
that role since he must first be judged by a rational standard--and not
examples precisely like mine, since most of my examples illustrate
psychological hindrances or helps to love. I do not justify the goal of loving
by my examples. Still, Kant could well ask why I thought loving was so
imponant that I would collect examples of hindrances and helps to it.

2

Actually, th~ matter is more complicated than these remarks sugaest. Ka t
says tha.t practical love, love residing in the will, can be commanded, whilen
patholo~cal. love, that of the feelings, cannot. (Groundwork 13) Much of my
mteres~ is m what Kant would call pathological love. However, Kant
reco?ntzed that o~ a ~condary level practical reason had to pay attention to
~on~mg~nt facts, . mcludrng human feeling.
Thus, if I recognize that selfish
mchnauons are hable to deflect me from the path of duty laid out by reason
duty de_mands th~t I try to c~ange those inclinations. So Kant would approv~
the ~ro3ect of this book, provided that it be recognized as a secondary matter of
practical anthropology and not real moral philosophy.
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How Kant Illustrates Rationalistic Moral Theory in General

this one ignores the important theoretical issue and falls to the level
of popular philosophy, producing "a disgusting hotch-potch of

In picking Kant to speak for rationalistic moral theory, I

second-hand observations and semi-rational principles on which the
empty-headed regale themselves, because this is something that can
be used in the chit-chat of daily life." (Groundwork

31) Such an

claimed that the Groundwork
utilitarianism as well.

illustrated features shared by

Readers may wonder what they are.

Kant

ungrounded combination of material and formal knowledge could

would criticize my first two chapters for being a mixture of empirical

damage morality, since it neglects strict rationality, the only defense

and formal knowledge.

against relativism.

for the same reason, since the first move in utilitarianism is from the

Kant's most profound accusation against popular philosophy is
that it is "heteronomous."

(Groundwork

87-89) In his view, when a

Would he not criticize the theory of utility

empirical observation that people seek happiness to the moral
proposition that they should?

Kant would criticize the appeal to

rational agent, by reason alone, sees that the categorical imperative

examples in chapters one and two, but utilitarians probably would

must be obeyed, he has achieved "autonomy."

not.

He gives himself the

And, where Kant would be suspicious of results oriented

universal law, which he sees as universal, applicable to all rational

thinking, Bentham and his philosophical heirs claimed that results

beings.

are the only things that matter in ethics.

Autonomy fulfills a rational being's destiny: "This much only

is certain: the law is not valid for us because it interests us (for this
is heteronomy and makes practical reason depend on sensibility-that is to say, on

an

underlying feeling--in which case practical

How does Kant represent

all rationalistic moral philosophy?
We need to see that under their much debated differences,
Kantianism and utilitarianism share a common view of the role of
Begin (first point) with the observation that J.S. Mill,

reason could never give us moral law); the law interests us because it

ethical theory.

is valid for us as men in virtue of having sprung from our will as

to take an example, would probably classify chapters one and two in

intelligence and so from our proper self. . . " (Groundwork

a manner much like Kant.

123) Kant

Mill distinguished the fundamental

would say, we may conclude, that a study like this one, if intended as

principle of morality from the subordinate principles people

moral philosophy, is destructive of autonomy and true human

inevitably use in applying it.

dignity.

along fairly well most of the time using these secondary moral

Mill supposed that most people get

principles, just as Kant allowed that popular moralizing usually met
most people's needs.

But when secondary moral principles came up
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on rightly applying the principle of utility or universalizing the
short, Mill insisted on the need for the primary principle in order to
combat relativism:

maxim of my action--in the stipulated circumstances.
Further (fourth), since the fundamental level of morality is

If utility is the ultimate source of moral oblig~tions, utility may

be invoked to decide between them when their demands are
incompatible. Though the application of the standard may be
difficult it is better than none at all; while in other systems,
the mo;al laws all claiming independent authority, there .is no
common umpire entitled to interfere between them: their
claims to precedence one over another rest on little better than
sophistry, and unless determined, ~s th~y gener~~ are, by the
unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility'. a~~ord a
free scope for the action of personal desires and parttahues.
(Mill 277-78)

rational, it is as rational beings that we are moral beings. Again,
Kant makes this more explicit.

In his account, human freedom and

dignity are tied integrally to autonomy, a function of practical reason.
Hence, he insisted that right actions must be done, not only in
conformity with duty, but from the motive of duty.

Right actions

done from inclinations such as sympathy or the desire for honor
deserve praise (since we ought to encourage the performance of right
actions) but not esteem. (Groundwork 10) Reason tells us what is

If utility is the ultimate moral principle, a study like the

right and we may not rightly rely on anything else.

Even if they do

present one can only have value as an exploration of a secondary

not make it a cardinal point, I think utilitarians make a similar move,

principle.

as witness the struggles of some of them to make sense of the

For Mill as much as Kant, the primary principle justifies

common notion, denied by Bentham, that motives should weigh in

and rules over secondary principles.
Next (second), utilitarians and Kantians agree that the primary
principle operates in the realm of rationality.

our estimation of actions.3

Once reason has declared this or that to

Kant seems more

consistent here, in that he also claims to derive his first principle
from rationality while the principle of utility is supposedly empirical,
but both sides picture the moral agent as a rational applier of the
ultimate moral principle.

People make moral decisions in an infinite

variety of situations, so the first principle (Kant's or Mill's) will result
in various actions, but once the facts of any situation are known, for
both camps the decision is made rationally.
So (third), for both sides, rational moral agents are
interchangeable.

Doing the right thing depends not on who I am, but

3 Mill struggled with tb.is problem. First, he says, "It is the business of ethics
to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them . . ." Then, he
reaffirms Bentham's position: ". . .utilitarian moralists have gone beyond
almost all others in affitming that the motive has nothing to do with the
morality of the action, though much with the wonh of the agent. He who
saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his
motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble . . ." To the objector
who claims that utilitarianism must therefore ignore the moral qualities
which motivate actions, Mill says, "These considerations are relevant, not to
the estimation of actions, but of persons; and there is nothing in the
utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other things which
interest us in persons besides the rightness and wrongness of their actions."
(Mill 269-271) But are these "other things" which interest us part of morality,
as we normally think? If they are, it seems there is a great deal more to ethics
than telling us our duties.
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be the right thing to do. it does not matter why an agent does it. so

be the same.

long as she does.

the particular circumstances of our situation.

And (fifth). for utilitarians and Kantians, law serves as the
model for ethical theory.

As rational agents we will apply the first principle to
In every case, a study

which asks how people can become lovers--a study which must pay

Kant, of course, is quite open about this; the

job of pure practical philosophy is to justify universal obligation.

attention to particulars of psychology and personal history--will be
classed as moral philosophy of secondary importance, at best.

Utilitarianism's legal model expresses itself more often in metaphor,

I think, for reasons I hope to make clear, that this is simply

as when Mill says that the first principle "umpires" between

wrong.

conflicting secondary principles or when he says that the job of

the great commands, to love God and neighbor.

ethics is to teach us our duties.

protesting against the intrusion of religious concerns at this point, a

Finally (sixth). both sides say the main job of ethical theory is
to describe the principle rule of ethics and show how it works.

Of

Before anything else, moral philosophy must make sense of
Of course, besides

rationalistic philosopher would say this objection confuses the
practical importance of these commands with their theoretical

course. once the rule is known, particular philosophers may give

importance.

most of their time to elucidating its application to practical problems.

while theoretically secondary.

tasks which necessarily involve them in messy empirical details.

A

difference between the practical importance of a bridge engineer's

utilitarian may fight against cruelty to animals or a Kantian make a

calculations and the theoretical importance of the equations which

detailed refutation of arguments against capital punishment.

underlie those calculations.

Both,

The great commandments could be crucial in practice
This may be.

An analogy: think of the

However much we need to have strong

however, would insist that their enterprise must be grounded in

bridges, theory must be more interested in the basic equations.

adequate theory.

Nevertheless, we may doubt that engineering provides a good

These similarities--among others, since I make no suggestion

analogy for ethical theory, though the stage has not yet been set to

that my list exhausts the likenesses between Kantianism and

explain why.

utilitarianism--simply mark out the contours of a rationalistic

theoretical importances of a thing may

approach to ethics.

do.

A variety of first principles have been suggested

in the history of moral philosophy; others could be imagined.

In

every case, as long as ethical theory is supposed to tell us our duties
as rational beings, the general shape of the theoretical enterprise will

At this point note only that the practical and
diverge does not mean they

Perhaps the practical importance of the great commands should

cue us about where we should begin theoretical reflection.

In any case, this study is not intended as an application of a
rationalistic moral theory.

I do not think moral philosophy must be
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grounded in some first principle conceived as operating on the
rational level.

I do not think it is as rational beings that we are

moral beings.

The next section explores how these denials come

should recognize and applaud some things the "ethics without
theory" crowd could say.
Iris Murdoch, who is not herself an anti-theorist, shows how a
philosopher could challenge the rationalist position without

together.

proposing an alternative in her essay, "The Idea of Perfection."

Theories of the foundations of Ethics

The rationalistic ethical theorist says I need to ground my
question--How can I learn to be a lover?--in an adequate theory of
ethics, which will reveal that every agent has a duty to love people ..

There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement
towards the building of elaborate theories, and a move back
again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts.
McTaggart says that time is unreal, Moore replies that he has
just had his ~reakfast. Both these aspects of philosophy are
necessary to it.
I wish in this discussion to attempt a movement of return. . .
(Murdoch 1)

Then, since if we take human psychology into account I am more
likely to love people if I have certain motivations and inclinations, it
is my duty to acquire those motivations and inclinations.

Note that

"A movement of return": anti-theory philosophers can criticize
the standard rationalistic moral theories by pointing to "simple and

in this picture of things, my "duty to love people" is a duty to

obvious facts" which those theories ignore, make irrelevant, or deny.

perform actions of a certain type ("loving" actions).

As examples of two such facts Murdoch recommends "the fact that an

The motivations

and inclinations which make these actions more likely are not

concept in morals." (Murdoch 1-2)

themselves love.
Philosophers who disagree with this picture usually do so in
one of two general ways.

Philosophers who take the first way deny

that we need a theory of any kind on which to base our moral
reflections.

unexamined life can be virtuous and the fact that love is a central

Philosophers on the second path agree that moral

philosophy ought to be based on theory, but not a theory of ethics.
As one of the latter group, I will say something about the kind of
theory of the foundations of ethics I find attractive.

First, though, we

I suggest another fact, that love is

an amalgam of inward and outward actions. an example of inward
action being gentleness (cf. chapter two, p. 69) and an example of
outward action being giving back rubs.

Those who recognize this as a

fact must set themselves against the picture that love consists
entirely of a certain kind of actions.

If we neglect either the inward

or outward aspects of love, we will produce a caricature of it.
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Murdoch's message is, if a theory makes no room for the
existence of unreflective virtuous people, so much the worse for the
theory!

Of course, rationalistic ethical theorists will concede that

ordinary folk don't need to spend their time pursuing abstract
theory.

But this is only because such theorists claim that the

unsystematized maxims of ordinary morality can be grounded on
and systematized by good theory.

It should strike us as odd that

such theories have to contort themselves to try to make room for the

Again, Murdoch suggests that we should think it strange that
standard ethical theories make love into a derivative, secondary
concept and/or reduce love to observable actions.

One need not have

a theory to know that love is central to morality and involves the

In general, the anti-theorist presents the rationalistic theorist
with a phenomenological challenge: pay attention to real life morality

n.

•

If, instead of making sense

.one of those exasperating

moments in philosophy when one seems to be relentlessly prevented
from saying something which one is irresistably impelled to say"
(Murdoch 21), the anti-theorist can demand that the theory be reexamined.

Perhaps the theory is right and what we feel we must say
I

is wrong, but perhaps not.

Why should a rational moral

theory have to explain ordinary beliefs?
could point to its own history.

Utilitarianism, for example,

At one time most people accepted the

"fact" that animals could not be moral patients in their own right, but
only derivitively, as actions toward animals tended to produce
actions of the same sort toward people.

Rather than accommodating

this fact, the theory of utility overthrew it.

Perhaps ethical theorists

concession that most people get things right most of the time.
This response is a counsel of desperation.

The anti-theorist will

ask if the defender of standard theory really means to lump "love is
a central concept of morals" with "animals are not moral patients."
Are they both pseudo-facts, which good theory may overthrow?

inward life as much as public behaviors.

of the "facts," a theory produces

challenge by denying its validity.

ought to ignore ordinary moral judgments and take back the

rightness of most moral feeling and doing.

and see if your theory makes sense of it.

Standard theorists could respond to this phenomenological

Surely it would be a strike against a

theory that it denied or ignored facts which it should explain.

It

seems hard to believe that many rationalistic ethical theorists would
say yes.

And if some philosophers did say yes, if they stuck to their

rationalistic guns and claimed that all purported facts of morality
had to be backed up by good theory, and if they further claimed that
it is just possible that love is not a central concept of morals, the
anti-theorist need not feel threatened.

Most rationalists are

committed to some conception of human nature in which reason is
supposed to play a defining (and usually ennobling) role: all people
participate (or at least can participate) in reason; thus, all people can

88

be moral.

. 4
The anti-theorist need not accept any sue h conception.

·
d
t1·c
Perhaps moral vision is non- emocra .

moral problems are mainly problems of vision in that we spend our

Maybe the rationalist really

can't see that love is a central concept of mor

al s

.

The anti-theorist

has no reason, on that account, to doubt the importance of love.

A study which asks how an individual can learn to be a lover

can be justified without recourse to theory.
morality as you know it in real life.
anti-theorist need not worry

1.f

Look.

Pay attention to

Is not love worth study?

time looking at shadow play; release from shadow play brings a
temptation, absorption with the self (Murdoch says the fire which
throws the shadows on the cave wall symbolizes the individual

I think the anti-theorist's criticisms of rationalistic theory are
sound.
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psyche); and there is a real, though indefinable good (the sun, which
cannot be directly looked at), which illumines all the goods of the
world.
I said that Murdoch endorses this myth, but that might not be

The

some people are not interested in this

quite accurate.

She says of the story of the cave: "Of course we are

theme, since some will be.
In spite of the applause which these criticisms of rationalistic

dealing with a metaphor, but with a very important metaphor and

theory have won, we should not be content with them, since we can

As I said at the beginning, we are creatures who use irreplaceable

have a theory of the foundations of ethics.

metaphors in many of our most important activities." (Murdoch 93--

However, such a theory

will not itself be moral philosophy, but metaphysics.

It will tell us

who we are and what our place in the world is.
Traditionally' people have understood their place in the world
by means of myth and metaphor.

Philosophers may build systems

one which is not just a property of philosophy and not just a model.

my emphasis)

Metaphysical systems based on mythological stories

often (always?) take those stories to be, in some important way, true;
that is, they really do tell us about the world and how we fit in it.
Think of religious creation stories and the metaphysical doctrines

on the myths and metaphors, but the deep going currents lie under

build on them.

we have seen, Iris Murdoch argues that the .. man"
the system. So, as
of modern moral philosophy is based on the metaphor of morality as

doctrine if one thought the underlying story was "only a metaphor."

action and suggests that the metaphor of morality as vision is better.

it a metaphor; it is important, perhaps irreplaceable.

She openly endorses Plato's myth of the cave. (Murdoch 92ff.)

model.

story expresses several things well, she thinks.

This

Specifically' our

Murdoch, of course, does not deride the Platonic story when she calls
It is not just a

Still, it is not entirely clear how the myth of the cave works

for Murdoch.
change?

c
"
a critical examination of the essentialist assumption
4 Cf. chapter ,our ior
which underlies the rationalist view of human nature.

It would be hard to believe the metaphysical

Does it tell us how the world is, or just illustrate moral

Surely Plato intended it to teach epistemological doctrine

(and other things) as well as teach about morality.

Myths, especially
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myths which provide good rock on which to build systems of

I do not look for a finished theory, in the sense of something

metaphysics, illuminate the world in several directions, so to speak.

unimproveable.

Murdoch does not say whether the myth of the cave throws light on

theologies are not.

anything but morality.

any extant theistic metaphysic is successful both in terms of its own

I look for a theory of the foundations of ethics in a metaphysic
built on theistic religious concepts.

The fund of myths for such a

material.

No doubt similar theories could be built using Koranic
Metaphysical systems, whether theistic or not, have their

own ambitions (quite large, usually) and must be judged as adequate
or inadequate, satisfying or unsatisfying, on those terms.

And I wish to leave as an open question whether

ambitions and in giving material for a theory of the foundation of
ethics.

Still, a theory of the foundations of ethics could be

constructed out of theistic materials which would not be subject to

theory is the traditional stories of the Jewish and Christian
scriptures.

After all, God is transcendent and perfect; our

Regarding

the phenomenological criticisms the anti-theorist throws at standard
rationalistic ethical theory.
(How can I justify a belief about some possible theory which
may or may not have been made?

The best justification would be to

a theory of the foundations of ethics, though, metaphysics must

construct the theory, but that is not this book.

before anything else give us our place in the world.

note how the criticisms leveled against rationalistic ethics by the

creatures are human beings?

What sort of

anti-theorist fail to bite on religious ethics.

What is the significance of their

1. The unreflective

virtuous person can hold a place of high esteem in religious moral

characters and actions?
Who are we?

As a poor substitute,

We ought to expect a theory of the foundations

thought, a position uncontrived and flowing naturally from virtues

of ethics to make sense of--have room for--human reason and

such as humility and obedience.

human feelings.

Rationalistic theories have tended to have room

the importance of both the inner and the outer life.

only for reason.

The moral philosopher ought to learn from

religious ethics love is seen as the leading moral concept; it is not the

psychologists, since moral theory must deal with real people.
is the significance of human beings?

What

A theory of the foundations of

2. Religious ethics often emphasize
3. In some

stepchild of duty or utility.)
By this time a question may have occurred to the reader.

ethics ought to allow us to find significance both in actions and

seems that I object to rationalistic ethical theories because they

imagination.

make the question of this study--how can I become a lover?--a

Rationalistic theory has tended to to focus so tightly on

It

action that imagination, the actions which go on "inside," has been

secondary one.

neglected.

theory of the "foundations of ethics," have I not made my own study

By agreeing that there might be a theologically based
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into something to be appended to metaphysics?

What is gained by
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Third, rationalistic theories of ethics do even less well as

grounding the question in metaphysics rather than a general theory

theories of metaphysics than they do as theories of ethics.

of ethics?

regards ethics, a metaphysical system ought to tell us what we are

Why not just call a theory of the foundations of ethics a
Perhaps my grudge

general theory of ethics and be done with it?

and our role in the world.

As

If we treat the standard rationalistic

against rationalistic ethical theories could be assuaged if those

theories as metaphysics, they tell us we are essentially rational

theories were characterized as metaphysical speculations.

beings, whose role is to make calculations of utility or give ourselves

Three points should be made:
First, it makes a difference

the categorical imperative.

wh~ther

moral philosophy is

organized around a single principle of morality or by reference to
something other than morality.

Standard ethical theories try to

But what can this mean, that we are

essentially rational, when irrationality seems such a large part of the
human picture?

Kant answers. and again he is only more rigorous

and clear than other rationalists: ". . .the law interests us because it is

systematize moral thought by subjecting all morality to a ruling

valid for us as men in virtue of having sprung from our will as

principle which is itself a principle of morality.

intelligence and so from our proper self; but what belongs to mere

Just as a theistic

theory would, a theory of the foundations of ethics may locate those
foundations outside moral thought.

As moral

principles, then, the

Second, rationalistic moral philosophers generally, with the
exception of Kant, do not imagine their ruling moral principle to be a
They might object to classifying the

ruling principle as metaphysical speculation.

the thing in itself." (Kant 123--Kant's emphasis)

We may take Kant

to mean that if human beings are not rational, they ought to be;

great commands could be of first importance.

metaphysical truth as well.

appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the character of

The principle of utility,

for instance, supposedly is derived empirically.

Empiricism can be a

reason itself dictates this conclusion.
appearance.

We can discount all contingent

Reason tells us "our proper self."

This ought to strike us as exceedingly strange.
Kant here engages in myth-making, or shows himself to be
building metaphysics on a myth which he found ready to hand when

metaphysical doctrine (and often is, even when its devotees deny it),

he began philosophizing.

but the principle of utility, though derived from empiricism. is

assumes without question--is widespread in philosophy and worthy

supposed to be a moral principle.

Kant, on the other hand, thought

that autonomy was not only the ruling moral principle, but also the
truth about rational beings (and therefore about human beings).

of attention.

The particular myth he believes--or
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the same thing as truth and that the history of science is full of
The Myth of Autonomous Reason

irrational fits and starts.
Another example: philosophers of religion have spilt a great

We usually think of ancient stories when we think of myths.
The myth of autonomous reason is not a story, but it is ancient.

deal of ink debating whether belief in God is rational.

It

recognize that belief in God is or isn't rational according to one's

pervades philosophy, almost to the point of being co-extensive with

definition of rationality.

In stripped down fonn, it is

philosophy as we know it in the West.

the idea that reason exists independently of any thinker.

exactly one most rational path.
Human beings, of course, often fail to fix beliefs or make

the myth of autonomous reason.

reason, this reflects poorly on human beings and their inability to

Right reason is pure

objectivity, "the point of view of the universe" in Sidgwick's phrase.

autonomous reason is at work.5

We need not suppose that all these

"out there," independent of thinkers; that would be to convict them
all of a sort of Platonism.

I do think, though, that for many

philosophers the myth of autonomous reason is a deep, almost

The myth of autonomous reason shows itself, more or less
As

Bernard Williams notes in the "Preface" to Moral Luck, almost all
science hopes to attain to a conception of the world "independent of
our peculiarities and the peculiarities of our perspective." (Williams
x)

rather than some

philosophers have an articulated belief that "reason" is somewhere

According to the myth of

clearly, in many philosophical enterprises, not just ethical theory.

Whenever reason

rational being is made into an actor, we may suspect the myth of

According to the myth of autonomous

autonomous reason, right reason leads to truth.

Whenever a philosopher says, "Reason dictates. . . " or "Clear

subordinated by reason. . ." (Kant), we should suspect the influence of

That is, we often criticize our

think straight, but not on reason itself.

which some definition will best describe.

thinking will show. . . " or ". . . mere appearance is necessarily

beliefs and decisions as being confused, shortsighted, foolish or in
some other way substandard.

They vigorously debate this or that

conception of rationality, convinced that rationality is some thing

It includes

the belief that in any decision making or belief fixing process there is

decisions in the "most rational" way.

Most of them

untouchable assumption.

It is connected to the first, most basic of all

philosophic instincts: "let's think about this."
Philosophers err, I believe, when they look for some thing
which corresponds to "reason."

I take th'is to be a Wittgensteinian

Philosophers of science follow suit, struggling to find a way to

affirm that science is a rational enterprise (a deep intuition which
nearly all of them share) while recognizing that current theory is not

5 Of .cours~ we s~o~ld allo.w writers the freedom to use figures of speech, and
sometimes reason 1s ,an innocent substitute for the thought of some rational
being. But often, as iii the Kant quote "reason" appears to be a strange thing:
a fonn, the mind of God, or some such. '
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point.
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The reader probably expects, now that the idea of autonomous

Asking, "What is reason?" is like asking, "What is meaning?"

The myth of autonomous reason assumes there is some thing which

reason has been labeled a "myth," that its every

is reason.

deplored or derided.

In reality, we use "reason" and "rational" to describe a

occurrence will be

Actually, I think it has a largely beneficial

great many mental activities, which cannot be reduced to any single

influence on philosophy.

principle.

theoretical concepts which describe situations which never happen or

A reasonable person exhibits skills, not all of them alike in

are impossible.

any obvious way:

Analogously, science profitably uses

In mechanics, for instance, we may theorize about

the ability to draw inferences,

what would happen on a frictionless surface, though we have no

the ability to think of counterexamples,

experience of such surfaces.

the patience to stick with a problem when it seems unsolvable,

myth of autonomous reason has at least two right uses.

By analogy with this use of a model, the

First, the myth of autonomous reason encourages philosophical

the ability to make distinctions between related ideas,
the ability to see the parts of a whole,

criticism.

the creativity to put seemingly disparate parts into a whole,

rational position or solution.

the wisdom to pick out the important fact or opinion from

liable to improvement; we are invited to look for flaws and make
corrections.

unimportant ones,

According to the myth, in every case there is an ideally
Thus, any actual position or solution is

Compare the notion of autonomous reason with

the willingness to criticize familiar ideas,

Murdoch's treatment of "good."

etc.

perfectionistic concepts.

A person can think more or less reasonably at different times:

invites us to see that it could be better; the good itself lies beyond

"I just wasn't myself; I was so mad I couldn't think straight."
people are more reasonable than others.

Some

But we do not make these

any concrete good.

(Murdoch 60-62)

Every good deed or thing

Similarly, the myth of autonomous reason invites

us to judge any rational decision or opinion in the light of reason

judgments by comparing a person at two times or two people at the

itself.

same time to an independently existing thing.

rigorous self-criticism.

Saying, "Tom is more

Both are what she calls

Philosophy would not be what it is without. its spirit of
(Of course, most philosophers find self-

rational than Bill," is like saying, "Tom is better than Bill at that sort

criticism hard to do; we happily believe our own howlers.

But

of thing," and not like, "There is more of this sort of thing in Tom

philosophy as a group activity is notoriously self-critical.)

That the

than in Bill."

myth of autonomous reason encourages philosophical criticism is a
good thing.
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Second, at an even more basic level, the myth of autonomous
reason encourages the philosophers' pursuit of understanding.

The

myth holds out the promise that life and the universe are not
fundamentally chaotic.
understand.
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"alien and implausible." (Murdoch 9)

He lives in utilitarianism and

existentialism as well as Kantianism; Kant only has the virtue of
drawing his profile more clearly than anyone else.

Somehow, if we keep at it, we will come to

Remember that in several dialogues Plato allows his

The myth of autonomous reason may or may not have
deleterious effects in other areas of philosophy, but in moral

characters come to no positive conclusion, but the conversation ends

philosophy it clearly falsifies who we are.

with an invitation or promise to return to the topic another day.

and see.

To

I invite the reader to look

It is not simply as rational beings that we are moral beings.

be a going concern, philosophy needs the confidence that rational

To the degree that rationality is part of our nature, and we may

thought about problems is worthwhile, whether that confidence is

agree it is, it is a part of our nature as moral beings, but we must not

expressed as a belief that reason leads to truth or in some other way.

think it is the whole story.

The myth of autonomous reason feeds philosophic confidence.

takes to be able to love and what it takes to desire to love as we are

We

can find the way if we just attune ourselves closely enough to right
reason, which exists independently of us.

We only need to keep

doing philosophy and not give up.

We should be as interested in what it

in decisions to love.
In summary, then, standard rationalistic ethical theories fail as

ethical theories unless, as Kant saw, they are also true as

Though recognizing these good effects of the myth of

metaphysical descriptions of humanity and its place in the world.

autonomous reason, we need to see that it also has wrong uses.

But Kant's description of humanity, which fits rationalistic theory, is

When we mistake the nature of rationality, taking it to be one thing,

simply not true.

we are apt to decide that reason is a science or a calculus.

reason.

That is

mistake enough, but when philosophers like Kant add to it the
doctrine that the true nature of human beings is to be rational, we
get a distorted picture of what it is to be a person.

The familiar

picture of the rational chooser emerges, isolated from his history and
character by his own penetrating understanding of those contingent
(and therefore not ultimately important) facts.

This rational chooser

is the '"man' of modern moral philosophy" which Murdoch finds

It makes wrong use of the myth of autonomous
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A Place for Rationalistic Moral Theory
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rationalistic moral theory can be of real use in political and legal
philosophy.

I am tempted to agree with philosophers who at this point
would abandon standard moral theories as wholly useless.

Why

This might seem to conflict with what was said above about the
possibility of a satisfying metaphysic supplying an adequate theory

should we not philosophize about the moral dimensions of life in a

of the foundations of ethics.

manner such as was done in chapters one and two, paying attention

grounded on a good theory which tells us who we are, why should

to psychological material and the facts of morality that seem obvious

we need a rationalistic theory, which admittedly gives a false reading

to us?

of who we are, to solve legal or political problems? The answer is

Some anti-theorists would counsel that we ignore the

If our ethical reflections can be

rationalist desire for a ruling principle and give our attention to

that we think about legal and political problems for social and

small areas of the moral life, making as much sense as we can of one

personal reasons rather than rational or philosophical reasons.

problem, virtue or vice at a time.

In general, moral philosophy

would be more satisfying if this advice were followed.

This study

The position proposed here follows Bernard Williams.
(Williams 80-82)

Williams believes that values, moral and others,

itself is an attempt to think about one such question, a very

cannot be reduced to any unitary good, nor can they be traded off in

important one.

some common currency of value.

Nevertheless, there is a place for rationalistic theories in ethics-though perhaps not the ones we currently have.

The characteristics

of rationalistic theories which we have noted can clue us about their
proper place.

1) Rationalistic theories use a legal model.

2) They

We shall return to this doctrine of

the incommensurability of goods in chapters six and seven.

Note

now, though, that this position pits Williams against rationalistic
theories which look. for a single supreme principle.
Williams also believes, against utilitarianism and Kantianism,

focus on public actions, neglecting matters of character and motive.

that in some situations there are unresolvable conflicts of obligation.

3) They reduce duty to what can be required of any rational agent,

It is the situation, not the less than perfect rational agent, which

the least common denominator.

Some questions of moral philosophy

do seem to call for a theory of this sort, i.e., questions of public

keeps the right action from being found.
If these things are true, Williams says, we should re-examine

behavior which must be justified by one party or parties in a society

our motives for trying to resolve conflicts about values.

to some other party or parties in that society.

among our values is not necessarily pathological, and if even where

In other words,

"If conflict

the situation is at fault, as with some conflicts of obligation, conflict is
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not a logical affliction of our thought, it must be a mistake to regard a
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Even if, as I believe, a good theory of the foundations of ethics

need to eliminate conflict as a purely rational demand, of the kind

can be made, moral philosophy based on it will not be monolithic.

that applies to a theoretical system.

Nor should we expect all parties in a society to subscribe to the

Rather we should see such

needs as there are to reduce conflict and to rationalise our moral

theory--especially if, as I expect, a good theory of the foundations of

thought as having a more social and personal basis."

ethics is made out of theistic religious material.

(Williams 81)

So, however much I

Williams' point is that modern societies are complex, and

believe in an ultimate unity of goods (a matter taken up in chapters

morally significant actions are performed by public agencies, which

six and seven), I agree with Williams that we can expect significant

are anwerable (in democracies) to those complex societies.

conflicts of values in society.

The

Our need to reduce that conflict will not

values of two or more parties in a society do not need to mesh or be

be rational or philosophical.

rationally reconcilable as long as those parties do not impinge on one

which organise moral thinking and feeling, especially about public

another.

questions of general duty.

In legal and political arenas, though, the values of various

parties do impinge on each other.

Since legal and political conflict

can be destructive, society needs--for social and personal reasons,

There will be a place, then, for theories

In addressing these questions, there may

be a place for rationalistic moral theory.
Note first: the role thus assigned to rationalistic moral theory

not strictly rational ones6 --to reduce the conflict which arises from

falls far short of the grandiose vision usually held for such

conflicts of values.

philosophy by its creators.

Shall public agencies perform abortions?

Should government

be entrusted with the responsibility to execute criminals?

How far

Note second: it is an open question whether some other way
could be found to think about legal and political questions, which

should private property rights be circumscribed in favor of cultural
or ~ervationist values? Around these and many like questions

could meet our practical need to reduce social and personal conflict

. can anse.
·
intense confl1ct

relativism, but rationalism may not be the only way to do it.

Our need to reduce that conflict is a

practical one.
6 Of course, given what has been said in this chapter, it may be dou~ted if
there are such things as "strictly rational reason5 as opposed to social and
personal reasons. . But this doesn't weaken Williams' ~oint, since he m~rely
says we don't need to resolve conflicts for purely rational reasons--h~ is not
thereby committed to believing in purely rauonal rea~ons. and ~v.en 1~ he does
believe in them, his readers can accept this point without bele1vmg m them.

as well or better than rationalistic theory.

Societies must avoid
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KANT, TIIE MYTH OF AUTONOMOUS REASON
AND ESSENTIAL HUMANITY

In the last chapter, the myth of autonomous reason was
introduced as the idea that reason exists independently of any
thinker.

It includes the belief that in any decision making or belief-

fixing situation there is exactly one most rational path.
Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul Ltd., 1970.
Williams, Bernard. Moral Luck.
Press, 1981.

Cambridge: Cambridge University

(If two

possibilities are equally rational, the most rational path is to prefer
the two to all others while being agnostic as to which of the two
should be preferred.)

Though this myth has benefited philosophy by

encouraging pursuit of truth and rigorous self-criticism, I claimed
that the myth of autonomous reason caused mischief in ethics.

First,

philosophers often fall into the habit of thinking of reason as one
thing rather than a collection of skills, a mistake which encourages us
to think morality is mostly about making right decisions.

Second,

and more important, the myth of autonomous reason falsifies who
we are.

It encourages a wrong understanding of human nature and

what our role is in the world.
These charges, if true, justify the limited place assigned to
rationalistic moral theories in the last chapter, that of judging public
questions of general duty.

But are they justified?

Can it be shown

that moral philosophers accepted the myth of autonomous reason
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Kant have written whole books on the topic. l
and were misled by it?

Cautious readers may be forgiven for

thinking that more needed to be said.

It is not, however, at all complete.

Rather than explore the

presence and effects of the myth of antonomous reason in the work
of many philosophers--a project suggested by the claims made in
chapter three, but which is beyond the scope of one volume--! will
turn again to Immanuel Kant, who, perhaps more than any other
philosopher, self-consciously and thoroughly worked out the
implications of rationalism in ethics.

This investigation will show (1)

that Kant's work bears the mark of the myth of autonomous reason,
(2) that the myth le,d him to a certain understanding of human
nature (or, at least, that it fit well with a certain picture of human
nature, even if Kant adopted that picture independently of the
assumptions of the myth), and (3) that this understanding of human
nature led Kant to write things which must strike readers, unless
they are under the spell of his system, as mistaken and even bizarre.
Kant's moral thought can be taken as an illustration of the
deleterious effects

of the myth of autonomous reason in ethics.

Morality as the Duties of Rational Aients

The place to begin is not with criticism, but with a fuller
understanding of Kant's moral theory.

to me to be the main ideas of Kant's ethics, which will ground the
criticisms made later; Kant scholars may judge whether this brief

This chapter, then, is an attempt to say more, to fill in some
details.

I will trace what seem

There is no room here, of

course, for a "full" treatment of Kantian ethics; many interpreters of

resume fairly presents Kant's position.

References will be taken from

the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of

Practical Reason (in this chapter referred to as Groundwork and
Critique,

respectively).

In Kant's view, morality is at heart a matter of duty.

He

recognized that emotions impinge on the moral life, but he would
insist (as we saw in the last chapter) that any attempt to think about
morality which focused first on love rather than duty would be
confused and doomed to failure.

Moral worth, Kant said, attaches to

actions done not just in conformity with duty, but from the motive of
duty. (Groundwork 9-10)
Duty occupied this exalted place in morality for two reasons.
First, Kant thought that careful reflection on the ordinary moral
judgments of everyday people revealed the fundamental importance
of duty. 2

Second, the concept of freedom, which is intimately tied to

the idea of duty, is "the keystone of the whole architecture of the
l o.f th,e secondary literat~re, the author has been most helped by R.J.
Though most of my interpretation
Sullivan s . Immr:nuel Kant s Moral Theory.
of Kant m this chapter fits well with Sullivan's, it will be based on citations of
Kant rather than secondary literature.
Naturally, readers should not impute
any of my criticisms of Kant's theory to Sullivan.
2 Kant, along with most moral philosophers, grants that most moral beliefs of
the general populace are correct. The problem is that philosophers haven't
been able to n_ialce s;:stematic sense of ordinary morality. But the problem is
not n_ierely ph1losoph1cal, as lack of good understanding of morality--and the
resultm~ wrong-he.aded attempts to inculcate morality in young people--could
undermine moraltty.
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system of pure reason and even of speculative reason." (Critique 3)

In other words, the adult wants the children to recognize that they

In other words, if morality is not primarily a matter of duty, Kant's

ought

whole critical philosophy collapses.

Both of these reasons for the

to do or not do something.
For Kant, the main job of moral philosophy is to make sense of

the concept of "ought."

primacy of duty need more explication.

"Ought" is not only the goal of moral

education (as in the imagined example of the adult with the

1. Duty as the Underlying Assumption of Popular Morality

belligerent children), it is the concept by which the adult participates
in morality as a mature agent.

Imagine the case of a parent or teacher dealing with two
children who are prone to fight over toys.

Generally, the adult tries

Obligation poses an interesting philosophical question.
does this conviction, that I or someone else ought

to prevent the children from fighting, or at least to keep their fights

come from?

from producing lasting harm.

is not the same as saying it is done.

In addressing this problem, the adult

may adopt many different strategies.

She may separate the children,

What is it?

Where

to do something,

Clearly, to say something ought to be done
Science teaches us what is;

morality seems to teach us what ought to be.

How does this happen?

punish particular behaviors, tell the children to share the toys

In the "Preface" to the Groundwork, Kant wrote:

instead of fighting, or even refuse to intervene in the children's

Every one must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute
necessity if it is to be valid morally--valid, that is, as a ground
of obligation; that the command 'Thou shalt not lie' could not
hold merely for men, other rational beings having no obligation
to abide by it--and similarly with all other genuine moral laws;
that here consequently the gound of obligation must be looked
for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the
world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts
of pure reason; and that every other precept based on
principles of mere experience--and even a precept that may in
a certain sense be considered universal, so far as it rests in its
slightest part, perhaps only in its motive, on empirical grounds-can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law.
(Groundwork vi)

fighting, on the assumption that they will discover for themselves
the unpleasantness of unregulated conflict and avoid fighting in the
future.
The adult does not merely want the children to refrain from
fighting.

A sort of armed truce could occur if they were motivated

by fear of adult punishment or displeasure if they were caught
fighting.

At certain stages of development, the children may be

incapable of acting on anything higher than a punishment-reward
level, but even if the adult recognizes this and provides the indicated
punishments or rewards, the adult's long-term goal is for the
children to share the toys and not fight because it is right to do so.
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This remarkable sentence reveals several important ideas

1l l

could be unconditioned, something which he recognized as a problem.

which interlock with each other in the complex which is Kant's moral

For the present, note that Kant thought that if we disregarded "the

thought.

nature of man" and "the circumstances of the world" we would still

First, the moral law must be unconditional.

This is a basic

be able to ground the moral law "solely a priori in the concepts of

assumption for Kant; it simply expresses what "everyone" means

pure reason."

when he says something ought or ought not to be done.

independently of "the circumstances of the world."

Of course,

Kant admitted that most of the maxims of popular morality appealed

Kant thought that pure reason could operate

Fourth, moral laws must be grounded in pure reason rather

to contingent, conditioned factors (such as utility, prudence or

than experience.

inclinations) to justify obligation.

propositions.

Underneath the sloppy thinking of

popular morality, though, Kant said we would find an unconditioned
moral law.

The real moral law, even if unrecognized by

This conclusion simply ties together the previous

If moral laws must be unconditional, if experience is

never unconditioned and if pure reason is unconditioned, then moral
laws must be grounded in the latter rather than the former.

The

unphilosophical people, is what gives popular moral judgments their

important thing to see is that Kant thought analysis led clearly from

force.

the popular concept of obligation through the intermediate steps to
Second, experience never gives unconditioned truth.

commonplace of philosophy in the modem era.

This is a

With other

necessity integral to the commonly accepted idea of "ought."

philosophers of his age, Kant recognized that empirical science had
drastically changed the way Europeans thought about the world.

this conclusion; only pure reason could provide the universal

But

Fifth, moral beings must be rational beings.

This contention,

which follows from the idea that moral law is grounded in pure

science, for all its importance, was limited by its inductive nature; it

reason, lies behind Kant's comment that a . moral law must apply to

never yielded certainty.

all rational beings, not just men.

This meant, for Kant, that science--and, of

Since real obligation allows for no

course, all other knowledge gained from the senses--could be of no

exceptions, it must rule over all moral beings, and since moral laws

help in discerning moral laws.

are grounded in pure reason,

Third, pure reason is unconditioned.

This claim is, in effect,

all moral beings must be rational.

fact, insofar as we are recognizing and grounding the moral law,

the myth of autonomous reason dressed up in Kantian terminology.

human beings are just like any other moral beings.

More will be said below, in the section regarding Kant's moral theory

contingent, in us or them, in our world or theirs, can have any

and the myth of autonomous reason, about how

bearing on the shape of moral law.

Kant thought reason

I

Nothing

In
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Sixth, the essential human nature is rationality.

In Kant's

that I ought to do something I do not want to do.

Kant saw no reason

mental chart of things, the class "men" is a subclass of the class

to explore how natural inclinations tempt us away from the path of

"rational beings."

duty, because this is obvious in everyone's experience.

No one knows whether there are other non-empty

subclasses of the class "rational beings" (at this point; we are in the

question about pure reason.

Groundwork--later, in the Critique,

which we experience as necessitation?

Kant gives a practical reason for

But there is a

How does it supply its half of the ought
Kant thought that analysis of

assuming the existence of at least one non-human rational being),

popular moral belief showed that pure reason had to have this role,

but if other rational beings do exist, they will be more like us than

but nothing in popular moral belief showed how pure reason worked

different.

to compel the will.

No matter how great the empirical differences between

men and other rational beings, our common rationality makes us

To address this question, Kant wrote the Critique

of Practical Reason.

merely different species under the same genus, "rational beings."
Obviously, if I say that Kant thought people are essentially

2. Duty as a Necessary Concept of Kant's System of Critical
Philosophy

rational beings, I need not mean that he thought people always, or
even often, act rationally.

A purely rational being, e.g., God, would

always act rationally and would therefore always act in conformance
with the moral law.

Kant wrote, "Hence for the divine will, and in

Kant's call to philosophy came in the writings of David Hume.
Hume pressed empiricism to skeptical conclusions, which in Kant's

general for a holy will, there are no imperatives: 'J ought' is here

view left science as well as morality and religion without good

out of place, because 'I will' is already of itself necessarily in

philosophical foundations.

harmony with the law." (Groundwork 39) In contrast to a divine

intolerable situation by a thorough reconstruction of epistemology, a

rational being, finite creatures such as human beings, who are

project he called critical philosophy.

subject to inclinations and thus not purely rational, experience the

Kant's critical philosophy will be given here, just enough to show how

moral law as ought.

duty has an indispensable role in it.

"I ought" emerges in the tension between the

dictates of pure reason and contingent inclinations.

Without both

Kant sought to correct what he saw as an

Only the briefest summary of

The crux of Hume's skepticism, in Kant's view, lay in his attack

sides, pure reason in the form of moral law saying one thing and

on causality. (Critique

50-51) Causality, as we normally think of it,

natural inclinations saying something else, people would not

is a necessary connection between two things (events or properties):

experience obligation as "necessitation," Kant's word for the feeling

if A, then necessarily B.

But, Hume said, experience of connection
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between things never shows that they are necessarily connected,
only that they are connected.

Causality, then, would have to be an a

tell if things-in-themselves have necessary connections between
them (Hume's point, according to Kant), we can clearly see that

priori concept. But it is impossible to have a priori knowledge of

appearances as we experience them do have necessary connections--

things in the world.

otherwise we could not experience them as we do.

Therefore, Hume claimed, causality--the idea

One of these

that one event in the world causes another event--is an intellectual

connections is causality.

fraud; we only believe in it through custom, never for good reason.

experienced. causality is conceivable and is, in fact. an a priori

Causality, Hume said, is inconceivable.

concept which makes experience possible.

Kant responded to this attack on causality with one of
philosophy's oldest tools.

He introduced a distinction.

He allowed

As an a priori

Thus, at least in reference to things-as-

concept, the category of causality (and all the

other categories introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason;

we focus

Hume's argument to be sound as regards things-in-themselves, "for it

on causality because Kant thought it crucial to morality) is free from

cannot be understo<?d, with reference to things-in-themselves and

the contingent nature of empiricism; in Kant's words, it has its seat in

their properties as such, why, if A

the "pure understanding." (Critique

is given, something else, B, must

also necessarily be given." (Critique

53) . But we never deal with

54) We may, then, apply the

category of causality to things-in-themselves, except that we don't

things-in-themselves, Kant said, but only with things-as-experienced.

know "the conditions for the application of these categories, and

Additionally,

especially that of causality, to objects." (Critique 54) So we know the
categories do apply to real objects, but we cannot by them gain

. . .it is very understandable that A and B as appearances in
one experience must necessarily be connected in a certain
manner (e.g., with reference to their temporal relations) and
that they cannot be separated without contradicting that
connection by means of which experience is possible, in which
experience they become objects and alone knowable to us. This
was actually the case, so that I could not only prove the
objective reality of the concept of cause with reference to
objects of experience but also deduce it as an a priori concept
because of the necessity of the connection it implies. (Critique
53)

experience of objects.

"And if, when subsequently applied to things-

in-themselves which cannot be objects of experience, it [causality]
cannot be determined so as to represent a definite object for the
purposes of a theoretical cognition, it could nevertheless be
determined for application to some other purpose, such as the
practical." (Critique

54)

We are barred from acquiring what Kant

called theoretical or speculative knowledge of things-in-themselves,
but we may apply the concept of causality to things-in-themselves

Kant turned his attention away from things-in-themselves to
the appearances of things as we experience them.

While we cannot

for what he called practical purposes.

1 16

By "practical," Kant meant action in the world.

Human beings

act when they desire something; for Kant, the faculty of desire is
equivalent to the will.

One sort of practical reason evaluates possible courses of action

Kant

denied that such reasoning was genuinely moral, since it appealed to
contingent facts in the world.
obligation in the Groundwork

As we have seen, his analysis of
required that moral law be

concept, applicable

knowledge of things-in-themselves.

In the passage just quoted, Kant

causality. If there is such as thing as a pure will, a will not
determined by contingencies but by reason alone, then we have a
practical reason to believe in a cause which is free.
In the moral law, the categorical imperative, Kant thought he
had the "determining ground" of the pure will. (Critique 56) The

unconditional.

categorical imperative commanded the will independently of

Another sort of practical reason, "pure" practical reason, if it
existed, would not appeal to contingent facts in the world.

Causality was shown to be an a priori

says that the concept of a will (practical reason) involves the idea of

For instance, will an

action' lead to the desired result (happiness, utility, etc.) or not?

causality.

to things-in-themselves, though not able to give theoretical

Reason is practical when it influences the will.

according to their prudential characteristics.

11 7

If a

inclinations or hopes for success.

Therefore, a pure will, a will

undetermined by contingent facts, was possible.

Kant carefully

rational being had pure practical reason, it would have a pure will.3

guarded against claims that this chain of reasoning gave knowledge

The pure will is a crucial idea for Kant.

of things-in-themselves.

In the concept of a will, however, the concept of causality is
already contained; thus in that of a pure will there is the
concept of causality with freedom, i.e., of a causality not
determinable according to natural laws and consequently not
susceptible to any empirical intuition as proof [of the reality of
the free will]. Nevertheless, it completely justifies its objective
reality in the pure practical law a priori.. .(Critique 55)
To review, by focusing on things-as-experienced rather than
things-in-themselves, Kant claimed to have saved the category of

Nevertheless, the fact that human wills

could be set in conformity to the law, motivated by reverence for the
law, gave a concrete reason to accept the idea of "an empirically
unconditioned causality," the free will.

In a move suggestive of

Wittgenstein's idea that some things could be shown but not said,
Kant wrote that the "practical reality" of the free will could be
"pointed out," even though the free will was not an object of
theoretical knowledge. (Critique

56)

Kant thought that what he called the "speculative" side of his
3 For Kant, "pure will" is not the same as "holy will." A holy will is a will
completely in conformity to the moral law. A being with a holy will (God)
would always and naturally act according to the moral law. A pure will is a
will determined by reason alone, apart from inclinations. A being with a pure
will could act in accord with the moral law by recognizing the necessity of the
moral law and subjecting all inclinations to its rule.

critical philosophy had rescued inductive science from Humean
skepticism.

The categories of thought (causality, temporal relations,

etc.) made possible only knowledge of appearances, but this was not
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a problem; science had only to accept that its proper role was

freedom, we know that things-in-themselves exist and that human

studying appearances rather than things-in-themselves.

categories of thought really apply to them.

Within the

realm of appearances, Kant had shown causality--the foundational

We see that the moral law is able to determine a will
independently of inclinations or other contingent factors.

concept of science--to be valid.
The practical side of critical philosophy rescued something else.

Therefore,

a pure will, a will undetermined by contingencies, actually can occur.

Many philosophers were worried by the notion, often occasioned by

Therefore, anytime a pure will occurs we have a practical reason {not

the growing success of science, that material determinism was true.

a speculative one) for accepting the reality of freedom, since a pure

If determinism were true, they worried, morality--insofar as it was

will combines the concepts of causality and freedom.

conceived as requiring free will--would be undermined.

whenever a human being has a pure will, a will determined only by

In contrast

to these thinkers, Kant readily accepted the doctrine that
determinism ruled the world of appearances.

Further, he agreed

Therefore,

the moral law, he has a practical reason to accept the reality of
freedom.

Whenever my will is determined by the moral law and not

with those who held that morality requires a free will, that without

by inclinations or other contingencies, I have a practical reason to

freedom there is no moral responsibility.

accept the reality of freedom and with it the reality of things-in-

But by locating the free

will in the realm of things-in-themselves, Kant saved morality (and
religion as an appendage to morality) from determinism.
We see, then, why Kant wrote that freedom served as the
"keystone" of his whole system. (Critique
morality saved from determinism.

3) Only by freedom was

Only through the concept of

t he ms elves.

For Kant, freedom holds everything together.
As we saw in the last chapter, Kant said that when a rational
agent sees, by reason alone, that the categorical imperative must be
obeyed, he has achieved autonomy.

Since the law the autonomous

freedom do concepts of God and immortality gain "stability and

person gives himself is based solely on reason, it is free from the

objective reality." (Critique

determinism which reigns in the world of appearances.

4) "Now is explained the enigma of the

critical philosphy, which lies in the fact that we must renounce the
objective reality of the supersensible use of the categories in

So autonomy

is equivalent to freedom.
Now we can see why duty is crucial to critical philosophy.

A

speculation and yet can attribute this reality to them in respect to

person achieves autonomy only when she wills in conformity with

the objects of pure practical reason." (Critique

the moral law.

5) Because there is

do her duty.

To will in conformity with the moral law is to will to
If it were not possible for pure practical reason to
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How Kant's Moral Theorv Exhibits
the Myth of Autonomous Reason

determine the will by the individual giving herself the moral law--if,
in other words, Kant's conception of morality with duty at its heart
was incoherent or false--then she could not be autonomous.
would be no freedom.

There

duty are rooted in the idea that reason functions in its own right,

So,

If morality is not essentially duty, there cannot be moral law.

If there is no pure will, there is no practical reason to accept
the reality of freedom and all the concepts which attach to it.
Therefore, if morality is not basically duty, Kant's critical

things-in-themselves.

independent of any reasoner.

First, he held that only "pure reason"

could give obligation the force which ordinary moral judgments

If there is not moral law, there is no pure will.

philosophy falls apart.

Both of Kant's reasons for thinking that morality is basically

We are left with skepticism in regard to
But Kant was confident he had defeated

skepticism: ". . . the moral law . . . does provide a fact absolutely
inexplicable from any data of the world of sense or from the whole

showed that it had.

Second, he held that only a purely formal

"determining ground" of the will could show that freedom was real,
and such a formal rule could only prescribe duty.

Both of these

moves assume that pure reason, the source of the moral law (the
purely formal determining ground of the will), actually exists.

This is

the myth of autonomous reason.
To a certain degree, it is unnecessary to prove this point.

Even

compass of the theoretical use of reason, and this fact points to a

a quick reading of Kant's work suggests that Kant's ethical thought is

pure intelligible world--indeed, it defines it positively and enables us ·

shot through with the idea that reason is independent of reasoners.

to know something of it, namely, a law.n (Critique 43) "The least

For Kant, reason is an actor; it can determine the will apart from

attention to ourself shows that this idea [the moral law] really stands

anything empirical. (Critique

as a model for the determination of our will." (Critique

careful, for Kant recognized a difficulty in the myth which many

43)

Thus, Kant had two reasons for thinking morality was primarily
duty.

Duty lay beneath ordinary moral thinking, and duty was

integral to the whole project of critical philosophy.

20, 41-42, etc.) But we must be

philosophers have missed.
As we have seen, Kant granted that mechanical necessity, i.e.
determinism, reigns in the empirical world. (Critique

48) So human

beings, including the self, viewed as objects of experience, are
determined.

For

e~ample,

a person's emotional attachments and

desires (in Kant's terms, the person's inclinations) often color his
thinking.

Kant would agree with the determinist who claims that
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these inclinations, combined with other admittedly hard to measure

compare her "own will," presumably a pure will, determined only by

contingent factors, cause a person to think one thing and not another.

the moral law, to some hypothetical "law of nature," a description of

So how can pure reason, assuming it exists, have any bearing on

mechanically necessary causation.

human thought, since human thought is as determined as any other

that people could judge possible actions by the purely formal

part of human existence?

requirements of the moral law, is for Kant the greatest concrete proof

Kant's answer, of course, makes use of the distinction between
the world of appearance and things-in-themselves.

Viewed as an

possible that I am also a thing-in-itself.
be undetermined.
saying I am.

that freedom and things-in-themselves exist, even if no example
could be given of a person who actually did judge her actions solely
by the moral law.

object of experience (which is how I must see even my own
subjective thoughts and feelings), I am entirely determined.

That people might do this, that is,

But it is

As a thing-in-itself, I could

I could be--but there is no speculative reason for

Only when ~he moral law appears, determining my will

It seems, then, that Kant recognized the problem, but failed to
answer it.

He does not say how pure reason can be related to the

thoughts of people.

He only insists that people may be seen as

things-in-themselves as well as appearances (so far with speculative

without reference to any contingencies, do I have a practical reason

reason) and that they must

for saying more, that in me reason can be undetermined.

autonomous (the additional reach of practical reason).

Strictly speaking, this explanation does not explain.
say how

It does not

pure reason expresses itself in my thoughts, which are part

of the world of experience.

Kant leaves as mysterious the interaction

between noumena and phenomena, though he instructs his readers

be so regarded insofar as they are

It is a

mystery how a person whose every thought is determined by
antecedent events can judge possible actions by pure reason, but
Kant thinks practical reason shows this must be.
Kant's position is equivalent to saying the myth of autonomous

how to apply the categorical imperative without understanding the

reason is true, even though no person, as observed, exhibits

connection.

autonomous reason.

"Ask yourself whether, if the action which you propose

Mystery shrouds any connection between true

should take place by a law of nature of which you yourself were a

reason and the thinking of actual persons, but we still have reason to

part, you could regard it as possible through your own will." (Critique

believe that true reason exists.

69)

If the natural law which would describe the action could be

approved if it were .a maxim of pure practical reason, then the action
accords with duty.

Note how Kant assumes the reader is able to

If true reason did not exist, neither
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would the moral law; since the moral law does exist, true reason
must exist too.4
So, though Kant was more self-conscious than many
philosophers about the myth of autonomous reason--he at least saw
that the idea is problematic--he still believed it.

Morality, as Kant

understood it, demands that reason be independent of the world of
experience.

Enough has been said, then, to justify my first claim, that

Kant's work bears the mark of the myth of autonomous reason.

How Kant's Work Exemplifies a Certain Picture of Human Nature

Above, while listing central ideas in Kant's moral theory, I said
that according to his mental chart, human beings were a species
under the genus rational beings.

In other words, Kant thought

people were essentially rational, even though they may rarely, or
never, act rationally.

To further support this important contention, I
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subordinated by reason to the character of the thing in itself
(Groundwork 123, Kant's emphases)
To substitute subjective necessity, i.e., habit, for the objective
which pertains only to a priori judgments would be to deny the
faculty of judging an object, of knowing it and what belongs to
it. It would mean, for example, that what usually or always
follows a certain prior condition could not be inferred to follow
from it, since that would imply objective necessity and an a
priori concept of a connection. It would mean only that similar
cases may be expected, as animals expect them. (Critique 12)
Man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the world of
sense, and to this extent his reason certainly has an inescapable
responsibility from the side of his sensuous nature to attend to
its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to the
happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life. But still
he is not so completely an animal as to be indifferent to
everything which reason says on its own and to use it merely
as a tool for satisfying his needs as a sensuous being. That he
has reason does not in the least raise him in worth above mere
animality if reason only serves the purposes which, among
animals, are taken care of by instinct; if this were so, reason
would be only a specific way nature had made use of to equip
man for the same purpose for which animals are qualified,
without fitting him for any higher purpose. (Critique 61)

offer these passages, one of which was partially quoted in the last
chapter.
This much only is certain: the law is not valid for us because it
interests us (for this is heteronomy and makes practical reason
depend on sensibility--that is to say, on an underlying feeling-in which case practical reason could never give us moral law);
the law interests us because it is valid for us as men in virtue
of having sprung from our will as intelligence and so from our
proper self; but what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily

In the first passage, Kant says that reason tells us that
rationality is our "true self," in spite of any experiential evidence to
the contrary.

The second passage distinguishes between human

k.-iowledge, which is made possible by a priori judgments, and
animal expectation, which is the most that can be had a posteriori.
Only unconditioned reason enables our thought to rise above "habit."
The third passage, besides giving another example in which reason is

4 This is simply an alternate way of putting the point of Kant's footnote
comment (Critique 4) that freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, while
the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.
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This evaluative note is part of the traditional belief.

In

an actor (reason is said to say things "on its own"), tells us that
virtually all cultures and in most of philosophy, human superiority to

reason is what distinguishes people from animals.
These, and similar passages, show that Kant held a certain view
of human nature.

Kant did not invent this view; it is so common in

In the history of philosophy, the traditional belief often arises
This question

is sometimes understood to ask what separates people from God, and
a Kantian phrase gives the traditional answer: Man is the finite
rational being (as opposed to the infinite rational being).

More often,

the traditional belief has arisen to answer another question: What
separates people from animals?

According to the traditional belief,

rationality separates people from animals; people are essentially

rational.

For all his innovations, Kant was at one with the main

tradition of western philosophy in this basic position.
The third passage quoted makes it plain that Kant did not
consider the non-rational elements of human nature (our "sensuous
nature") to be unimportant.

He said we ought to use our rational

faculties to look out for our interests and inclinations--as far as we
can within the moral law.

But if that is all the use we make of

rationality, we are no different from the animals.
in evaluative terms; we are better

Our tradition often asks how or why

people are better than animals, but rarely whether they are better
than animals.

philosophy that it may be called the traditional belief.

in response to a metaphysical question: What is Man?

animals is taken for granted.

And Kant put this

than the animals only to the

Consider how the traditional belief uses an obvious difference
between people and animals, the fact that animals do not talk.
According to the traditional belief, animals do not talk because they
are not rational; speech is the best behavioral mark of rationality.
The fact that virtually all people talk while animals do not is thus
made into evidence for the traditional belief.5

Further, since rational

beings are superior to non-rational beings, animals' lack of language
(and therefore reason) justifies human use of animals.
Observe that the traditional belief results from a search for the
essential human characteristic.

The traditional belief is essentialist.

Like Socrates grilling Meno for a definition of virtue, philosophers
who search for a definition of Man want a characteristic common to
all people which at the same time distinguishes them from animals.
The traditional belief says that characteristic is rationality.
Clearly, Kant accepted the traditional belief; rationality is the
true human self.

Since it is so basic to the Western philosophical

tradition, he may never even have questioned it.

But in swallowing

degree that we use our rationality for those ends which reason itself
commands.

5 Experiments in which apes learn some sign language only underscore the

traditional belief. With great effort one or two animals have been taught a
fraction of the language skills billions of human two-year-olds pick up
effortlessly.
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as walking, eating, drinking, playing.
the idea that reason is our true nature, Kant also accepted the
principle of essentialism, that humanity has some defining
characteristic that separates it from animality (and raises it above
animality).

Kant's position, which in this case is the position of most

philosophers in the West, rests on essentialism.

If we unpack this little paragraph, we will find a direct

challenge to the traditional belief.

Kant's picture of human nature led him to mistaken conclusions in
But if, as I have just contended, Kant's picture of human

nature agrees with the dominant picture of human nature in our
philosophical tradition, it may be hard to see his mistakes as

remember that in the traditional belief, human language is the most

So, before we reach the last point, we must take a detour: an
examination of the essentialist assumption which undergirds the
The detour sign is found in a

passage in Wittgenstein.

Reason

shows up in science, of course, and practical decisions (e.g. Aristotle
says reason allows people to pursue happiness rather than mere
pleasure), but the ability to talk marks us as rational as nothing else
does.

Wittgenstein sums up the traditional belief simply as "they

[animals] do not think, and that is why they do not talk."

mistakes unless the outline of the picture is challenged and redrawn.

traditional belief about human nature.

To see this, one needs only to

telling of all the behavioral marks of human rationality.

The third main point I want to make in this chapter is that

ethics.

(Philosophical

Investigations 12)

Wittgenstein's rejection of the traditional belief cuts to the
heart of its doctrine: "But--they simply do not talk."

He admits that

animals do not use language, with the stipulation that we only mean
'·
they do not use complicated language, but he rejects the move from
"they do not talk" to "they do not think."
Curiously, Wittgenstein does not make his point about animals

A Wittgensteinian Challenge to the Traditional Belief

explicit in the passage just quoted.
think.

In section 25 of Philosophical Investigations,

Wittgenstein

says:

He does not say that animals

Instead, he makes a point about people.

"Commanding,

questioning, recounting, chatting are as much a part of our natural
history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. "6 The things the

It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack
the mental capacity. And this means: 'they do not think, and
that is why they do not talk.' But--they simply do not talk. Or
to put it better: they do not use language--if :'e except . th~
most primitive forms of language.--Commandmg, questI~nmg,
recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history

traditional belief turns to as the best marks of rational beings,
Wittgenstein lists as part of our natural history.

He implies, I take it,

6 Note that commanding, quesuomng, recounting, and chatting are all
complicated language uses; according to traditional belief, all marks of human
rationality.
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that natural history describes us as one of the animals.

Human

66 he writes, "Don't say: there must

be something common, or they

rationality, then, is part of our animality, not the thing that separates

would not be called 'games"'--but look and see whether there is

us from other species.

anything common to all." (Philosophical Investigations

This is in direct opposition to Kant, who held

than attribute to Wittgenstein a new essentialist definition of

that reason raises us above other species.
Later in Philosophical Investigations

31) Rather

(part Il, section i; p. 174),

Wittgenstein considers whether a dog could hope.

He conjectures

humanity, I read him as challenging the craving for such a definition.
Whether this reading of Wittgenstein proves accurate or not (a

that while a dog could be angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, and

matter hard to settle), it suggests that the traditional belief rests on a

startled, it could not be hopeful.

faulty assumption, the assumption that humanity can be defined by

language can hope.

Only someone who has mastered

"That is to say, the phenomena of hope are

modes of this complicated form of life," he writes.

It seems that

a single trait or particular combination of traits common to all people
and not shared with animals.

Since anybody can readily pick out

Wittgenstein thought of language on a scale of complexity, from the

many examples of human beings, the question, What is Man? affords

primitive forms of language of animals to the complicated forms of

an opportunity to follow Wittgenstein's instruction to "look and see."

people.

He probably thought of thinking in the same way, as ranging

1. All human beings are homo sapiens, that is, they share a

from simple to complex.
Possibly, Wittgenstein here offers a different answer to the
question, What is Man?

Let us list candidates for an essential trait of humanity.

Where the traditional belief defines

Biologists undoubtedly could define the

common biological nature.

term more precisely, probably mentioning a certain genetic structure
This definition is true, and it is

humanity as finite rational beings, Wittgenstein could be read as

or a combination of physical traits.

defining humanity as the animals with the most complicated forms of

essentialist: the specified biological description fits all people and no

thought and language.

animals.

put things.

I think, though, that this is a wrong way to

Wittgenstein is not giving a different answer, but a

different kind of answer (better still, a different kind of response) to

The biological candidate borders on tautology.
our question--What is Man?
are people.

the question.
The traditional belief, we noted, is essentialist.

It is also not what the traditional belief needs.

In other

In the context of

What is human nature?--it says people

(In other contexts, I presume, such as medicine, the

biological definition of humanity is not tautological and represents a

contexts, Wittgenstein laid the blame for many philosophical errors

real gain in knowledge.)

on the urge to understand words through their essences.

characteristic of humanity looks for something that grants special

In section

The philosophical quest for an essential
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5.

experience which accompanies play, and second, that animals cannot
have such experiences.
probably false.

Both assumptions are unsubstantiated and

The objection exhibits what Wittgenstein called a

showers, and baseball.

For a philosopher like Kant, this trait is the

opposite of what we are looking for.

Enjoyments, based on

inclinations, are precisely the things we share with animals.

mental cramp.
In his science fiction story, Stranger in a Strange Land,

4.

Human beings enjoy things,such as music, food, sex, hot

If we

cannot think of something other than these sorts of traits, Kant might

Robert Heinlein hit on laughter as the distinguishing mark of

say, we are no different from (implying, no better than) the animals.

humanity.

But if we subtract from life all such enjoyings, is what is left a human

humor.

Apparently no animals other than people engage in

(Obviously, the hyena's "laugh" is not a laugh.)

Once again,

life?
Of course, one can overstate Kant's denigration of inclinations.

we may wonder how we know animals do. not laugh, but even if that
is granted problems arise.

We could doubt that all people laugh;

He did believe we have a duty to pursue our own happiness, which

some people really are humorless and not all of them see that as a

includes enjoying things.

lack in themselves.

of humanity cannot be anything contingent; reason reveals that the

One could speculate that all people are capable of

But he would insist that the essential part

Therefore, we can fairly attribute to him the

humor and that humorless people have merely lost something

true self is noumenal.

human.

belief that human life is still essentially the same, even if we

But if that is true, humor can hardly be the essential human

subtract from it all phenomenal enjoyments.

trait, since people are still people after they lose it.
More importantly, the ability to laugh is not the sort of
essential characteristic the traditional belief wants.

Like biological

rebel against this idea because it is literally incredible, we have
cause to doubt
6.

differences between our species and others, it does not seem to
support the elevated status people (not just philosophers) want to
give to people.

For instance, surely we are not justified in testing

If we find that we

Kant's picture of human nature.

Human beings think and talk.

More specifically, they

sometimes think rationally and talk philosophy.

Together, of course,

thinking and talking constitute the core of the traditional belief.

carcinogens on rabbits merely because we laugh and they don't.

Wittgenstein, we have seen, challenges the idea that animals do not

Laughter's failed candidacy reminds us that for the traditional belief,

think.

the essential characteristic of humanity is also an ennobling and

than ours.

praiseworthy characteristic.

much more complex than another person's.

Perhaps their thought and language are only less complex
But then, the thought and language of one person may be
Could we measure

complexity of thought, so that the differences between all people is
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so much smaller than the differences between people and animals

have individual moral worth.

that we would have a reliable way to tell them apart?

explanation.

conceivable, if doubtable.

This is at least

Even if this is granted, the difference

But this is bald assertion, not

It is not the traditional belief.)

But, some defender of the traditional belief might object,

between our species and another would only be larger than the

human beings ·cJo have moral worth, worth not attributable to any

difference between individuals of our species, a difference of

animal.

quantity, not quality.

we ought to choose the interests of a human being over those of an

I wonder if the traditional belief can be

(Only the most radical animal rights proponent would deny

So there must be

content with anything less than an absolute qualitative difference

animal in hypothetical forced choice scenarios.)

between people and animals.

some characteristic or combination of traits which people share and

Kant thought there was.

The traditional belief could be wrong about its particular claim-that rationality and language distinguish humanity from animality--

which no animal has and which explains human moral worth.
Well, we do crave an explanation for our belief that people

and still be right in its general claim that some essential trait of

have greater moral worth than animals, a belief I share.

humanity exists.

say there must be a common element.

7.

I will suggest three more.

Our ethical traditions tell us that every human being is the

focus of moral worth.
human being!"

The cry of the oppressed is: "I, too, am a

The traditional belief holds that the moral status of

human beings depends on their distinction from the animals.
Kant is an example.

Again,

People have dignity as autonomous rational

beings, that is, those who are able to give themselves the form of the
moral law.

Hence, we should never treat a person as a means only.

I have no desire to deny the moral dignity of every person.

8.

But, do not

Look and see.

People are self-conscious subjects.

Philosophers make much

of this idea, but what does it come to in real life?

We ought to have

an understanding of self-consciousness before we say it serves as the
characteristic the traditional belief looks for.
Here are examples of what could be called self-consciousness:
(a) "I was embarrassed." (b) "And then I thought, 'She's going to say
no,' so I really turned on the charm.

Boy, was I cool--and I knew it."

(c) "Let it be the real I that prays, and the real thou I pray to."

(d)

But if human moral worth depends on some trait that distinguishes

"Mom, Dad and my boyfriend were all in the stands, but I said to

us from the animals, then human moral worth cannot itself be that

myself, 'Forget all that,' and just concentrated on the basket."

trait.

(One could maintain, of course, that human beings are

distinguished from and superior to the animals simply because they

In (a), someone felt a feeling.
which he was able to label.

In (b), a person acted a part

In (c), a person assumes that her

personality may include elements hidden from herself and tries to
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make allowance for this possibility.

doubted that an easy cut-off will be found between human character

In (d), a person pushed away

distractions in order to accomplish a task.

Perhaps this is enough to

make us doubt that self-consciousness is a single phenomenon.
is not, how does it serve to mark humanity?

If it

Is one of these sorts of

self-consciousness, or some other one, the essential human trait?

Is

and that of animals.

Ordinary speech, for instance, ascribes

viciousness, loyalty, and bravery to some dogs.

Is this only a manner

of speaking, as defenders of the traditional belief usually say?
Wittgenstein noted that we do not speak of dogs as hoping (Fido

there a common element to every experience we call self-conscious?

expects his dinner; we do not say he hopes for it). I suggest that the

(A chasm opens before us.

fact that some words seem to apply to dogs while others do not may

The common element of humanity is self-

consciousness; the common element of self·consciousness is

indicate a real, if unsystematized, observation that dogs have certain

something else; that something else has yet another common

characteristics but not others.

element; etc.)

some moral characteristics are part of one form of life, while others
are only part of more complicated forms of life.

Two more questions: do all people share the requisite
experience of self-consciousness?

Taking self-

consciousness as the essential characteristic of humanity is frought

Human beings are moral agents.

We not only want others to

pay attention to us, we feel we ought to pay attention to others.
accept blame and take credit for things we do.

We

We exhibit such traits

as honesty, laziness, kindness, etc., or their opposites.

Can moral

We have taken this long detour in order to raise doubts about

the assumption that there is some essential human characteristic.
Wittgenstein compared our concept of number to a thread, made of
many intertwined fibers, with no element common to the whole.

(Philosophical Investigations, section 67, p. 32) If we reject the
search for an essentialist definition of humanity, we may use the

agency serve to distinguish humanity from animality?
No.

of degree, not of kind.
the underlying assumption of the traditional view of human nature,

with many questionable assumptions.

9.

If this makes sense,

the difference between people and animals again appears to be one

Do we know there is no such

experience for animals such as monkeys or dolphins?

Wittgenstein would probably say that

First, like moral wonh, moral agency is held by the

same metaphor for human nature.

Many , traits, including reason

traditional belief to depend on, not constitute, the essence of

and speech, make up our nature, but none of them need be common

humanity.

to us all.

Second, like rationality and language, moral agency seems

to lie on a scale from unresponsible automata like viruses to the
completely self-aware chooser of existentialist novels.

It can be
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I suggest that there is no defining trait of humanity.
there is, it is not rationality or speech.8

Even if

This means that Kant's

picture of human nature is thoroughly misconceived.

Therefore, we

ought not to be surprised that his understanding of human nature
led him to conclusions which are mistaken.

Kantian Conclusions Which Cannot Be Acce.pted

Many passages could be quoted, but two will suffice.

Kant

wrote:
It is doubtless in this sense that we should understand too the
passages from Scripture in which we are commanded to love
our neighbour and even our enemy. For love out of inclination
cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty--although
no inclination impels us, and even although natural and
unconquerable disinclination stands in our way--is practical,
and not pathological, love, residing in the will and not the
propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting
compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an
object of command. (Groundwork 13)
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For inclinations vary; they grow with the indulgence we allow
them, and they leave behind a greater void than the one we
intended to fill. They are consequently always burdensome to
a rational being, and, though he cannot put them aside, they
nevertheless elicit from him the wish to be free of them. Even
an inclination to do that which accords with duty {e.g., to do
beneficient acts), can at most facilitate the effectiveness of
moral maxims but not produce any such maxims. . . . reason,
when it is a question of morality, must not play the part of
mere guardian of the inclinations, but, without regard to them,
as pure practical reason it must care for its own interest to the
exclusion of all else. Even the feeling of sympathy and
warmhearted fellow-feeling, when preceding the consideration
of what is duty and serving as a determining ground, is
burdensome even to right-thinking persons, confusing their
considered maxims and creating the wish to be free from them
and subject only to law-giving reason. (Critique 118)

The Groundwork
great commandments.

passage gives Kant's famous reading of the

Love, according to Kant, is a positive good will

toward everyone, that is, control of our maxims in accordance with
duty--rather than anything pathological.

Why did he think this?

Kant's immediate answer was that we cannot directly control our
emotions; therefore it would be unjust for God to command that we
do so (the doctrine of ought implies can).

8 Scripture says that God created people in her image (Genesis 1:26), and that
God is love (1 John 4:16). It would seem that Christian speculation about the
Imago Dei should center on the possibility that the ability to love is the
defining human characteristic. Cf. Marilyn McCord Adams' brief comments in
the section "The Nature of God" in her anicle, "Forgiveness: A Christian
Model." (Faith and Philosophy, July 1991, 277-300, esp. pp. 290-291)
Historically, of course, theologians have adhered to the traditional belief
instead.
It would be interesting to explore the contention that love is the essential
human trait. I will not do so here, because 1) it would require another volume,
and 2) the criticisms of Kant (and through him of the traditional belief) in this
chapter stand without it. At this point, it is enough to see that rationality is
not the essence of humanity.

More fundamentally,

though, Kant grounded morality in the traditional belief.

If

rationality is the essence of a person, and if all morality (the moral
law, moral agency, moral responsibility) is tied to that essence, then
pathological inclinations are irrelevant to morals, or at most a
decidedly secondary matter.
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It is important to see that this reading of scripture is only
possible through a kind of philosophical spectacles.

A less biased

reading of the New Testament (and the Pentateuchal materials which
lie behind the gospels) will not restrict the great commandments
from matters of inclination.

Indeed, the commandments say we are

to love God and each other with all our heart.

Kant's philosophical

true nature; he would wish to be free of all emotions, including
"sympathy and warmhearted fellow-feeling."
There is always a danger, when reading a text from another
time or place, of not entering into the author's worldview enough to
read it fairly.

In other places, Kant argues that we have a duty to

develop benevolent feelings in ourselves, since we know they will

commitments have led him to a blatant misreading of the text.

increase the odds we will act in accord with duty.

Unless we share similar philosophical commitments, we have no

change Kant's basic position.

reason to think morality is mostly a matter of applied reason.

the moral law, so all matters of inclination are secondary.

What

we call morality may be importantly related to several traits, not just
rationality.

Once free of the traditional belief, we may see that

sensitivity, desires (bad and good), and imagination, to name only
obvious candidates, play roles in morality as surely as rationality
does.

If they do, and if God paid attention to people as they are, then

it might well be possible for God to command people to love him (and

each other) pathologically--with all their heart.
In the passage from the Critique,

strange conclusion.

The heart of morality is recognition of
In

actuality, Kant's position here simply draws out the implications of
the traditional belief.

If human beings are essentially rational, then

morality really is chiefly a matter of duty.
Nevertheless, we must recognize and reject this position as
mistaken, even bizarre.

It is simply not true that healthy people

would wish to be free of sympathy and fellow-feeling.
judge for themselves.

Readers may

Would a parent hope that her child develops a

strong sense of duty, but regard sympathy as unimportant in the

Truly rational people,. he says, will regret having

child's moral growth?

Would a teacher hope this for a student?

Though it is impossible, they will "wish

husband for his wife?

A friend for a friend?

inclinations, even good ones.
to be free of them."

Kant reaches an equally

But this does not

Why?

In practice, inclinations are not

dependable, since feelings come and go.

But Kant gives a deeper

reason: inclinations--even those which move us to act in accord with
duty--cannot "produce" truly moral maxims.
pure reason can produce real moral law.

Only unconditioned

So, the truly rational {and

therefore truly moral) person would wish consistently to live out his

A

Someone who wishes to

argue Kant's position cannot take refuge by noting that these are
cases of other people while Kant said the rational person would wish
himself to be free of benevolent inclinations.

Kant's conclusion rests

on the iron implications of his starting point and apply as much to
other rational beings as to the self.

In Kant's view, the truly rational

person would wish all rational people to be free from all inclinations,
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since they cannot ground the moral law.
us to such a conclusion cannot be right.
Enough has been said to support the third point of this chapter,
that Kant's view of human nature led him to espouse positions which,
unless one is under the spell of his system, must strike the reader as
mistaken.

Much of the lure of Kant's moral theory lies in the fact

that it works out the implications of a widespread traditional
philosophical belief.

I contend, though, that upon examination that

belief is groundless; upon examination, Kant's ethics and other
similar theories will lose their attraction.
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Kohlberg began his doctoral research in 1956.

For both his admirers

and detractors, Kohlberg's work has dominated the discussion of

CHAPTERV

psychological theories of moral development for a quarter century.
As reconceived by Murdoch, moral philosophy will learn from

HOW NOT TO TIIlNK ABOUT MORAL PROGRESS

psychology.

She thinks we need to gain some understanding of the

workings of the selfish ego so that we may overcome its tendency to
define all the world in terms of itself.I
A passage from The Sovereignty of Good I have quoted already:

The reader should note how

drastic a reconceiving of moral philosophy this is.

Standard ethical

theories do not have much room for questions of moral
The problem is to accommodate inside moral philosophy, and
suggest methods of dealing with the fact that so much of
human conduct is moved by mechanical energy of an
egocentric kind. In the moral life the enemy is the fat
relentless ego. Moral philosophy is properly, and in the past
has sometimes been, the discussion of this ego and of the
techniques (if any) for its defeat. In this respect moral
philosophy has shared some aims with religion. To say this is
of course also to deny that moral philosophy should aim at
being neutral.
What is a good man like? How can we make ourselves
morally better? Can we make ourselves morally better?
These are questions the philosopher should try to answer.
(Murdoch 52)

improvement, because in them the right thing to do (the crucial
moral question) is determined by the rational application of
theoretically well-grounded decision procedures.

Agents can only

progress by becoming able to judge more rigorously the right action
and/or be becoming more conscientious in performing the actions
such judgment demands.

For example, Kant, who said we have a

duty to develop certain inclinations, and thus could have developed a
doctrine of moral progress, relegated such matters to "practical
anthropology," not really a moral question at all.

Against this,

Murdoch holds that a central task of moral philosophy is to find
If Murdoch is a philosopher trying to win a place for discussion

techniques for the defeat of egoism, i.e. methods of moral progress.

of moral progress in philosophy, Lawrence Kohlberg is a psychologist

In a manner parallel to Murdoch, Kohlberg thinks psychology

who has tried to win a place for discussion of cognitive moral
development in psychology.

can learn from philosophy; more than most social scientists, he shows

The large extent to which he has

succeeded can be judged by the enormous quantity of theoretical and
research literature published in the field of moral development since

1 Note that in her tum to psychology Murdoch finds cenain Freudian
conceptions helpful; this does not mean, however, that she endorses all of
psychoanalytic theory. Similarly, my use of Steven Johnson's work in chapter
one doesn't mean I endorse any panicular psychological theory.
Philosophers
should be free to leam from various psychological schools.
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an awareness of the philosophical issues inherent in psychological
studies of human nature and morality.

The revolution Kohlberg has

proposed, and to some degree fomented, in psychology is as great· as
the revolution indicated by Murdoch's reconception of moral

In this chapter I will try to summarize Kohlberg's methods and
results; discuss his philosophical assumptions, only some of which he
seems to be aware of; and criticize his work as being an example of
how not to think about moral progress.

The reader should be aware

of two obstacles which greatly increase the difficulty of this stated
First, the sheer volume of work published by (1) Kohlberg, (2)

his associates and students, (3) other research psychologists friendly
to his theory, and (4) the many psychologists, sociologists and
philosophers who have attacked his theory from a variety of
perspectives makes it impossible to give anything like a complete
summary of the issues Kohlberg's work has raised.

I can only point

out those matters which I deem most important and leave it to
readers familiar with the literature of moral development research
to decide if I have read it fairly.

Second, Kohlberg's theory is a

moving target; he and his associates have significantly revised their
methods and claims over the years.

No doubt, this speaks well of

Kohlberg's willingness to accept criticism of his own theory and
change his mind, but it makes the task of analysis and criticism more
difficult.

collection of articles written by Kohlberg and his associates which
traces the development of his theory and includes a current
statement of it.

Most references in this chapter will be to that

volume.

philosophy in that field.

task.

Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages, a

Fortunately, in 1984 Kohlberg published the second volume

of his Essays on Moral Development, entitled The Psychology of

At the outset, Kohlberg's work must be seen against the
background of American social science of the mid-twentieth century.
Like Murdoch, he found that as understood by most of his
professional colleagues, his field did not allow him to say things
which seemed obvious.

In particular Kohlberg rebelled against social

relativism and the anti-cognitivism of behavioristic theory.

Kohlberg

wanted to study how moral actors think about moral issues; he
rejected theories which told him thinking was irrelevant to moral
behavior or that it amounted to internalizing arbitrary social
standards.
Kohlberg quotes Berkowitz as an example of social relativism in
psychology: "Moral values are evaluations of actions generally
believed by the members of a given society to be either 'right' or
'wrong."' (Kohlberg 3)

With this definition went the assumption that

different societies could have radically opposed evaluations of
actions, so that children in different societies would judge some
particular action differently (right in one society, wrong in another)
and both children would be correct.
ignore the fact

This seemed to Kohlberg to
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. . .that individual moral actors have their own points of view.
Student civil disobedience is an example of a behavior studied
by psychologists that may be wrong by the standards of the
majority but right by the moral actors' own moral standards.
Socially relativistic studies of moral values and behavior that
neglect the actors' own standpoint soon lead into
inconsistencies and lack the ability to order the research data
gathered. (Kohlberg 3)

to scientific, verifiable statements.

But this was impossible, since

value-neutral discussion of moral matters inevitably assumes a
moral relativist stance.

In matters of morality, Kohlberg denied that

psychology could be neutral.

(Compare Murdoch: "To say this is of

course also to deny that moral philosophy should aim at being
neutral.")

Kohlberg recognized that his objections to social relativism and

So far, philosophers will probably approve of Kohlberg's

behaviorism ran deeper than their failure to make sense of research

rebellion against this sort of background.

data.

lost its cachet in philosophy.

After all, the great virtue of behaviorism, according to its

Positivism has long since

Kohlberg's reading of analytic

devotees, is that it strictly limits itself to observable and manageable

philosophy, in particular R.M. Hare's Language of Morals,

data and rejects unnecessary theoretical entities.

him to break with the dominant philosophic assumptions of

B.F. Skinner was

encouraged

thus able to equate good with whatever provides positive

American social science of the 1950's, assumptions which are still

reinforcement.

distressingly prevalent in many ·schools of psychology and sociology.

According to Kohlberg, it is the "psychologists'

fallacy" (modeled on Moore's "naturalistic fallacy") "to think that a

The counter-assumptions which Koblberg made, which enabled

definition of morality could be made purely in terms of effectiveness

him to study the thinking of moral actors, and the research he built

in ordering research data without dealing with the philosophic

on those assumptions have greatly changed psychological thought

concern about what the truly good should be." (Kohlberg 2)

about morality.

In other

I will try to summarize both fairly.

words, psychologists who commit this fallacy slide from theories
which explain

behavior to theories which explain morality without

realizing they have moved from "is" statements to "ought"

Kohlberg's Prqject: Assumptions and Methods

statements.
Behind both behaviorism and social relativistic theories of
morality Kohlberg detected the influence of logical positivism.
(Kohlberg 278-279)

Social scientists typically tried to give value·

neutral definitions of moral matters, striving to limit their discourse

Kohlberg's writings show him to be conscious of three main
groups of assumptions underlying his work.
Influenced by Hare, Kohlberg tried to make metaethical
assumptions which seemed to him to fit with the ordinary use of
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words like moral and moral development.

Compared to many

psychologists, he was wonderfully explicit about what these were.

moral agents.

These processes would have identifiable formal

structures, structures independent of actual decisions by individuals
about moral dilemmas.

a. The assumption of value relevance implies that moral
concepts are not to be understood as value neutral. . .
b. The assumption of phenomenalism implies reference to
concious processes.
c. The assumption of universalism implies that moral
development has some features to be found in any culture. .
d. Prescriptivism is the idea that one ought or should do
something, not simply the idea that one would do it. . . .
e. Cognitivism or rationalism is the idea that moral
judgments are not reducible to, nor directly expressive of,
emotive statements but, rather, describe reasoning or reasons
for action where reasons are different from motive.
f. Formalism is the notion that there are formal qualities
of moral judgment that can be defined or argued upon
regardless of whether or not agreement exists on substantive
matters.
g. The assumption of principledness implies that moral
judgments rest on the application of general rules and
principles. They are not simply evaluations of particular
actions.
h. The assumption of constructivism implies that moral
judgments or principles are human constructions generated in
social interaction. . . .
i. These assumptions lead to a corallary assumption of the
primacy of justice. . ..Thus, moral judgments and principies
imply a notion of equilibrium, balancing, or reversibility of
claims. (Kohlberg 215-216)

In addition to metaethical assumptions, Kohlberg made certain

theoretical psychology assumptions.

In his research, Kohlberg looked

for Piagetian stages of cognitive development.

In the cognitive-

developmental tradition of psychology, Piagetian stages had four
characteristics: 1) different modes of thinking--structures--can be
distinguished which serve the same general function at different
times in an individual's life; 2) these structures appear in an
invariant sequence which in an individual can be sped up, slowed
down or stopped by societal influence. but not changed in order; 3)
each sequential stage forms a "structural whole," an underlying
organization of thought which the individual uses on a variety of
tasks; and 4) the stages form a hierarchical pattern in which each
succeeding stage integrates and displaces the earlier stage. (Kohlberg
238)

Kohlberg hypothesized that research would find such an

invariant pattern of stages in test subjects' thinking about moral
dilemmas.
Kohlberg made yet another assumption or set of assumptions.
He thought that moral philosophy would have no trouble giving a

These assumptions let us see what Kohlberg was looking for in

rational explanation for the pattern of stages in moral reasoning.

his research: conscious, rational mental processes which could be

Each stage would supplant the one preceding it for logical, not merely

found in all cultures and which progressed in an orderly fashion to

psychological, reasons.

produce principles of justice which would prescribe right actions for

be seen as moving .to higher, more adequate levels, finally issuing in

The development of moral reasoning would
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a general moral principle at the highest level.

He assumed, then, that

if research confirmed his hypothesis, that confirmation would tend to
support the normative claims of the philosophical principle which
best ordered the development of the moral reasoning stages as a
rational series.

Kohlberg realized that such claims--that psychology

could inform philosophic debate about normative ethics--would be
highly controversial.

Nevertheless, he stood by this third group of

assumptions and the conclusions derived from them until the late
1970's.

(Kohlberg 222)

Kohlberg first tested his hypotheses in a cross-sectional study
of three groups of boys, ages 10, 13, and 16.
social class and sociometric status.

Dilemma III: In Europe, a woman was near death from a
special kind of cancer. There was one drug t~at the doctors
thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a
druggist in the same town had recent!~ discovered .. The drug
was expensive to make, but the druggist was chargmg ten
times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the
radium and charged $4000 for a small dose of the drug. The
sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to
borrow the money and tried. every legal means, but he could
only get together about $2000, which is half of what it. cost. He
told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell
it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So,
having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and
.
considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his
wife.
Should Heinz steal the drug?
(Kohlberg 640)

The boys differed in

53 of these boys were subjects of

After asking a boy what Heinz or the fictional agents in the

a longitudinal study in which they were re-interviewed regularly at

other dilemmas should do, the interviewer probed the boy's thi~king

3-4 year intervals for 20 years. (Colby and Kohlberg 44)

with "why?" questio~s. e.g. "Is it actually right or wrong for him to

Interviewers asked each boy to respond to nine hypothetical
moral dilemmas.

The dilemmas addressed three problems of justice

steal the drug?"

"Why is it right or wrong?" etc. The purpose of the

interview was to determine if the hypothesized formal structures of

identified by Aristotle: distributive justice, commutative justice and

thinking about moral dilemmas would be present.

corrective justice.

and reasons were transcribed, which allowed them to be evaluated at

The dilemmas were grouped into three forms (A,

B and C), each of which had one dilemma of each kind.
Each dilemma consists of a short story which tells of some

The boys' answers

the time of the origi11al study (1957-58) and re-evaluated later.
Over the years, Kohlberg and his colleagues devised different

person facing a moral problem; the boys were asked what that

ways to score test subjects' responses.

person should do.2

"Sentence Rating" and "Global Story Rating," produced results which

An example, the famous Heinz dilemma.

The early scoring systems,

initially seemed to confirm Kohlberg's hypotheses.

But in the

longitudinal study and in other studies which sought to replicate
2 There is one exception to this: in dilemma .VII, the ques~on is which . of two
characters did the worse thing in a companson of cheating and stealing.

157

156

Kohlberg's work, these scoring systems produced enough sequence

Claims and Controversy

anomalies in moral stages to provoke a reworking of the scoring.
Kohlberg and his colleagues claim these revisions resulted in a

Beginning with "The Development of Children's Orientations

clearer differentiation of moral judgment structure from content.

Toward a Moral Order: Sequence iri the Development of Moral

The result, "Standard Issue Scoring," aims at greater objectivity and

Thought" in 1963, Kohlberg and (later) his associates have published

reliability by specifying clear and concrete stage criteria. (Colby and

over one hundred articles and several monographs presenting the

Kohlberg 43-44)

results of their research.

In the 1980's, the transcripts of the longitudinal

Having read only a fraction of these many

study were re-scored using Standard Issue Scoring and a blind rating

thousands of pages and a smaller proportion of the even more

system; different raters scored each form for each interview.

extensive secondary literature written in response to Kohlberg, I

The original study focused on boys from the Chicago area.

must again emphasize that what follows are what I deem the

Since 1958, however, researchers have done similar studies

important issues in cognitive moral development research.

(sometimes using slightly modified questions, depending on cultures)

since Kohlberg returns again and again to similar themes, we can be

including women, adults as well as children, and people in various

confident that they also reflect what he thinks important in his work.
In brief, Kohlberg and his associates claim that empirical

countries, including separate studies in Turkey and Israel.
Though one might want to break into the story at this point to
make analytical comments, we are not ready for that.

Before asking

what really drives Kohlberg's thought, I ought to summarize his early
public claims and the storm of controversy they aroused.

However,

Then we

need to see how Kohlberg and his colleagues modified their claims-and how they did not modify them--before evaluating those claims.

research tends to confirm his initial hypotheses.
Subjects seemed to use a coherent structural orientation in
thinking about a variety of moral dilemmas. Their thinking
developed in a regular sequence of stages, neither skipping a
stage nor reverting to use of a prior stage. The Standard Issue
Moral Judgment Scoring System was found to be reliable and
appears to be a valid measure of Kohlberg's moral judgment
stages. (Colby and Kohlberg 41)

According to Kohlberg's theory of moral stages, individuals'
thinking about moral issues develops through six discernable stages,
grouped by pairs into three main levels.

The preconventional level

is marked by the social perspective of the concrete individual, the
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conventional level

by a member-of-society perspective, and the

postconventional level

by a prior-to-society perspective.

Over time,

Kohlberg modified his definitions and claims about some of his

what you want and get along in a world where. other people have
interests of their own.
At the conventional level, stage 3 (Mutual Interpersonal

stages, especially stage 6, but the three main levels have remained

Expectations and Relationships), right is living up to expectations and

the same.

"being good," which includes trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.
The stage 3 person does these things in order to be a good person in

The six developmental types of stages defined in my
dissertation were divided into three major levels of
development:

her own eyes and because of her belief in the Golden Rule.

Stage 4

(Social Sytem and Conscience) brings an emphasis on law and a more

Level A. Premoral:
Stage 1--Punishment and obedience orientation.
Stage 2--Naive instrumental hedonism.
Level B. Morality of conventional conformity:
Stage 3--Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations,
approval by others.
Stage 4--Authority-maintaining morality.
Level C. Morality of self-accepted moral principles:
Stage 5--Morality of contract, of individual rights and
democratically accepted law.
Stage 6--Morality of individual principles of conscience.
(Kohlberg xxix)

systematic understanding of conventional relationships.

Right

Each stage gives different answers to Kohlberg's questions:

acts from a sense of obligation to the good of the whole group and

consists in fulfilling actual duties to laws and social groups,
motivated by the need to defend the society or institution from
breakdown.
At the postconventional level, stage 5 (Social Contract or Utility
and Individual Rights), right is impartiality and obedience to rules
mutually agreed upon--the social contract--in a world where people
have differing values and many rules are relative.

A stage 5 person

"What is the right thing to do?" and "Why should we do the right

belief in individual rights like life and liberty.

thing?"

Ethical Principles) individuals follow self-chosen ethical principles,

At the preconventional level, stage 1 (Heteronomous

Stage 6 (Universal

Morality), right is obedience and the avoidance of rule-breaking; the

which are seen to underlie the social contract.

reasons are avoidance of punishment and the power of

violate the principle of justice, one acts in accordance with the

authorities/parents.

principle rather than rules.

The stage 2 (Instrumental Purpose and

When societal rules

Belief in the rational validity of

Exchange) child follows rules only when it is to his immediate

universal moral principles motivates stage 6 behavior.

interest.

621-639, cf. chart 174-176)

Right is what's fair.

The reasons for right action are to get

(Kohlberg
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In his earliest published reports of his research, Kohlberg
called these stages developmental ideal types, rather than stages.
Only after longitudinal and cross-cultural data had been collected

invariant sequence of stages. (Kohlberg 426-446, Colby and Kohlberg
44-47)
Scoring changes brought about changes in age to stage

and a assessment method which revealed invariant sequence in the

correlations.

data had been developed did he write (in 1983) that the evidence

fairly rapid growth through the stages in youth.

As the longitudinal data were accumulating, a problem
emerged in Kohlberg's own research and that of others who tried to
A significant minority of the test subjects seemed to

revert from stage 4 to stage 2 around age 20.
returned to stage 4 or 5 by age 25.

For instance, in his

1969 paper, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental

justified calling them stages. (Kohlberg xxx)

replicate it.

Early reports by Kohlberg and his associates indicated a

All of these subjects

Evidently, college age relativism

played a role of some kind in a complicated and roundabout
progression from conventional to postconventional morality, in which

Approach to Socialization," Kohlberg reported that studies in the U.S.,
Taiwan, and Mexico all showed a marked progression from age 10, at
which far more than half of all subjects were at stages l and 2. to age
16, at which stage 4 had become dominant (about 30%) with stages 3
and 5 close behind and a significant minority (5-10%) at stage 6.
(Kohlberg 55-56)
significantly.

With Standard Issue Scoring, this picture changed

By the 1980's, no longer did Kohlberg claim to have

for a period of 2 or 3 years the individual would give responses

found any true stage 6 subjects, and no true stage 5 subjects were

characteristic of naive hedonism.

found before age 24. (Kohlberg 270, 458)

For a time, Kohlberg's research

team entertained the idea that real regression occurred in these
cases.

Then, since all of the "regressees" returned to higher stages,

In spite of these on-going struggles to organize and understand
a rapidly growing body of research. Kohlberg suggested far-reaching

they tentatively labelled them "stage 4 1/2," a transitional stage

conclusions and made recommendations for moral education based

between stages 4 and 5.

on his findings.

Eventually, the reversion problem and

other anomalies in stage scoring led Kohlberg and. his colleagues to
reformulate their scoring system.

By postulating A and B substages

First, regarding theoretical psychology, Kohlberg claimed that
the evidence showed that children developed morally in a

to the six stages of the system and more precisely defining the

generalizable pattern in which cognitive change was the key.

structure of thought in each stage, they obtained a scoring method

not deny motivation or emotional affect a place in morality, but

which they could claim was valid and reliable and which revealed an

claimed that their development was largely mediated by changes in
thought patterns. (Kohlberg 63-64)

He did

Many studies, including the
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famous research by Hartshorne and May in the 1920's, had indicated

and high school students in 1969, cognitive-developmental

behaviors such as cheating and lying correlated far more highly with

interventions were tried in a variety of institutional settings.

situational factors such as likelihood of detection than with the

engaged his students in Socratic classroom dilemma discussions for a

subjects' reported values, lending support to a behaviorist suspicion

semester.

of supposed entities such as "character traits."

them moved up a stage while a control group remained unchanged.

In contrast, Kohlberg

Blatt

With before and after testing, he found that a third of

claimed that cognitive and developmental factors did correlate well

(Kohlberg xii)

with Children's behavior, especially at stages 5 and 6. (Kohlberg 69-

were combined with democratic governance, e.g. in a high school

70)3

many school related decisions were put in the students' hands.
Second, concerning moral philosophy, in the 1971 paper "From

Is to Ought:

How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away

Where possible, in other interventions Blatt's methods

Evaluations made in connection with most of these interventions
reported individual stage progression. (Higgins, Power and Kohlberg

with It in the Study of Moral Development," Kohlberg argued that a

74)

normative philosophical theory which could explain the greater

of high schools in order to compare alternative schools, in which

adequacy of each successive stage revealed in his research would be

democratic governance was practiced, to regular schools.

isomorphic

research tentatively indicated that cognitive-developmental

with a psychological theory which explained why one

stage led to another.
theory.

(Kohlberg 223)

The two theories would be one

Thus, Kohlberg claimed that his research tended to support

the philosophic theory which best explained the progression of the
stages.

"From ls to Ought " left the reader with the unmistakeable

Later, attempts were made to measure the "moral atmosphere"

This

interventions could affect the moral atmosphere of a school as a
whole, as well as individual students.

(Higgins, Power and Kohlberg

103-105)
Given the sweeping nature of Kohlberg's positions, many social

impression that an adequate philosophic theory of justice would be

scientists and philosophers criticized the assumptions, methods and

some variety of Kantianism.

conclusions of cognitive-developmental moral psychology.

(Utilitarians were stuck at stage 5.)

Third, regarding moral education, education could be
structured so as to promote moral development.

Beginning with the

work of Kohlberg's graduate student Moshe Blatt with intermediate

Of these

criticisms, here are eight.
1.

A number of Kohlberg's critics seem offended by his non-

relativism or "absolutism."

Anthropologist Rick Shweder (421-424)

and psychologist Robert Liebert take this line, which can be read as
3 Obviously, these claims (in "Stage and Sequence," 1969) were made before
scoring revisions attenuated any claims about stage 6 and made stage 5 into an
adult stage.

the response of the behaviorist and/or social relativist in social
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science.

Liebert represents what he calls' the cognitive-behavioral

To the extent that this first criticism is simply a restatement of
traditional behaviorism, it explains much of the heat of the debate

approach, which

over cognitive-developmental moral psychology.
. . .assumes that appropriate responsiveness to environmental
consequences is the fundamental mechanism of biological
adaptation. Verbal and substantial behavior within the moral
sphere, like all behavior, is under the direct influence of both
objectively and subjectively perceived or anticipated
con~equen~es.
Any ~uch behavior is intended to gain reward,
a~o1~ pumshment, w1~ praise, or secure some other advantage
withm the payoff matnx of social interaction. It is not a
ror;riantic expression of moral goodness or principled thinking.
(Liebert 184)

reader of some literature in this field is struck mostly by the way
opponents talk past each other.

development" is moral sophistication, the abilty to secure
advantages in ever more efficient, powerful and complex ways.
Hard-headed relativism recognizes that all individual organisms
pursue their own interests.

"Moral maturity, from the cognitive-

behavioral perspective, involves the expression of increasingly
farsighted efforts to live pragmatically and pursue one's own self-

were based on assumptions he rejected.
2. Along with a restatement of behaviorism and relativism,
many of Kohlberg's critics in the social sciences took issue with

A good number of anthropologists and sociologists criticized
Kohlberg for ignoring the fact that moral values are dependent on
(The cultural relativism argument seems to be alive and

well in some fields, if not in philosophy.) His work was thus an
example of cultural imperialism.
first category.

Sometimes the differences center on

different interpretations of the same data.

For instance, Liebert and

Kohlberg both refer to studies of students who participated in the
free speech movement at Berkeley in the 1960s.

Liebert says the

original study published by Haan, Smith and Block in 1968 showed a
lack of correlation between sitting-in and scores on developmental
tests. (Liebert 186)

Kohlberg claims that when the original transcript

were rescored with "Standard Issue Scoring" (see above) there was a
clear and positive correlation between higher moral stage and

interest." (Liebert 185)

culture.

It goes without saying that Kohlberg

felt no need to adjust his theory to the criticisms of relativists, which

specific research findings.
Liebert goes on to say that what develops in "moral

The philosophical

We can place such objectors in this

sitting-in. (Kohlberg 541-546)

I will not try to adjudicate these

matters or say more about data debates.

They are not crucial to the

philosophical issues as I see them.
3. In early papers such as "Stage and Sequence" and "From ls
to Ought," Kohlberg claimed that many high school age students
reached stage 5, some even reaching stage 6.

A number of readers,

more sympathetic to cognitive-developmental moral psychology than
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Liebert or Shweder, wondered whether this made sense of adult

altruism and empathy, suggesting not only that they motivate much

development.

behavior, but that there may be links between the development of

early?

Do most people reach their full moral development so

Or are there adult stages of moral development?

As we have

seen, Kohlberg later retreated from some of these claims, partially in

empathy and justice reasoning.

(Hoffman 299-300)

5. Many critics noted that Kohlberg based his findings on data

response to critics who asked that his theory make some room for

drawn from hypothetical dilemmas.

the common sense notion that people continue to grow morally in

different phenomenological feel than hypothetical stories.

their 30's, 40's, and beyond.

assume that moral progress measured by responses to hypothetical

In particular, Jurgen Habermas'

But real life moral issues have a
Can we

suggestion of an adult "seventh stage" moved Kohlberg to modify his

dilemmas will be matched by progress on actual problems faced by

thinking, even though he rejected the idea of a seventh "hard" stage,

the test subjects?

that is, one that would meet Piaget's criteria. (Kohlberg 249-250,

which seem to indicate wide discrepancies between responses to test

385-386)

questions and moral problems created by researchers to mirror real

4. Some writers criticized Kohlberg for giving too simple an
account of moral motivation.

According to his theory individuals at

stage 5 and 6 are motivated by their rational appreciation of societal
structures, individual rights, impartiality, and universal principles.

Behaviorists like Liebert like to point to studies

life dilemmas, such as the Milgram experiments in which test

subjects were asked to administer painful shocks to other people,
though there were in fact no shocks given. (Liebert 186)
6. Kohlberg's most famous critic combined these last two

When someone realizes that his behavior violates the principles he

objections to his theory, his dependance on hypothetical dilemmas

recognizes as rationally valid, cognitive dissonance will move him to

and his neglect of actual motivations.

change his behavior.

women (a marked c;ontrast to Kohlberg's main longitudinal study)

But critics noted that later stages are supposed to integrate, not
obliterate, the insights of earlier stages.

Surely, even if people at

Carol Gilligan interviewed

about a problem they faced in their own lives, whether to have an
abortion or not.

It seemed to Gilligan that these women did not see

stage 6 act out of a need to live up to rational principles, people at

their problem in terms of principles (right to life versus right of self-

earlier stages often act from other motives.

determination), but in terms of care and responsibility (care for the

How does a stage 6

principle make room for the essential affective element in love?

self versus care for the other).

Such critics were not always unsympathetic to Kohlberg's general

be scored as a Kohlbergian stage 3. This Gilligan refused to do.

theory.

proposed two orientations to moral problems: the justice orientation

For instance, M.L. Hoffman has written a good deal about

Superficially, these responses could
She
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which organizes Kohlberg's stages and an orientation of care and
responsibility.

While most people use both orientations. she claimed,

most men use the justice orientation more while most women use the

which interact to produce behavior: (1) interpreting a situation, (2)
determining what ought to be done in a situation, (3) deciding what
one would do in a situation (given that human beings have other

care and responsibility orientation more.
I will note later how Kohlberg took Gilligan's criticisms into
account in modifying his theory.

wrote that psychology ought to study at least four inner processes

It should be noted that her critique

came from within cognitive-developmental psychology.

Her basic

approach to research fits well with Kohlberg's; though well-known,
her criticisms do not present a radical challenge to his assumptions.
7. The "psychologist's fallacy" which Kohlberg pinned on his
behaviorist opponents is a form of the naturalistic fallacy.

Yet, in

values in addition to moral values), and (4) implementing a course of
action.

Some research has been done in each area, but very little has

explored the interrelationships between these processes.

In Rest's

view, a conprehensive theory of moral development would
completely integrate all four.

Since Kohlberg's work tells us

something about the second and third processes, but not the first or
fourth, it cannot be considered at all complete. (Rest 27-33)

"From Is to Ought ," Kohlberg thought he could make empirical
Adjustments and Responses to Criticisms

findings inform normative ethical discussion without falling into the
naturalistic fallacy himself.

Many philosophers denied that he had.

From the beginning, Kohlberg's reading of philosophy had led
him to hypothesize moral development much like that he found in
the data.

It is no surprise, critics objected. that if you begin by

reading Kant your highest stage sounds like the categorical
imperative.

Such theory tainted research could have no bearing on

especially from the mid-1970's on.

Examples of his responses to

criticism:
1. Though he gave no ground to behaviorism or cultural
relativism in terms of his basic assumptions, Kohlberg became more
circumspect in presenting his findings.

normative ethical debate.
In time, Kohlberg greatly changed his Is to Ought claims,
though he did not ~bandon them completely (see below).
8. Several friendly critics charged Kohlberg not so much with
error as with narrow vision.

As noted above, Kohlberg modified some of his claims,

His work researched only one important

facet of moral development, they claimed.

For example, James Rest

For instance, he wrote that

the claim that stage 5 is a more adequate level of moral reasoning
than stage 3 was not

a claim that a person at stage 5 was better than

than someone at stage 3.

Similarly, Kohlberg repudiated any

intention of comparing different cultures in terms of moral
development. (Kohlberg 330-331)
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2. Against objectors who challenged his empirical data Kohlberg
simply produced more studies or otherwise defended his work.
3. Influenced by Habermas, Kohlberg gave up calling his theory
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theory.

In moving from the "identify thesis" to the "complementarity

thesis," Kohlberg gave up the heart of his "Is to Ought" claim. He no
longer thought that the success of a psychological theory which

one of moral development and decribed it as a theory which gives a

explained how one stage emerged from its predecessor could serve

"rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning."

as evidence for its complementary normative ethical theory.

(Kohlberg 217-224)

However, if a theory in psychology failed to account for the evidence,

Kohlberg learned from Habermas to think of his

work as hermeneutic interpretation of subjects' responses in test

that failure would count against the theory's philosophical

interviews rather than a positivistic test measurement.4

counterpart.

He stopped

So, in a way reminiscent of Popperian philosophy of

thinking of the interviewer as an observer and saw him as a

science, psychology might falsify a philosophical theory, but it could

participant in a dialogue.

not support it. (Kohlberg 318)

Necessarily, then, interviewers brought

their own normative beliefs to their interpretation of test subjects'

4. In Kohlberg's original theory, stage 6 represented the

The research goal became by imagination to enter into

endpoint of moral development, that of thinking and living in

responses.

the subject's way of seeing the world so that her responses could be
understood as rational.

This, of course, assumes

that subjects'

responses are rational; hence, the theory gives a "rational
reconstruction" of the development of thinking about justice issues.
Kohlberg did not retreat from his claim that the stages are
stages.

Human beings do move through just this sequence of ways of

thinking about moral dilemmas.
by empirical fact.

So much he claimed to be supported

But reading Habermas helped Kohlberg to see that

Kantian autonomy.

As I noted above, Kohlberg later abandoned any

claim to have found stage 6 in his research.

Stage 5 was also re-

envisioned as a completely adult development.
Along with these changes, Kohlberg showed increasing interest
in possible adult stages of morality. (Kohlberg 249-250)

He was

convinced that adult development did not fit Piaget's criteria for
hard structural stages (e.g. invariant sequence), but that important
changes--"soft" stages--did occur in adulthood.

Postconventional

his psychological theory which tried to explain the facts was

justice reasoning could tell a person what to do in a dilemma, but

complementary

Kohlberg found older subjects still asking Why be moral? and What

(rather than isomorphic) to a normative ethical

is the purpose of life?
4 I oversimplify events. As I have noted,
dissatisfied with their scoring methods for
moving toward a more interpretive stance
1975. Kohlberg's reading of Habermas in
philosophic grounding to this shift.

Kohlberg and co. had become
reasons of their own. They began
in evaluating interviews as early as
the 1980's confirmed and gave

Kohlberg thought older people often continued

a search for ethical and religious perspective on life, a search which
led to an integrative sense of morality fitting into a cosmic order.
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5. Though he had given up stage 6 as an empirically

persons as ideal ends in themselves (i.e., the ethic of care).
(Kohlberg 357)

supportable endpoint to moral development, Kohlberg continued to
hold that some endpoint was theoretically necessary.

A rational

reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning could be
proposed only from the standpoint of a goal.

If the sequence of

6. His outlook broadened by Gilligan's criticisms, Kohlberg came
to see his theory as explaining, not the whole moral domain, but a
part of it. His was a theory of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning,
not of morality.

stages is a rational one, to what do they lead?
In a major change, Kohlberg allowed that one could state a

(Kohlberg 212)

Further, he admitted that moral

reasoning was not the whole of morality; researchers had to address

stage 6 principle otherwise than in terms of a principle of justice, for

the connection of reasoning to moral action, which necessarily would

example, in terms of care or agape. (Kohlberg 273)

mean giving attention to questions of affect.

A researcher like

Nevertheless, Kohlberg

Gilligan need not accept the rather Kantian ethical theory which

remained convinced that justice reasoning played a central role in

undergirded his stage theory in order to study moral development

moral development, a point made explicit in "The Current

with it.

She could give a rational reconstruction of the sequence of

stages from the perspective of a principle of care.

But Kohlberg

rejected the idea that a care orientation was opposed to or
independent of a justice orientation.

In a passage of special interest

to this study, he turned to the Bible for an example of the tie
between justice and care:

Formulation of the Theory." (Kohlberg 304-307)

The primacy of

justice reasoning in morality united several of Kohlberg's concerns,
specifically that moral judgment is prescriptive, universal, cognitive
and structural.

"While the assumption of the primacy of justice has

not been 'proved' by our research, the fact that data collected under
this assumption meet the requirements of sequentiality, structured
wholeness, and relationship to action indicates the empirical

In the New Testament there are two alternative statements of
the Golden Rule. The first can be seen in the fairness
orientation as 'Do unto others as you would .have them do unto
you.' The second version is phrased in terms of the orientation
of care as 'Love they neighber as thyself.' Like other
statements of postconventional morality, the teachings of the
New Testament often integrate considerations of care and
justice presenting, as modern moral philosophy does, a view of
justice which is beyond either strict contract, strict retribution,
or strict obedience to rule. Rather, it is a view of justice which
focuses on ideal role-taking, a principle which can be called,
alternatively, respect for persons (i.e., justice) or caring for

fruitfulness of the assumption." (Kohlberg 308)
7. In later studies, Kohlberg and his associates tried to respond
to those who objected to his dependence on hypothetical dilemmas.
Interviews allowed test subjects to talk about their thinking about
such issues as military service, divorce, etc. in their own lives.

They

also tested high school students with "practical dilemmas," which,
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though still hypothetical, were set in situations in the students' own

work is useless.

schools. (Higgins, Power and Kohlberg 82-83)
8. Critics of Kohlberg's early claims persistently asked that his
theory make better sense of the gap between moral reasoning and
moral behavior.

fundamentally flawed.

In response, he and his colleagues distinguished

They then measured

judgments of responsibility by various interview techniques.
(Kohlberg and Candee 58-60)

much social science.

stage 4 reasoning about a deontic judgment might, for stage 3

One can disagree with Kohlberg without wanting

to re-enshrine relativism as a totem of behavioral science.
Regarding moral progress, Kohlberg's early presentations of his
theory (roughly, through 1975) go wrong in just about every way
they could.

Four main problems:

1. Kohlberg emphasized thinking, to the neglect of affect.

According to these studies, judgments

of responsibility lag behind deontic judgments (e.g., someone giving

Surely he has performed a valuable service by

pointing out and disagreeing with the positivistic assumptions of

between deontic judgments (judgments of right) and judgments of
responsibility (judgments of what I should do).

Saying this does not mean I think Kohlberg's

Of

course, this flowed naturally from his desire to defend the place of
rational cognitive processes in morality, and we cannot justly expect

reasons, make a different responsibility judgment about the same

a researcher to cover all aspects of morality.

issue), but they conform more and more closely to deontic judgments

extraordinary claims about the importance of cognitive processes in

at higher stages.

moral development.

Thus, the cognitive-developmental school admitted

But Kohlberg made

The very word "development" gives away the game.

that people's action~ often do not square with their words while still

Human

maintaining that change in the way people think about moral

beings may very well go through identifiable stages in the way they

problems is the main factor in change in their behavior,

think--about everything, not just moral dilemmas.

I am no expert,

but as a parent I am quite willing to believe psychologists who say
that at certain ages/stages children are ready to tackle certain

Critique

cognitive tasks.
A detailed account of the criticisms of and changes in
Kohlberg's theory has been necessary in order to say why it fails to
help us think about moral progress.

Kohlberg and company have

and would be alarmed if one of them did not.

It remains

Kohlberg wanted to

transfer the same expectation to moral development: here are the
stages that children naturally ought to move through.
I do not

been willing to hear objectors and change their theory; but the
changes have not touched the theory's deepest roots.

We naturally expect them to develop in these ways,

As

want to challenge Kohlberg on empirical grounds here.

noted above, many psychologists have questioned his empirical
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findings, but I am willing to assume that the stages of justice

to know. Now, should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not?" But

reasoning are pretty much as he describes.

this act orientation ignores the "fat relentless ego" which, as Murdoch

What I am challenging is

the move from "development of justice reasoning" to "moral

reminded us, makes it maddeningly difficult to see the facts of many

development."

situations.

ReaL moral development, if there is such a thing, must

include affective development.

We do not live in a world in which the facts relevant to a

moral problem are given; none of us face "Heinz" problems.

Kohlberg's theory has little room for moral regression.

This is

Indeed,

the first hindrance to moral progress is my inability to even see a

predictably.

The concept of development implies natural

problem.

progression.

One stage flows logically into the next.

problem of coming to see the moral world accurately cannot tell us

But we may

observe that a fact of the moral life is that people can get worse as
well as better.

I can give in to the easy view of things, in which

people are furniture in my world.
others.

I can quit loving.

much about moral progress.
3. Kohlberg emphasized ought rather than good, to the neglect

I can forget to pay attention to

I can fall back into the traps of narcissistic defenses in order

to feel good.

A research method which ignores the fundamental moral

Something is wrong with a theory

of "moral vision" (in a sense to be given in chapter six). "Ought" is a
minimalistic idea; like rationalistic moral philosophers, Kohlberg was
interested in what could be required of anybody in a specified

which so focuses on cognitive stages that it makes no sense of moral

situation.

regression.

good thing could be better, philosophers who emphasize the good

2. Kohlberg emphasized action, to the neglect of "seeing" (in the
sense of chapter two).

As I have noted, some of his critics attacked

his theory for not accounting for moral action, since people's actions
often differ from their reported thinking.

We should not let this

If

my goal is to do the rationally required right thing, I need properly
I

grounded rules of conduct and a high degree of conscientiousness.

something better.

Though he probed his subjects' thinking, it was always

I need something I can admire and pursue.

A

theory of ethics which does not give me a vision of the admirable

thinking directed to action.

does not give me anything to progress toward.

In the Heinz story, as in all the hypothetical dilemmas in
Kohlberg's original study, the details of the problem are given.

tend to ask how someone can get better in his particular situation.

But if my goal is to get better (e.g. become a lover), I need a vision of

criticism obscure the basically act oriented nature of Kohlberg's
theory.

In contrast, the good is a perfectionistic idea; since every

4. Kohlberg's is to ought claim rested on theory-tainted data.
In

effect, the interviewer tells the subject, "These facts are all you need

In an overarching way, this is true of his whole theory; it reflects the
assumptions of much modern moral philosophy.

In particular,
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though, Kohlberg wanted empirical psychological data to inform

as an example of standard modern ethical theory, only drawn from

normative ethical theory.

the ranks of psychology rather than philosophy.

But the data gathered were as much a

This matter is

product of his ethical beliefs as of the research which those beliefs

worth detailing a little.

shaped.

Kantianism and utilitarianism (Chapter 3, pages 79-82):

I am not now retracting what I said earlier, that moral

Compare the six points in common between

First, Kohlberg would agree with Kant and Mill that in morality,

philosophers ought to be "paying attention to psychological material

matters of principle come before matters of affect.

and the facts of morality that seem obvious to us." (Chapter 3, page

tell me that the first principle directs such and such an action; since

Standard theories

The problem with Kohl berg's is to ought claim was that he tried

certain dispositions (in psychological terms, certain affects) make

to established facts of morality on the basis of psychological material

such actions more probable, I ought to acquire those dispositions

which had been gathered in a search organized by those facts of

(affects).

morality.

that justice reasoning is primary in defining the moral domain.

100)

Even if, as Kohlberg believes, justice reasoning is central to

morality, responses to the Heinz dilemmas do not show it, because
the Heinz dilemma was constructed to focus on justice reasoning, not
morality.
As we have seen, Kohlberg later greatly changed the is to ought
claim.

He no longer said his data directly supported his theory, only

that if his data had been different they would have disconfirmed his
theory.

But, should we grant that this change answers the charge of

In another way of saying the same thing, Kohlberg says

Thus, while morally relevant emotions and sentiments are
part of moral development, it is important to distinguish
between the description or expression of a feeling about a
moral situation and the making of a moral judgment about it.
Expressions of the speaker's emotions about Heinz and the
druggist or about the feelings of Heinz or the druggist do not
directly constitute moral judgments. Such expressions tell us

something about the affective and ego development of the
subject, but they do not tell us anything directly about the
specifically moral development of the subject. (Kohlberg 293,
my emphasis)

theory tainted data, the later presentations of Kohlberg's theory
(after 1975) still do not correct the first three problems, though they
modify details of the theory considerably.

target, emotivism.

The reader will probably have noticed that the first three
problems I identified--that Kohlberg emphasized thinking, action and
obligation, to the neglect of feelings, seeing the facts and moral
vision--parallel main themes of this study.

I suspect a passage like this is directed against a familiar

In short, Kohlberg serves

But one need not make the emotivist claim that

all normative moral talk merely expresses feelings in order to insist
that affective and ego development are part of the "specifically moral
development" of a person.

18 1

180
Second, again like Kant and Mill, Kohlberg looks for rational
principles to adjudicate moral disputes.

And among rational

Sixth, Kohlberg's belief in the primacy of justice reasoning
suggests that he would agree with standard ethical theorists that the

principles, Kohlberg looks for a hierarchy, so that some supreme

main task of ethical theory is to describe the first principle of

principle will umpire between the secondary ones.

morality and show how it organizes the field.

The alternative

to principleness, Kohlberg believes, is relativism. (Kohlberg 296-300)
Third, Kohlberg agrees with standard ethical theorists in
regarding rational moral agents as interchangeable.

Moral judgments

are supposed to be applicable universally, not just to individuals
within a culture, but to people in all cultures.
Fourth, just as Kant does, Kohlberg's theory plays up one
motive of moral behavior, a kind of conscientiousness driven by a
need for cognitive equilibrium.

In Kant's terms, right actions are

performed in accordance with duty and from the motive of duty.
Kohlberg is not quite so restrictive, in that he does not question the

In response to Gilligan and other critics, Kohlberg allowed that
his theory covered only a part of the "moral domain."
We admit, however, that this emphasis on the virtue of justice
in my work does not fully reflect all that is recognized as being
part of the moral domain. We may note that, in addition to
justice, the moral domain also includes reference to a virtue
emphasized by Christian ethical teachings. This virtue, agape
in the Greek, is the virtue we call charity, love, caring,
brotherhood, or community. In modem American research this
virtue has been called prosocial behavior (see, for example,
Rushton [1982] and Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg [1977] or an
'ethic of care and responsibility' Gilligan (1982]). (Kohlberg
227)

validity of other moral motives at the conventional level, but the
only motive his theory seems to use (especially in his earlier
presentations of it) at the postconventional level is the cognitive
need to avoid disharmony between one's deontic judgments and
one's responsibility judgments, expressed in actions.
Fifth, implicitly rather than explicitly, Kohlberg uses law as the
model for ethics.

Readers can see this in the general tone of the test

dilemmas, as well as in dilemmas which ask for responses to
specifically legal problems.5
5 Examples from Kohlberg's original study: in dilemma III', which follows the
Heinz dilemma, a police officer wonders whether to report that Heinz stole the
drug; in dilemma IV', a doctor wonders whether to report a fellow doctor who

In spite of thus making room for love, and admitting that

justice reasoning was a part of morality, Kohlberg clearly believed
that justice was the central concept of morals.

Against this, I suggest

that we ought not to look for a most important rule.

It is not just

justice vs. love, though those are the terms Gilligan has pressed on
Kohlberg.

A voice from the religious tradition of our culture suggests

other important concepts of morals, also neglected by standard
ethical theories: "He has showed you, 0 man, what is good.

And what

does the LORD require of you? To act justly and to love mercy and to
mercy-killed a cancer patient; also in dilemma IV', a jury has to consider
whether to convict the doctor who killed his patient.
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CHAPTER VI

A VISION OF TIIE GOOD

Begin with stories of lovers.
Jean Donovan

Jean Donovan was a Catholic lay volunteer who worked with an
Ursuline sister named Dorothy Kazel in El Salvador. l

They traveled

the countryside in the midst of civil war in a white Toyota van.

They

moved supplies, gave rides to refugees, and helped villagers who
could not afford vehicular travel search for family members when
they "disappeared."

Jean was especially concerned to help children,

the orphans of war or other disasters.
Jean enjoyed a reputation among Maryknoll missionaries as "St.
Jean the Playful."

She had a guitar and a motorcycle; with one she

played Irish folk ballads, with the other she gave rides to children.
Every week Jean baked chocolate chip cookies for Archbishop
Romero--until his death in March, 1980.

As a lay volunteer, Jean

struggled to decide her future; should she marry or continue her
ministry as a missionary?

l Information about Jean Donovan has been taken from four anicles in the
December, 1990 (Vol. 19 No. 10) issue of Sojourners. See works cited.
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In late November, 1980, Jean and her friends hosted
Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White,

the U.S.

whom they had met at a

Thanksgiving service, at their base in La Libertad.

The ambassador

and his wife invited the sisters to visit in his official residence when
they next came to San Salvador.

were political activists on the side of the guerillas.

On March 18,

1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig suggested that the women's
van had tried to run a roadblock and ". . .there may have been an
exchange of gunfire."
It must also be said that Ambassador White, who was familiar

On December 1, 1980, Jean and

Dorothy, with Father Paul Schindler, took up the Whites on their

with U.S. efforts to investigate the killings until he was removed by

invitation.

the Reagan administration, insists that there was no evidence

They talked far into the evening and--since night travel

whatever for Haig's statement.

was dangerous--stayed the night.

Why was Jean Donovan in El Salvador?

On December 2, Jean and Dorothy did some shopping before
going to the airport to pick up some missionary friends.

Two of the

friends, Maura Clarke and Ita Ford, had been unable to get tickets for
the flight, so Jean and Dorothy returned to the airport to pick them
up at 6 p.m.

The four did not make it to La Libertad for a party

which had been planned for that evening.

Their friends, concerned

help explain.

Her own words may

In a letter to a friend,

Several times I have decided to leave El Salvador. I almost
could except for the children, the poor, bruised victims of this
insanity. Who would care for them? Whose heart could be so
staunch as to favor the reasonable thing in a sea of their tears
and helplessness? Not mine, dear friend, not mine.

for their safety, discovered the van the next day: abandoned,
stripped, burned.

On December 4, Ambassador White witnessed the

removal of the bodies of the four women from a shallow grave; they
had been first identified by their sandals, an item few Salvadoran
peasants could afford.

Jean's face had been crushed by a bullet.

At

In the question she asked the Whites on December l, the night

before her death,
What do you do when even to help the poor, to take care of
the orphans, is considered an act of subversion by the
\
government?

least two of the women had been raped.
Unfortunately, it must be said that respectable people soon
hinted that the churchwomen died because they were somehow tied
to one side in the civil war.

Ronald Reagan had just been elected

President of the United States.

Jeanne Kirkpatrick, designated by

Reagan to be Ambassador to the United Nations, said that the nuns

Jean Donovan died, I think, because she wanted to love
children in a place and time where there was little room for it.
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local presbyteries make most decisions without consulting regional or

Andre Trocme

national leaders.

Andre Trocme pastored a protestant church in the French
village of Le Chambon in the 1930's and 1940's.

When he and his

Chambon decided to stand by their pastor, even if he was listed as a
conscientious objector, an illegal status. (Hallie 84)

wife, Magda, and their four children moved to Le Chambon in 1934,
the village seemed to them to be dying.

Located on a high volcanic

plateau in Southern France, the village alternated between long, cold,
windy winters and a busy three-month tourist season in which the
villagers tried to fleece every coin they could from visitors.

Trocme

thought it was as if he had been called to help this inhospitable
village die. (Hallie 78)

To inject new life into the community, Trocme

fostered the opening of a school, a year-round enterprise which

In spite of criticism, the presbyterial council of Le

In the "temple" (a name of derision given to Huguenot churches
in France by persecutors in earlier centuries) of Le Chambon, Trocme
and Theis preached a message of active nonviolent resistance to evil.
Trocme scorned any connection between pacifism and passivity in
the face of evil.

Accordingly, he and Theis denounced the racism,

brutality and hatred of Nazi doctrine and urged the Chambonnais to
overcome evil with love.

They had no specific plan.

A follower of

Christ must simply be ready and look for creative ways to love when

would bolster the local economy. But the Cevenol School was to be
more than that.

Independent of the state school system, it would

the time came. (Hallie 85)
With German occupation of France, the time came.

show forth a spirit of peace, internationalism and nonviolence, causes
important to Trocme.

Trocme induced a conscientious objector friend

from university days, Eduard Theis, to come to Le Chambon as

A largely protestant village in Catholic France, Le Chambon
housed long memories of persecution of Huguenot forebears.
Trocme's energetic ministry soon tapped into the Chambonnais' sense
of community.

They became intensely loyal to him.

resistance to the Vichy government in Le Chambon was largely
symbolic; villagers refused to salute the flag or ring church bells
when commanded to do so.

assistant pastor and schoolmaster.

As Hitler's

Germany rearmed and French patriotism revived in response to it,
many people criticized the nonviolent ideals of the Cevenol school.
But protestant churches in France, since they are outside the
dominant Catholic church, have their own political structure in which

At first,

significant in their timing.
1940.

But these symbolic actions were
Imagine the situation for a Frenchman in

We have lost the war, yet we have a French government; the

leader is Marshal Petain, our great hero; French police enforce the
laws; and Germany seems certain to defeat its last foe, England.
Why, in this situation, should anyone make trouble by resisting?
would be pointless and hopeless.

It

The Chambonnais' quiet refusal to

salute and rings bells cut through this moral fog; they recognized and
were determined to resist evil. (Hallie 86-92)
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Refugees

love, an intensely practical readiness to do the good thing that lies at

began turning up at the Trocmes' door and were taken in.

A simple

hand, a love which included the persecutor as well as the persecuted,

phrase--"and were taken in"--but a phrase of illegal love.

For

draws our attention to Le Chambon.

Soon Le Chambon found more concrete ways of love.

refugees to be helped, they had to be hidden.
ration cards had to be made.

Andre Trocme was not a gentle person.

False identity and

called her husband a turbulent stream, thrusting its way with great

Some of the refugees had to be led

speed and force through and around obstacles, changing always as it

secretly to the Swiss border, others hidden until the end of the
occupation.

All this the nonviolent resisters of Le Chambon did.

time passed, they began to "specialize."

As

Le Chambon became a place

struck and flowed." (Hallie 47)

In contrast to the steady and self-

effacing Eduard Theis, Trocme could explode in great anger.

Trocme

described himself as un violent vaincu par Dieu, "a violent man

of refuge for children.
Resistance in Le Chambon was not that of a tightly controlled
organization.

"Magda Trocme once

Unlike the Cimade, an underground network created

conquered by God." (Hallie 265)

Briefly, in the late 1930's, Trocme

toyed with a plan to use his German fluency to get close to Hitler and

and led by Madeleine Barot and other women for the one purpose of

assassinate him.

helping refugees escape France, Le Chambon was simply, first and

from Jesus who rejected armed violence to counteract the crime

always, a village.

being prepared against him." (Trocme 5)

Few of the villagers knew whether or how many

Jews were hiding in their neighbors' houses.

But from the winter of

But he wrote that he feared "seperating himself

Trocme believed that Jesus'

example of love was one of immediate help to the concrete individual

1940-41, when Magda Trocme heard the knock of the first refugee

combined with a deliberate rejection of two things: violence

and immediately admitted a German Jewish woman, until the end of

committed in the name of massed individuals and "abstention," the

the occupation in 1944, no Chambonnais ever refused to give shelter

route taken by those who withdraw from conflict with evil. (Trocme

to a refugee and no Chambonnais ever betrayed a refugee. (Hallie

142-148)
Andre Trocme's passionate, active, inventive love led

196)

There were, of course, others who resisted the Germans.

eventually to his recognition as one of the "just ones" by Israel.

In

Especially as the war went on and Germany suffered defeats, people

1972, after his death, Magda planted his tree at Yad Vashem, the

joined various groups of the Maquis or De Gaulle's Secret Army.

memorial of the holocaust victims, along the path of the just ones.

Undoubtedly, such armed resistance required courage.
Chambonnais' courage that marks them as different.

It is not the
Rather, their
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How could he, a Christian called to love his neighbor, participate in a

John Woolman
Born in 1720 in New Jersey, John Woolman died in York,
England, in 1772.

He worked at times as an orchardist, dry goods

shopkeeper, schoolteacher and surveyor, though he found his lifelong
trade as a tailor could meet his financial needs.

Far more important

than any of these occupations, to his mind, would have been his role
as a Quaker minister.

As such, Woolman traveled often, by foot and

horse, through several of the English colonies in North America.
While working as a young man for a retailer, Woolman was
asked to write out a bill of sale for a slave.

"The thing was sudden;

and though I felt uneasy at the thoughts of writing an instrument of
slavery for one of my fellow-creatures, yet I remembered that I was
hired by the year, that it was my master who directed me to do it,
and that it was an elderly man, a member of our Society, who bought
her; so through weakness I gave way, and wrote it; . . . " (Woolman,
Journal

14-15) The sensitivity which made him see this as a moral

failure, a co-operation with evil, drove Woolman into a remarkable

used to bring wealth to white men?
lead to hatred and violence.

Since George Fox, who said that he "lived in the virtue of that
life and power that took away the occasion of all wars," Quakers have
In the early eighteenth century,

though, they had no such testimony against slavery; in fact, in
America, Quaker prosperity enabled many to own slaves themselves.
But Woolman saw that the getting and keeping of wealth is surely
one of the greatest occasions of war. (Woolman, Journal

162-163)

Surely this injustice could only

To be obedient to truth, Woolman felt

he must refuse to ever again cooperate with slavery.
Besides writing letters and pamphlets against slavery,
Woolman visited slave holding Quakers.

During these visits he spoke

against slavery and, since he was often hosted in slaveowners'
homes, paid for such hospitality--urging the masters to give the
money to their slaves, or else giving it to them directly--rather than
benefit from forced labor.

Further reflections on slavery led him to

abandon the use of sugar and clothing dyes, since both products were
heavily dependent on slave labor.

One could imagine that such direct

confrontation of slave owners would produce angry contention, if not
violence.

But Woolman's concern, in opposing slavery, was for the

evil effects of the system on the master as well as on the slave. His
gentleness, compassion and integrity won him a hearing even in the
homes of Quaker slaveholders.

ministry of love.

held a testimony against war.

system in which the labor of prisoners captured in African wars was

As a result of the ministry (agitation

would be the wrong word) of Woolman and other Friends concerned
about slavery, American Yearly Meetings officially disapproved of
slaveholding before Woolman's death.
Readers should not imagine that Woolman's ministry was
limited to opposing slavery.

He wrote and spoke about the

connections between wealth and luxury on one hand and social
divisions and war on the other.

In 1763, while the passions of the
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French and Indian war were still high, he visited Indians in

cheerfully noted episodes in which slave owners granted freedom to

wilderness country, an experience which led him to protest the sale

slaves after conversations with them and recorded decisions by

of alcohol to Indians. (Woolman, Journal

monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings against slavery.

134-139) In the last year

of his life he traveled to England to engage in ministry there.
One could analyze Woolman's motivations in many ways, but
the deepest source of his ministry was love.

For

Woolman, the quiet rest of an obedient and loving soul was the
important thing.

His thoughts about his

desire to visit the Indians (while confined all day to a tent in the
wilderness) probably apply to all his work.
Twelfth of sixth month being the first of the week and a rainy
day, we continued in our tent, and I was led to think on the
nature of the exercise which hath attended me. Love was the
first motion, and thence a concern arose to spend some time
with the Indians, that I might feel and understand their life
and the spirit they live in, if haply I might receive some
instruction from them, or they might be in any degree helped
forward by me following the leading of truth among them; and
as it pleased the Lord to make way for my going at a time
when the troubles of war were increasing, and when, by reason
of much wet weather, travelling was more difficult than usual
at that season, I looked upon it as a more favorable
opportunity to season my mind, and to bring me into a nearer
sympathy with them. As mine eye was to great Father of
Mercies, humbly desiring to learn his will concerning me, I was
made quiet and content. (Woolman, Journal 142, emphasis
added)

Herbert Nicholson
I wish that I could remember exactly when and where I first
met Herbert Nicholson. It seems I have known him all my life.
But I know it was sometime during the chaotic and turbulent
years of World War II. The memory is clearest about what he
did at Manzanar War Relocation Center. There I saw him bring
joy where there was sadness, hope where there was despair,
and love where there was hate. He brought these gifts to us as
we struggled for dignity behind barbed wire and watchtower. -Togo Tanaka (Nicholson and Wilke vii)

Born in 1892, Herbert Nicholson went to Japan as a Quaker
missionary in 1915.

While there, he met and married Madeline

Waterhouse, a Congregationalist from California.

The Nicholsons

continued in Japan, with occasional visits to the U.S., until 1939,
when the growing threat of war settled them in Southern California,
where they ministered in the West Los Angeles Japanese Methodist

When one reads William Lloyd Garrison or other abolitionists of

Church.

Though a lifelong Quaker, Nicholson cared little for

the nineteenth century, the sense of conflict, of a great social

denominational labels; he worked with anyone in whom he sensed

struggle, cannot be avoided.

the motions of divine love.

inward.

In Woolman, the struggle is quiet,

He did not measure his ministry by success, though he
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On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive

Along the way he revisited some of the relocation camps, urging the

Order 9066, permitting the removal and concentration of Japanese

young men not to make their situation worse by rioting.

Americans in the Pacific States and parts of Arizona.

Washington, military officials agreed with Nicholson that Japanese

In the rushed

In

evacuation that followed, many families sustained great losses in

soldiers had proven their loyalty, that drafting people from the

selling their belongings while others hastily stored their goods in

camps was unjust, and that the camps should be emptied.

warehouses or churches.

claimed public opinion demanded that the Japanese not be released.

By August, 1942, over 110,000 people had

But they

If Nicholson could demonstrate a public desire for the camps to open,

been interned without charge or trial.
Receiving permission to visit the camps in July, Nicholson

he was told they could be opened immediately.

So Nicholson

loaded a rented truck with pianos, hymn books, discarded library

organized a letter writing campaign, using contacts he had made all

books, and many other requested items and drove it to Manzanar,

over the western United States.

the relocation camp ,closest to Los Angeles.

In the next two years he

made numerous trips to the Poston and Gila camps in Arizona as well
as to Manzanar. Nicholson also drove to Topaz in Utah, Minidoka in
Idaho, Heart Mountain in Wyoming, and Amachi in Colorado.
(Nicholson and Wilke 80, 86, 98) On most of these visits he drove a
truck belonging to Tom Yamamoto, an internee, ferrying all sorts of
personal belongings to the prisoners.
In January, 1944, the United States began drafting Japanese
Americans into the Army.

(The famous 442nd, a special combat unit

Within four months, 150,000 letters

came to Washington, requesting the internees' release.

Nevertheless,

the release was not announced until December, after the 1944
election. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Mitsue Endo case,
which said that Japanese citizens could not continue to be held, was
subsequent to these political decisions. (Nicholson and Wilke 111122)

After the war, Nicholson raised funds for agricultural relief
efforts in Okinawa and Japan.

With the help of other volunteers, he

transported hundreds of goats, useful for their milk production, on

made up of Nisei volunteers, had been authorized in January, 1943.)

old liberty ships.

This additional injustice--drafting young men from among people

they ministered in hospitals, prisons and leprosaria regularly.

detained without trial, to serve in the military of the country which

1961, they retired to the United States.

considered them dangerous aliens--caused anger and bitterness in
the camps.

Herbert Nicholson decided to go to Washington, D.C. to

express his feelings to John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War.

Then he and Madeline resettled in Japan, where
In

In 1977, the 89 year old Madeline slipped into an unconscious

vegetative state.

I knew Herbert in those years, the late 70's and

early 80's, when, helped by his daughter Virginia, he cared daily for
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his comatose wife with patience and evident love.

In his nineties, he

parents felt as if Andrew's death had left a permanent hole in their
lives.

still visited Quaker meetings and other churches, speaking with

A few years later, an opportunity came to fill the hole.

humor and deep concern, urging people to trust God and grow in

My

older sister, a teenaged "juvenile delinquent" in the terminology of

love.

the day, was placed as a foster child with our family.
had already disrupted more than one foster placement.

Apparently

she saw something special in this home; a year later she asked Dad

A.K. Smith

and Mom to adopt her.

My father grew up in rural poverty in the Arkansas River
valley of southeastern Colorado.

State Foster Agency caseworkers recognized a good thing when

As a young man, he followed an

they saw it.

older brother to Washington State, where he worked in fruit
orchards, forests and factories of one sort or another.

And so, through the sixties and early seventies, a procession of foster

father's drama as a lover did not take place against the backdrop of

are still "Dad and Mom" to them.

My father and

mother married in 1948, in the heart of the baby boom.

adopted her.

Once again Dad is shepherding a child toward healthy

adulthood.

they adopted an infant boy born to a young woman in the hospital
When I was born in 1954,

followed by my younger sister in 1956, they felt they were only one
child short of the family size they wanted.

born in 1958--and died the next day.

Later, after my older adopted

brother's death, my parents took in Steve's daughter and legally

By 1951,

when they had not yet had a child (and worried that they might not),

families were common in those years.)

Some lived with us only a few

offically adopted, stayed through high school graduation; my parents

days, months and years of ordinary family life.

where my mother worked as a nurse.

children came to share our home.

months, some a few years. . Two of my brothers, though never

A story slow to unfold, it occupied the

Things started slowly, without being sought.

If these people could help a difficult teen, why not

persuade them to open their home to other hard to place children?

Unlike Jean

Donovan, Andre Trocme, John Woolman and Herbert Nicholson, my

war or massive oppression.

Her behavior

Stories and Vision

(Remember that large
I want to say two things in this section: 1) to grow morally, we

Then Andrew Smith was

need a vision of the good (to grow as lovers we need a vision of love),

After three ceasarian

deliveries, doctors forbade any more pregnancies for my mother.

My

and 2) visions are given through stories.
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pilgrims of one sort or another.
I should try to say what I mean by "vision."

Though

avoid some destination rather than another, or even make progress

importantly related to the topic of chapter two, what is meant here
by a vision of the good is not the same as the moral seeing of that
chapter.

Moral vision (chapter two sense) is the ability to pay

attention to the reality of other things and people, to see them as
subjects in their own right and have compassion for them.

A moral

vision (present sense)--of the good, or of love--is a global
understanding, involving rational thought, emotions, and imagination,
of something toward which a life can be directed.

A moral vision

seizes on some thing or person and makes that thing or person an

what we are pursuing or avoiding.2

Without such an understanding,

we may well waste our lives traveling in circles.

That we need a

vision is, I think, obviously true; I will make no more positive
argument for it. In the next section ("Vision and the Good"), however,
I will try to defend this assertion--that we need a vision of love to
grow as lovers--against an objection to it.
Modem moral philosophers do not write much about moral
vision.

But if, as Iris MurdocJ1 suggests, moral philosophers ought to

ask how we can make ourselves morally better (Murdoch 52), they

Note that as defined, many things can be the object of moral
I think, in fact, that people have different moral visions,

directed to different objects; that these objects of admiration and
pursuit are as various as

toward or away from some destination, we need to have a vision of

'.

object of admiration and pursuit.

vision.

If as pilgrims we want to reach or

success, greatness (military, artistic or

moral), racial purity, happiness, a theological or philosophical creed,

need to think about the goals toward or away from which people
travel in the moral life.

Given the assumptions and questions which

frame most discussion in ethical theory, assumptions and questions
generated by the myth of autonomous reason, we should not be
surprised that ethical theorists have largely ignored moral visions.

nationalism, integrity, renunciation, love, and many other things; and
that much of human goodness and evil results from the pursuit of
the objects of our moral visions.
The claim being advanced here is this.

To grow morally, we

need a vision of the good; more specifically, to grow as lovers we
need a vision of love.

We need to understand what love is in a way

that involves our emotions and imagination as well as our rational
thought.

The moral life is characterized by growth, motion, travel

(not, of course, in the behaviorist sense of public actions); we are all

2Readers might wonder at my awkward insertion of the idea of avoiding a
moral destination. An example might help. Hermann Graebe was a German
engineer working for the Todt organization in Poland and the Ukraine in
World War II. He did not want to believe reports that the Einsatzgruppen were
killing Jews. But then he witnessed an "action" in Dubno. Later, he said, "One
of the most terrible things I remember seeing--and that I have reported
before--was a father, perhaps in his fifties, with his boy, about as old as my
son, Friedel, was at that time--maybe ten years old--beside him. They were
naked, completely naked, waiting for their tum to go into the pit. The boy was
crying, and the father was stroking his head. The older man pointed to the sky
and talked quietly to the young boy. They went on speaking like that for a
while--! could not hear what they said because they were too far away from
me--and then it was their tum." (Rittner and Myers 40-41) Repelled by the
vision of evil this experience gave him, Graebe helped save over three
hundred Jews in Eastern Europe.
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Ethical theory generally is not interested in moral pilgrimage, but in

apart.

principles and decision procedures.

incoherency or ignoring some plain fact, the theological critic often

Even the accepted forms of

philosophical conversation--lectures, treatises, etc.--work against us.
As I have claimed in chapters three and four, standard ethical
theorists labor under the myth of autonomous reason.

As

Where philosophical critics often accuse the system of

accuses the system of ignoring an important facet of traditional
stories.
Stories have a staying power greater than theologies.

philosophers they are supposed to appeal to reason; the truth, moral

Theologies can go stale and lose their ability to hold people's

truth included, is supposed to be open to any rational mind that

attention.

cares to think.

step forward to shake the religious community and reshape the

Hence, we have the philosophical lecture, which aims

to be precise, coherent, and well-grounded.3
is never autonomous rationality.

But human rationality

Since human beings feel and

dream, moral truth (to say nothing of other truths) demands more
than rational apprehension.

Moral philosophy needs to make a place

theology.

When this happens, impassioned reformers sometimes

Whence the reformers' passion?

the stories with a fresh ear, as if for the first time.

Stories provide the stuff of visions .because they touch our
emotions and imaginations as well as our rationality.

By helping us

Engaged by the

story, tlrey try again to understand it, thus producing new theology.
Stories have a greater fecundity than theologies because they
are less precise.

for stories.

Usually, they have heard

Often reformers find them applicable to a new

generation's issues while the old theologies seem tied to tired
questions.

After centuries of repetition, having been used in

to a more global understanding of the thing we pursue, stories give

different ways by different theological systems, a story may

us a goal.

generate new questions (or old, forgotten questions) for theologians

a. Stories obviously engage the rational mind. Consider
theology, which can be characterized as attempts to systematize the
truth of stories.

Like philosophy, theology has in it opposing

movements of thought.

One theologian or school of theology builds

to ponder.
Obviously, I have special interest in some theological stories,
Biblical ones. But what is true of Biblical stories is also true of moral
stories in general.

Stories can engage the intellect.

Perhaps even for

up a position, much like the impulse in philosophy to construct a

those purposes of rational discussion, for which moral philosophers

metaphysical or epistemological system.

have adopted discursive lectures, they should consider telling stories.

Then critics tear the system

3 My remarks should not, of course, be construed as lack of appreciation for
precision. coherency, or well-groundedness. Would that my own writing had
these virtues.

204
b.

Stories engage the emotions.
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Lying there in bed, I began to weep again. I thought, Why
run away from what is excellent simply because it goes
through you like a spear? (Hallie 1-3)

Consider, for example, Philip

Hallie's account of his first encounter with Le Chambon and Andre
Trocme.

Hallie admits that an emotional reaction is not an infallible rule
There was once an art cnuc, I have been told, who had a sure
way of identifying ancient Maltese art objects: he found himself
crying before them. . .
Of course these are symptoms of an awareness of excellence. .
. .any doctor will tell you that symptoms are important, and
just as pain can be a symptom of disease, painful joy can be a
reliable reaction to excellence.
One afternoon I was reading some documents relating to
Adolf Hitler's twelve-year empire. . . .
Across all these studies, the pattern of the strong crushing the
weak kept repeating itself and repeating itself, so that when I
was not bitterly angry, I was bored at the repetition. . . .
On this particular day, I was reading in an anthology of
documents from the Holocaust, and I came across a short article
about a little village in the mountains of southern France. . . .
About halfway down the third page of the account of this
village, I was annoyed by a strange sensation on my cheeks.
The story was so simple and so factual that I had found it easy
to concentrate upon it, not upon my own feelings. And so, still
following the story, and thinking about how neatly some of it
fit into the old patterns of persecution, I reached up to my
cheek to wipe away a bit of dust, and I felt tears upon my
fingertips. Not one or two drops; my whole cheek was wet..
And so I closed the book and left my college office. . . .But that
night when I lay on my back in bed with my eyes closed, I saw
more clearly than ever the images that had made me weep. I
saw the two clumsy khaki-colored buses of the Vichy French
police. . .I saw the police captain facing the pastor. . .
Then I saw the only Jew the police could find, sitting in an
otherwise empty bus. I saw a thirteen-year-old boy, the son of
the pastor, pass a piece of his precious chocolate through the
window to the prisoner. . .I saw the villagers passing their gifts
through the window until there were gifts all around him. . .

by which to separate excellent things from dross.

But no theoretical

account of nonviolent loving rei:istance to evil, e.g. one of Andre
Trocme's more abstract sermons in the period before the war, can
cause wonder and admiration in us as can the story of the empty
buses. We rejoice to hear such stories. We wish we could be like
that.

Desiring to become like what we admire, sometimes we do (to

varying degrees).

c. Stories engage and feed the imagination. One could readily
admit that stories touch our emotions and intellect and fail to see
how important their affect is on our imagination.

I count

imagination--one function of which is to let me see the world from
someone else's point of view, even though I am not that person--as
crucial to character. (Cf. Chapter 2, p. 61)
I can imagine a world, and my own self, different from the way
they are now.
enough.

But this is possible only if my imagination is rich

An impoverished imagination, which cannot see the world

or the self other than they are, often lies behind the passive
indifference to evil which makes it possible.

Few alcoholic co-

dependents are aware that their "helping" and "patience" only enable
the alcoholic in their lives to destroy himself.
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Lack of moral imagination can cause evil.

I suspect that few

people who beat children think to themselves that they are doing
wrong.

They probably do not think much about it at all; this is just

the way children are treated in their world.

Child beaters do not

faced their greatest tests in time of war; Woolman and Nicholson
were Quaker ministers; and all but Trocme were Americans--and
even Trocme attended seminary in New York, where he met Magda.
These people are also different in various ways--their educations,
I think, though, that such similarities and

need to be told what they are doing is wrong so much as they need

social backgrounds, etc.

to be able to imagine themselves living in a world where children are

differences are superficial; the main thing is their common moral

treated differently.

vision.

The stories that feed a person's imagination probably indicate
that person's character more accurately than any doctrine of morals
she espouses.

What does she admire?

What does she pursue?

Of

Any moral theology based on the story of Jesus must make
sense of his saying that the commandments to love God and neighbor
surpass all other religious duties.

So Christian theologians and moral

course, the stories we profess to admire (such as the catalog with

philosophers have tried to communicate the primacy of love.

which I began this chapter) are not the only ones which shape our

story sets the bounds and provides the raw material for the

imaginations.

Stories of horrible, ugly and evil things often fascinate

us and help create our moral vision.

We hope that stories of evil will

theological task.

The

Most often, in the process of making a coherent

system out of the story material, the theologians and philosophers

always repel us, but sometimes we must admit that they attract us.

reduce things to ordered and connected propositions, such as, "the

In this regard, as in the matter of coming to see people accurately, a

commandments to love God and neighbor surpass all other religious

person can do something to aid her own progress. even if it is a

duties."

difficult and only partially effective thing.

We can--to some degree--

choose which stories will feed our imaginations.

me.

(So I include myself with the philosophers and theologians.
There is nothing wrong with trying to make sense of religious stories,

I have given a sampling of the stories which are important to

even producing an ordered propositional system or. a creed.

These stories are rooted in Christian non-violent ethics, the

problems come when we think the system we have made of the

agape

commands, which in turn are rooted in the story of Jesus.

They share other similarities.

Woolman, Nicholson and Trocme were

The

stories can replace the stories.)
Many people have noted the inability of such propositional

avowed pacifists; Jean Donovan, Trocme and my father were

systems to help moral pilgrims.

However true a theology is (by

especially involved with children; Nicholson, Trocme, and Donovan

definition, no theology is perfectly true; God is not captured in
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doctrine), it remains only an intellectual system, with limited grip on
our emotions or imaginations.

Stories, on the other hand, can give

better communicated by stories than by the propositions of a ethical
system. 4

people on the way -\risions which fire their passion and enlarge their
Vision and the Good

imagination.
So if I believe, for instance, that Jesus' command that his
followers love their enemies means that modern Christians ought to
be pacifists, how should I explain this to someone else?

vision of love" in this chapter.

I can

certainly arrange sentences in a logical "argument" that proves my
abstract proposition.
just war position?

Would this persuade a Christian who takes a
Almost surely not.

I have repeatedly used the phrases, "a vision of the good" or "a

Disagreement goes on and on

such talk reveals my naivete.

Some philosophers would object that
After all, what is "the good"?

Bernard Williams writes approvingly of Isaiah Berlin, who
"always insisted that there is a plurality of values which can conflict

between people who give good rational arguments for mutually

with one another, and which are not reducible to one another;

exclusive conclusions.

consequently, that we cannot conceive of a situation in which it was

Just war theologians know the arguments for

pacifism and pacifists are regularly confronted with the arguments

true both that all value-conflict had been eliminated, and that there

for just wars.

had been no loss of value on the way." (Williams 71)

I suggest the arguments do not persuade because the

Williams

disputants have differing moral imaginations; they see different

disbelieves in any Utopian future in which value conflicts have been

possibilities and give different accounts of events in the world.

eliminated; this could only be accomplished by the loss of some

how can I speak for Christian pacifism to a friend?

So

Perhaps if I tell a

story he will by it gain a moral vision in which pacifism makes sense.
Jesus' story is foremost for Christians, of course.

But Biblical

things which have been counted as virtues by people at different
places and times.
Utopians might object that such purported virtues represent

stories have been told so often and so overlaid with interpretation

false consciousness.

that they sometimes, leave us cold.

Kingdom comes, ferocity, sometimes prized in martial societies, will

Latter day stories capture the

imagination and make the theology based on Jesus' story come to life.

A pacifist Christian might claim that when the

be revealed as a false value.

A Marxist might claim that when

Clearly, moral excellence does not depend on believing
Christian theology, but it does need an imagination shaped by a
vision of the good.

I suspect that any vision of the moral goal will be

4 Cf. Kant's opm1on of moral examples (Groundwork 25-34), which is almost
diametrically opposed to mine. He claims that universal rational laws cannot
be based on stories; therefore, they are useless for pure practical philosophy.
But that is just the wrong use of stories.
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Iris Murdoch, on the other hand, thinks that good is unitary,
communism is achieyed, many bourgeois false values will fall by the
Williams shares Berlin's scepticisms about such claims: "As in a

way.

given choice at a given time one value has to be set against another,
so also there is loss of genuine human value over time." (Williams
76)

though she recognizes that such a belief is a consoling idea: "The
notion that 'it all somehow must make sense,' or 'there is a best
decision here,' preserves from despair. . . " (Murdoch 56-57)

wary of consolation, since it tempts us to believe all sorts of fantasies
and keeps us from seeing the real world.

Williams does not think the existence of such persistent
conflicts of value is a bad thing. He claims, for instance, that
aesthetic values sometimes come into conflict with moral claims and
that "while we are sometimes guided by the notion that it would be
the best of worlds in which morality were universally respected and
all men were of a disposition to affirm it, we have in fact deep and
persistent reasons to be grateful that that is not the world we have."
(Williams 23)

Williams illustrates his point by suggesting that it

would be a duller world if Gauguin, for conventional moral reasons,
had not gone to the South Seas.

A similar example: by many

accounts, Wagner was a scoundrel, a dishonest freeloader who
thought the world not only owed him a living but its constant
undivided attention.

Yet we are grateful that he lived and that

people allowed him to abuse them, for this enabled him to write
music.

Not all values we treasure are moral values.
Of course, conflict of values must be managed and, in some

circumstances, reduced.

But Williams denies that we have a rational

need to reduce conflict of values; rather, as I noted in chapter three,
social living gives us practical reasons to keep conflicts under control.
(Williams 81-82)

She is

attention to the virtues.

Nevertheless, she draws

How, for example, do we distinguish

between true courage and rashness, ferocity, self-assertion and so
on?

By reference to other virtues: the best courage is also steadfast,

calm, temperate, intelligent, loving, etc.5

Her suggestion is that the

virtues are connected, and that increasing moral sophistication
reveals increasing unity.
Now it might be supposed that my contentions in this chapter,
in particular my contention that to grow morally we need a vision of
the good, depend on this debate being decided in favor of Murdoch
and against Williams.

If there is not "the good," but only many

incommensurate goods, how can it make sense to speak of "a vision
of the good"?
This supposition is wrong for two reasons.

First, if Murdoch is

right and the good is unitary, its unity is on a ratified level, as she
5This suggests a possibly better way of putting the contrast between the
Chambonnais and the Maquis. I said before that they were both couraaeous
and that it was . the Chambonnai_s' love ':"hich drew our attention. Perh:ps we
shouI? say that 1t was the supenor quality of the Chambonnais' courage, in
that 1t was m~rked by love rather than hatred, which makes us admire them.
Someone convinced of the unity of good might even suggest that the Maquis
exhibited ferocity rather than true courage. Someone who thinks like
Williams, that goods are not unitary, would prefer the first way of putting the
matter.
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recognizes.

"It might be said that 'all is one' is a dangerous falsehood

at any level except the highest; and can that be discerned at all?"
(Murdoch 56)

Believers in a single good might think (like the
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people at least) worth greater attention, in which case we should
speak of the need for an egoistic vision or a vision of beauty.
As readers could guess, I am more inclined to agree with

utopians Williams disagrees with) that some of what appear to be

Murdoch than Williams.

goods really are not.

that if morality becomes less important to us we will still have a

But they would also have to agree that the

One reason lies just here.

ultimate good might well appear as diverse goods in a penultimate

concept of morality, only a different one.

world.

Finite creatures can only collect or pursue a finite number of

far to go on this line.

goods.

If the number of penultimate goods is large (as believers in

computer; achieving high scores is a good.

Williams says

But he does not say how

Suppose I like playing electronic games on my
But achieving high scores

the unity of good would probably admit). finite creatures can only

on computer games requires time, a precious commodity for a finite

pursue some of them.

creature.

So even if there is (in an ultimate sense) only

If goods are incommensurable, it may not make sense to

a (single. true) vision of the good, finite creatures will necessarily

ask how the good of achieving high game scores measures against the

pursue (limited and probably diverse) visions of the good.

good of spending time with my sons (or writing philosophy).
seems I can measure these goods against each other.

Secondly. if Williams is right and there exist many

Yet it

How far can

incommensurable goods. this fact in no way diminishes the role of a

our concept of morality be modified by admitting the idea that goods

vision of (some) good in human development, whether that

are many and unique before it becomes unrecognizable as morality?

development is moral progress (or regress) or something else.

So

long as one admits that character develops, that human beings are
always on the way, one must admit the importance of the goals
toward which or away from which people move.
incommensurability of goods could
is

worth much attention or effort.

Believers in the

question whether moral progress
Williams notes that scepticism

But all this is beside the main point. Even if goods are many and
unique, we need a vision of a good to pursue it.
So, whether good is unitary or not, people on . the way need a
vision of something admirable to pursue.
make a suitable object of admiration.

But not just anything will

The admired good must be rich

enough to support global understanding; it must engage reason,

about certain features of the concept of morality, such as its being

emotions and especially imagination.

I cannot yet have a vision of

independent of luck and its being grounded in a moral order, may

the good of achieving high computer game scores.

lead to scepticism about the importance of morality. (Williams 39)

it; there is not enough there.

Perhaps egoistic values or aesthetic values would seem (to some

which presented achieving computer games scores as admirable,

I cannot enter into

It would be hard to imagine a story
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though I suppose some master storyteller could do it.

In contrast,

the stories of lovers with which I began, even in the truncated forms
in which I presented them, appeal to our emotions, challenge our
understanding and enliven our imagination.

I suspect that stories of

lovers will always be richer than stories of computer game high
scorers.

Gentiles of the Holocaust displayed the characteristic of
psychological solidity, then a question arises that my wife and
face all the time as we raise our young son: How does one
nurture that powerful and benevolent sense of self-esteem?
(Rittner and Myers 138)

Murdoch would agree and would have no trouble explaining

why, for love is much more closely related to good than computer

This returns us ·to the questions of chapter one: how can I
overcome my need not to know?

How can I help my children to

know that they are worthy citizens of the world just as they are,
without meeting impossible standards of beauty, success, or moral

game success is.

perfection?
Sauvage also raises a question about stories and the language

The Good and the Journey

we use to tell them.
Pierre Sauvage was born in Le Chambon in 1944.

Later, he

became fascinated with the story of the village that sheltered his
parents, making his very existence possible.

His film about the

Chambonnais' resistance during the war, "Weapons of the Spirit,"
makes important connections between a vision of the good and
healthy self esteem.

The Chambonnais identified themselves as

Christians; their vision of love was shaped by Andre Trocme's and
Eduard Theis's presentation of the New Testament story.

But

Sauvage also points out that they had a solid sense of who they were,
as individuals and as a people.

He asks a question.

If, indeed, it is true that the people of Le Chambon and
elsewhere had a very secure, very anchored sense of self, a
spontaneous access to the core of their being, that resulted in a
natural and irresistable proclivity to see the truth and act upon
it, and if it is indeed true that many or all the Righteous

The people of Le Chambon, through their individual and
collective actions, endangered the lives of each and every one
of them. Yet, there, too, the risks are acknowledged but not
considered to have been a critical part of the decision-making
process. We tend to interpret this, and indeed dismiss it, as
modesty. But could it be that everybody, except the
courageous themselves, attaches more importance to courage
than is warranted? Could it be that whenever we
overemphasize the courage of the righteous, we do not
communicate anything about its nature or help to encourage its
emergence?
A glib reference to the courageous, selfless people of Le
Chambon may thus have a hollow ring to our ears and generate
no real responsiveness in these people, because such words
correspond to an empty concept. Perhaps the subconscious
intent of such vocabulary is in fact to make such people seem
essentially different from you and me, and thus not really, not
challengingly, relevant to our daily lives.
How do we learn to view the people of Le Chambon, and
others like them, as people with a solid, productive grasp on
life, and not as incarnations of fairy-tale virtues which we can
then preach about and/or ignore? (Rittner and Myers 139-140)
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But stories of latter day lovers can give us access to the

story of Jesus, and multiple stories can give us access to the story of
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consolatory power of this idea.) If she is right, or if some religious
doctrine of grace is true, then moral pilgrims can expect wonderful
surprises.

Selfishness is almost impossible to escape, and a vision of

the good may seem almost impossibly high; but if we pursue the
vision, real moral progress can occur.
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CHAPTER VII

ON ORDERING LOVES

Readers of chapter six, "A Vision of the Good," may have been
unsatisfied with the cursory attention given there to the problem of
incommensurable goods.

It described how Iris Murdoch and Bernard

Williams can be taken as representatives of two sides, one which
affirms the ultimate unity of goods and one which denies any such
unity.

The aim, of course, was simply to defend the importance of

moral visions and the stories which give them, whichever side was
right.

One need not take Murdoch's side to see that a moral vision

can help the moral pilgrim.

But if goods are incommensurable, the

fact that they are must condition the way we think about many
issues in moral philosophy, hence the reader's unsatisfaction with the
discussion in chapter five.
Clearly, not all the ramifications of the alleged
incommensurability of goods can be discussed in a short space, so
this chapter will focus on just one problem connected with it, which
may be called the problem of ordering loves.

We will find that this

problem is a central one, consideration of which will reveal
something right and something wrong in the ways the
incommensurability of goods has been expressed by philosophers.
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given in utilitarian or Kantian ethical theory--Wolf claims we will

The problem of ordering loves arises if someone loves more
than one person or thing and if those loves can conflict with each

find a contradiction between that ideal and other ideals we hold,

other.

even though, she says, "it is generally assumed that one ought to be

I will take it for granted that lovers do love more than one

If we are not as morally

person or thing and they often find these loves in at least prima facie

as morally good as possible." (Wolf 419)

conflict.

good as we could be, she says, the generally accepted view marks

Whether loves remain in conflict after all things have been

considered is part of the problem; philosophers who assert the

this down as a failure, attributable to imperfections in our nature.

incommensurability of goods will say yes, while philosophers who

But the ideal of moral goodness, of either main variety, may conflict

believe in the unity of good affirm that ultimately all right loves will

with other ideals we have of a good life, that is, the sort of life it

harmonize.

would be good to live.

Discussion of this problem could begin at a number of places.

I

Wolf points to several non-moral excellences which good lives

will start with Susan Wolfs article, "Moral Saints," which raises in a

may display, such as haute cuisine, athletic prowess, artistic skill,

distinctive way the plurality of goods people pursue.

biting humor, skill in interior design, etc.

Consideration

Her criticism of moral

of Robert Adams' response to Wolf will define more clearly the issues

sainthood begins (1) by accepting these non-moral ideals of the good

involved.

life as things we ought to admire.

Since moral relativism is never far from the discussion of

"In general, the admiration of and

the incommensurability of goods, I will explore what Bernard

striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal

Williams and John Kekes have to say about relativism and how Kekes

excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people

distinguishes between a pluralism of goods and relativism, defending

to have." (Wolf 426)

the former against the latter.

world has practically unlimited opportunities for doing moral good

Only after considerable exposition,

then, will I try to say something constructive about ordering loves.

Then she notes (2) the empirical fact that our

(alleviating hunger, homelessness, illiteracy, etc.). So, if we ought to
do as many morally excellent things as possible, there will be no time

How Good Should I Be?

or energy for non-moral excellences.

Since for Wolf both (1) and (2)

are true, she says w,e have to change in one of two ways; either we
In "Moral Saints," Susan Wolf writes with some awareness of
the importance of moral visions, though she write of "ideals" rather
than visions.

If we strive to be as good as possible--as that ideal is

should improve our theories of ethics so they produce an ideal for
which we can strive without excluding non-moral ideals, or we
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should realize that it is not generally true that we should be as
morally good (as expressed in a theoretical ideal) as possible.
Wolf describes two general pictures of moral saints.

The

Loving Saint genuinely finds her happiness in the happiness of
others; her desires are unlike most people's.

The Rational Saint has

ordinary human desires, but for duty's sake always acts in the
interests of others.

Both lives are other directed: "dominated by a

commitment to improving the welfare of others or of society as a
whole." (Wolf 420)

Neither gives a place to the pursuit of non-moral

excellences, since "if the moral saint is devoting all his time fo
feeding the hungry or healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam,
then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe,
or improving his backhand." (Wolf 421)

Utilitarian theory will

generally approve of the Loving Saint, and Kantians will like the

he could achieve by giving himself to feeding the starving or housing
the homeless. (428)

Further, even if the utilitarian did increase

general happiness through some excellence (say, playing a really
beautiful game of chess), he would value the excellence because it
produced general happiness.

But this is backwards, says Wolf, "it is

not because they produce happiness that these activities are
valuable; it is because these activities are valuable in more direct
and specific ways that they produce happiness." (429)

Utilitarianism,

it seems, cannot escape Wolfs criticism of moral sainthood.
Wolf considers two versions of Kantianism.

The first, which

takes cognizance of Kant's belief that we have a duty of benevolence,
falls victim to a criticism similar to that leveled against
utilitarianism.

A duty of benevolence in a world full of unmet basic

needs such as the world we have would leave little room for

Rational Saint. (Wolf 427)
A utilitarian, Wolf admits, need not preach moral sainthood for
everyone.

cooking, art, or whatever) could be preferred reasonably over what

Utilitarians recognize the great variety of interests,

talents, and pleasures which people admire.

If very many people

intellectual or artistic excellence.

And, to the degree that the Kantian

did develop non-moral excellences, it would be out of respect for the
"dignity that members of our species have as a result of being

devoted themselves to the interests of other people or society as a

endowed with pure practical reason. . . .But [that] is hardly what one

whole, then necessarily some of these good making things would be

expects to be dominantly behind a person's aspirations to dance as

neglected and the general happiness would suffer.

well as Fred Astaire, to paint as well as Picasso, or to solve some

So the utilitarian

would approve of most people pursuing personal values.
about the utilitarian himself?

But what

Wolf says he would have to devote

himself to moral sainthood; no improvement in the general happiness
which he could achieve by pursuing personal values (through

outstanding problem in abstract algebra, and it is hardly what one
hopes to find lying dominantly behind a father's action on behalf of
his son or a lover's on behalf of her beloved." (Wolf 431)
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potential to deserve moral praise." (433)

The second version of Kantianism, Wolf says, sees in the
requirement to universalize maxims a limit to moral saintliness.

We

In sum, the minimalistic

version of Kantianism unnaturally limits the scope of morality, while

could not desire that everyone's every action be an act of

the perfectionistic version falls prey to Wolfs criticism of moral

benevolence, and we can treat others as ends without promoting

sainthood.

their interests at every moment.

In this version of Kantianism, we

fulfill our moral duty by observing a list of specific duties.

Beyond

Wolf concludes that utilitarianism and Kantianism cannot avoid
projecting an ideal of moral sainthood.

In general, she doubts that

these minimum requirements, morality has nothing to say, so this

any theory of morals could be constructed which would not come

interpretation of Kant will not yield an ideal of a moral saint.

into conflict with our beliefs that certain non-moral excellences ought
to be pursued in preference to purely moral interests. (434)

Interestingly, Wolf criticizes this second Kantianism for just

We are

driven to the only remaining alternative, i.e., we should change our

that feature of it that avoids the problem of moral sainthood.

attitude toward moral theories.
For to put such a limit on one's capacity to be moral is
effectively to deny, not just the moral necessity, but the moral
goodness of a devotion to benevolence and the maintenance of
justice that passes beyond a certain required point. It is to
deny the possibility of going morally above and beyond the call
of a restricted set of duties. Despite my claim that allconsuming moral saintliness is not a particularly healthy and
desirable ideal, it seems perverse to insist that, were moral
saints to exist, they would not, in their way, be remarkably
noble and admirable figures. (432)

If some ethical theory leads to an

untenable ideal, as both utilitarianism and Kantianism do, we should
not count that against the theory.

Rather, we should recognize that if

we want to live "perfectly wonderful" lives, we may well not live
"perfectly moral" lives. (436)

It is not true, according to Wolf, that

we should be as morally good as possible.
Wolfs argument moves between two foci, moral goods and
non-moral goods, while my interest in this study has been love.
While "good" and "love" name significantly different concepts, whose

I think that Wolf rightly has put her finger on something

relationship is complex, they are enough alike for Wolfs conclusions

important here, which I have tried to express in terms of admiration
and pursuit of a vision.

Morality consists not only in keeping certain

minimal requirements, but also in pursuing something excellent.

As

Wolf says, "A moral theory that does not contain the seeds of an allconsuming ideal of moral sainthood thus seems to place false and
unnatural limits on our opportunity to do moral good and our

to bear on the problem of ordering loves.
Think of an executive in a famine relief agency.

Her fund

raising and project planning literally save lives, but she feels as
though the time her work takes is stolen from her husband and
children.

We can describe this as a conflict of two goods, but it is just
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as appropriate to describe it, as the woman might, as a conflict of two
loves.

How can she answer the legitimate calls of two loves?

This

dilemma is familiar to nurses, teachers, ministers, and many others.
We can imagine a second example, in accord with Wolfs
emphasis on non-moral goods, in which a love for one's family
conflicts with a love for intellectual excellence.I

A philosopher, to
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discipline our emotional attachments, to order our loves.

The

utilitarian's highest attachment is to the general welfare, while the
Kantian's is to rational duty.

The good person subordinates all other

loves to the supreme love.
Wolfs criticism of moral sainthood serves to criticize utilitarian
and Kantian theories as ways of ordering loves.

The complete victory

take an obvious example, might describe the conflicting demands

of moral goods over non-moral goods does not seem to lead to what

made by thinking and writing on one hand and children on the other

we want in a good life.

as a conflict of two loves.

something strange in speaking of love for the general welfare or

He will want to order them properly, not

so that he can devote himself entirely to whichever is more

At an even more fundamental level, there is

rational duty.

important, but so that he can give to each love the attention and
energy it merits at that time in the context of his life as a whole.
I think this desire to rightly order one's loves is a common,
though perhaps not often recognized, feature of serious attempts to
live good lives.

It stems from a fundamental desire that a life--

including its emotional side--make sense, that it not be basically
arbitrary, rigid or chaotic.

Standard ethical theories can be read not

only as prescriptions of the right thing to do, but as ways to

1 I will ignore, in this discussion, the objection that "love" is wrongly used in
relation to things. It is, for example, hard to reconcile a "love" for a wellplayed sonata or even for the playing of the sonata oneself with the notion I
approved in chapter two, that agape (defined as accurate vision and
compassion, Murdoch's "just and loving gaze") is an indispensable ingredient
in all loves. How does one have fellow-feeling for a thing?
We could be fastidious, using "like" for our feelings for things and reserving
"love" for sentient beings. But this would get us nowhere. After all, we do say
we love sonatas. beautiful paintings, and all the non-moral goods which
interest Wolf. And, whether we say like or love, we still admire and pursue
these things; we still have the problem of ordering our loves. How much of my
limited time and energy should I give to the many varied things I admire?

Moreover, there is something odd about the idea of morality
itself, or moral goodness, serving as the object of a dominant
passion in the way that a more concrete and specific vision of a
goal (even a concrete moral goal) might be imagined to serve.
Morality itself does not seem to be a suitable object of passion.
Thus, when one reflects, for example, on the Loving Saint easily
and gladly giving up his fishing trip or his stereo or his hot
fudge sundae at the drop of the moral hat. one is apt to wonder
not at how much he loves morality, but at how little he loves
these other things . . . .The Rational Saint, on the other hand,
might retain strong nonmoral and concrete desires--he simply
denies himself the opportunity to act on them. But this is no
less troubling. . . .[One suspects the Rational Saint of having] a
pathological fear of damnation, perhaps, or an extreme form of
self-hatred that interferes with his ability
enjoy the
enjoyable in life. (Wolf 424)

to

That standard ethical theories can be read as prescriptions for
ordering loves does not mean they should be read that way.

Since

the main theories of ethics are directed to the non-specific rational
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being, they necessarily treat emotions as secondary to actions

Adams' criticism of Wolf centers on her definitions of moral

(usually understanding them as dispositions to action), because

sainthood.

emotions are specific and personal while actions are conceived as

(1) "

.a person whose every action is as morally good as possible"

independent of particular agents.

(2) "

.a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be" and (3)

For such a theory, rightly ordering

She says, at different points, that a moral saint is

loves is only important as it increases the odds that right actions will

"[a person] dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of

be performed.

others or of society as a whole." (Wolf 419, 420) Wolf treats these

The moral agent would do better to improve his

ability to calculate utility or recognize duty (and--in both cases--

definitions as equivalent, Adams implies, though they are quite

become more conscientious) than to order his loves.

different. ("Saints" 394)

Noting, but not discussing, Wolfs

If the desire to order loves is as important as its common

controversial limitation of morality to the welfare of others in the

occurence would suggest, we must look elsewhere for clues to how to

third definition, Adams concentrates on the confusion between the

do it.

first two definitions.

Wolf does not offer any explicit suggestions in this regard,

The second, he says, ". . .probably comes closest

since her project was a critical one and focused on goods rather than

to expressing an intuitive idea of moral sainthood in its most general

loves.

form." ("Saints" 396)

At most, she can be read as suggesting that loves for moral

goods need not always outrank loves for non-moral goods.

We need

to tum elsewhere to further sharpen the question.

But Wolf seems to think that to be as morally

good a person as possible one's every action must be as morally good
as possible.

Against this, Adams says, "The idea that only a morally

imperfect person would spend half an hour doing something morally
Maximal Devotion

indifferent, like taking a nap, when she could have done something
morally praiseworthy instead, like spending the time in moral self-

Robert Adams, in his response to Wolf entitled "Saints," agrees
with much that she says.

She is right to reject the ideal of a life

devoted only to moral goodness and to insist on the place of nonmoral goods in a good life.

Also, she is right to think that a moral

examination, is at odds with our usual judgments and ought not to be
assumed at the outset." ("Saints" 394)
In "Saints," Adams writes to defend the desirability of
sainthood against Wolfs attack.

By confusing her first two

theory ought to ". . .contain the seeds of an all-consuming ideal of

definitions she has made her argument's premises irrelevant to her

moral sainthood"; that is, we ought to be able to be devoted to

conclusion.

something. (Adams 401)

morally good as possible (conceived in the narrow sense of

Adams agrees that a life whose every action was as
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promoting the interests/rights of others and not the self) might not
be a good life.

But, since a person whose every action is as morally

good as possible is not equivalent to a person who is as morally
worthy as can be, Adams thinks that Wolfs argument does not show

She is unable to see how any theory could give a viewpoint from

which moral and non-moral values could be ordered, so "at some
point, both in our philosophizing and in our lives, we must be willing
to raise normative questions from a perspective that is unattached to
any particular well-ordered system of values." (Wolf 439)

that sainthood is undesirable.
Since Wolf goes awry, in Adams' view, through confused
definitions of saints, he offers his own: "Saints are people in whom
the holy or divine can be seen." ("Saints" 399) Wolf rejects saints, he
thinks, because she conceives of moral saints, people devoted to
morality, whereas real saints are people devoted to divine reality.
"What interests a saint may have will then depend on what interests
God has, for sainthood is a participation in God's interests.

And God

. . . is not so limited that His moral concerns could leave Him without
time or attention or energy for other interests." ("Saints" 399)
A saint, e.g. Albert Schweitzer, can recognize that humanitarian
commitments have a higher claim on his life than treasured artistic
and intellectual pursuits and still find time to play piano while
serving in a medical mission in Africa.

2)

"Very likely that time could

have been employed in actions that would have been morally
worthier, but that fact by itself surely has no tendency to disqualify
Schweitzer from sainthood, in the sense in which people are actually
counted as saints." ("Saints" 397)
In Religion and the Foundations of Ethics, Adams notes that
underlying Wolfs attack on moral sainthood is an acceptance of what
Thomas Nagel has called "the fragmentation of value." ("Devotion" 1-

Adams

readily accepts that "we may be faced with hard and painful choices
about which we are bound to have conflicting feelings." ("Devotion"
4)

But he finds the idea that we may just have to accept fragmented

values "deeply disturbing."
Where I have written about ordering loves, Adams speaks of
integrating a person's motives.

If values are fragmented, motives

will be chaotic rather than integrated.
To have inner conflicts is not necessarily to be at war with
oneself; the difference is important, but not easy to explain.
If I am at war with myself, I will sometimes have no better
explanation for a decision than to say, 'There was a fight in me,
and this side won.' The two sides in me will look at each other
with unsympathetic hostility, and perhaps with a sort of
incomprehension. For from the perspective of the motives that
favor one side in the conflict, no value can be seen on the other
side.
·
If I am at peace with myself, I may still have conflicting
motives, but they will be related in such a way that each, so to
speak, can acknowledge the others as good and as belonging to
the same family . . . . Few if any of us, I imagine, have fully
attained such inner harmony, but it seems a desirable part of a
motivational ideal.
.. .I need an inclusive perspective; ideally, none of my
motives would need to be simply suppressed. And if I am not
to be just a battle-ground on which now one side wins and now
another, I need a basis for saying what is most important to
me. . . . There certainly need not be any algorithm or set of

233

232
rules that would predict my preferences and decisions. But my
values must form a system at least in the sense that my
motives have enough kinship among themselves for me to be
at peace with myself in the way I have indicated. . . . And I
must be attached enough to the system to have a reasonable
constancy over time in the pattern of what I care about, and
how much; otherwise I become again a fluctuating
battleground, and it will be hard to speak of character or
integrity in my case. ("Devotion" 5-6)

denying that character and integrity figure in good lives in the way
Adams thinks.

In the language of this chapter, Adams sees a

practical need to order loves to avoid inner chaos and arbitrariness;
an opponent may, however, see no need to order loves because she
may not see inner chaos or arbitrariness as inimical to a good life.
Adams finds his "inclusive perspective" in a sort of religious
platonism in which "a love for art, an aspiration to intellectual

We may note here that the "ideal" of which Adams writes
consists in a harmony, or order, among a person's motives.

Such

honesty, a regard for the welfare of one's neighbor, and all other
good motives [are] forms of love for God." ("Devotion" 11-12) He

harmony would not remove inner conflict in the sense of "hard and

suggests that loves for these things are loves for God in three ways.

painful choices," since conflict may arise from sources other than

First, loved things may resemble God. ". . . a pattern of caring about

disordered motives, e.g. from finitude.

goodness makes one a person who cares about what is in fact a sort

The heart of this passage is Adam's use of "need" and "must": "I
need an inclusive perspective. . . I need a basis for saying.

. my

of resemblance to God, whether one knows it or not.

God is the focus,

identified or unidentified, around which such a pattern of motivation

values must form a system. . . I must be attached enough to the

is organized.

system."

thought or state of mind that has God as its intentional object." (15)

What kind of necessity is proposed here?

"otherwise I become a fluctuating battleground."

A practical one:
The persuasiveness

This is obviously not an explicit love that involves a

Second, we may enjoy God in enjoying something else.

As we enjoy

of Adams' argument rests on his readers feeling a similar practical

other people in our experience of their personal characteristics--their

need.

voices, their touch, their feelings and ideas--so we may enjoy God in

Adams assumes that "character" and "integrity" name qualities

that readers will recognize as part of good lives.
then, a logical refutation of Wolfs position.

He does not give,

The "fragmentation of

creation or in our enjoyment of fellow creatures. ( 16-18)

Third, we

may share God's love for something else, e.g. a fellow creature.

"The

values" disturbs Adams because it conflicts with his idea of a good

most obvious point here is that love for God can be manifested in

life, which includes. stable character and integrity of person.

wanting

The

philosopher who disbelieves in any unity of goods, who finds goods
incommensurable, could avoid the power of Adams' "need/must" by

to share God's love for what is good in the creation." {20)

We should note again, that in offering this "inclusive
perspective," Adams does not offer a decision procedure for deciding
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between moral and non-moral loves.

Someone who loves both the

cello and her children may face recurring difficult choices between
practicing her instrument and being with her children, even if she
sees both as gifts from God.

Nor does Adams think that everyone

should order loves alike; different people have different vocations.
Only ultimately do all true loves harmonize; in a penultimate world
lovers may feel unresolved conflict between the calls of various
loves. But by seeing all loves for goods as forms of love for God,
Adams thinks he avoids a fragmentation of values in which the

"A person may be perfectly wonderful

without being perfectly moral," Wolf says, but wonderfulness is not
thereby enthroned as a standard by which morality could be judged.
Sometimes normative questions should not be answered by
reference to any ordered system of values, but by "intuition." (Wolf

439)
The disagreements between Adams and Wolf suggest two
questions.

First, is Adams' theistic version of an "inclusive

perspective" the only way to order loves or integrate motives?
Under the influence of platonism, Christian theology has traditionally

competing "sides" of a person stare at each other with

identified the good with God, though in the process non-moral goods

incomprehension.
Adams' reader might wonder just what he has gained by an
ideal of devotion which gives so little aid to agents trying to decide
between moral and non-moral goods.

moral saint. (Wolf 435-436)

I think Adams' best response

would be that he gains just that, an ideal of devotion.

If Adams is

right, it is at least possible to order rightly my loves, even if it is like
an artistic accomplishment rather than a correct application of a
decision procedure.
Wolf, having dethroned moral sainthood as anything to which
we ought to give maximal devotion, seems willing to have nothing
take its place. If Wolf is right, it will never be possible to order my
loves rightly ; any such ordering must necessarily be arbitrary.
While she insists that "the ideal of moral sainthood should not be
held as a standard against which any other ideal must be judged or
justified," she does not condemn the person who aspires to be a

have often received little approbation.

Adams wants to maintain the

identification of the good with God, but to recognize and explicate the
place of non-moral goods in the good which God is. If, like Adams,
someone wants to avoid an internal battle between mutually
incomprehesible "sides," need he be, as Adams is, a monotheist?

I

will briefly discuss this first question, but only after considering the
second.
Second, is it possible to believe in the incommensurability of
goods without slipping into moral relativism, and if so, how?

Wolf

says, "Moral sainthood should not be held as a standard against
which any other ideal must be judged or justified."

Suppose again,

as in chapter six, I were to devote myself to achieving high computer
game scores.

Can trivial items of life become ideals? If so, should

not such ideals be judged against moral standards?

Perhaps by
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emphasizing "any" I distort Wolfs intent, but philosophers who have

the claims she made in "Moral Saints" applies to all of them: "they

defended the incommensurability of goods have taken pains to

call into question the assumption that it is always better to be

defend the idea against such charges of relativism.

morally better." (Wolf 438)

We will turn to

Now, if 1) it is at least sometimes better to do and/or be less

two of these next.

than the morally better, and 2) there is no ordered system that can
tell us whether this time is one of those times, but instead we rely on

How Pluralism Does Not Imply Relativism

intuition, then it seems that 3) no claim of the form, "this is a time
The contagion of a philosophical idea can spread rapidly and
broadly in a culture.

One might speculate that this indicates

something deeply human about philosophizing, a notion flattering to
philosophers.

rejected, except as it conflicts with intuition.

Since people's moral

intuitions vary, (3) is a version of moral relativism.

I suggest that

part of the ready acceptance of the pluralist cluster is due to the way

I doubt, however, as I have noted in other

connections2, that philosophers' ideas infect by virtue of their logical
power or rightheadedness (as philosophers would like to believe),
but because they answer a feeling or desire already present in a
culture.

when it is better not to do/be the morally better thing," can be

Someone whose anthropological theory emphasized

it can so easily be made to imply moral relativism.
Several philosophers who advocate one or more elements of
the pluralist cluster have written to distinguish its claims from
relativism.3

Bernard Williams, for example, lists four denials which

communal notions rather than individuality might go so far as so say

the claim that values are incommensurable can be thought to

that a culture calls forth certain philosophical ideas, rather than a

involve:

philosopher's ideas changing a society.
Susan Wolfs attack on moral sainthood, the fragmentation of
values, the incommensurability of goods, and the plurality of values
are familiar themes in recent writings on ethical theory.

These

terms, though not synonymous, constitute a cluster of ideas (I shall

1. There is no one currency in terms of which each conflict of
values can be resolved.
2. It is not true that for each conflict of values, there is some
value, independent of any of the conflicting values, which can
be appealed to in order to resolve that conflict.
3. It is not true that for each conflict of values, there is some
value which can be appealed to (independent or not) in order
rationally to resolve that conflict.

call them the "pluralist cluster") which have received a ready
acceptance in certain parts of our society. •What Wolf wrote about
2 Cf. Chapter 1, p 29.

3 While this section focuses on Bernard Williams and John Kekes, cf. also
Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, pp. 200-203. Nagel thinks that the
"fragmentation of values," (his own phrase) can be overcome from within a
moral point of view.
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4. No conflict of values can ever rationally be resolved.
(Williams 77)

that it be impossible to "live within" both systems of belief, a phrase
Williams admits to be vague.

Williams thinks that the believer in incommensurability (such
as himself) will support (1), (2), and (3), but need not accept (4).
(Williams 77, 80)

The obvious quality which differentiates denial (4)

from the first three characterizes most defenses of the pluralist
cluster against moral relativism.
that some

The first three denials simply mean

conflicts of values are not rationally resolvable, while the

fourth says that all

conflicts of values are conflicts which are not

rationally resolvable.
Williams makes a similar point

when he tries to say what is "the truth in relativism."

He introduces

a mental machinery which he claims can be applied to all sorts of
The problems of relativism can only arise,

he says, if there are two or more "systems of belief" which are in
some specifiable way "exclusive of one another." (Williams 132-134)
Williams deals with a number of worries in defining these terms,
worries which I will pass over, since the basic ideas are clear enough.
The problems of relativism concern communication and issues of
preference between conflicting systems of belief.

Williams admits

that a conflict between systems of belief may be hard to define, since
some systems of belief are so different that they cannot be compared
at all.

a "locus" of the exclusivity between the systems of belief.

There has

to be at least one description of some belief or action which the two
systems will agree is an adequate description of that belief or action,
but in regard to which the two systems give differing answers.
(Williams 136)

In ethics, for example, two systems of belief might

agree on the description of an action and disagree whether it is
morally correct to perform the action.
With this machinery in place, Williams introduces two

In a later essay in Moral Luck,

relativism. (Willaims 132)

To further set up the problems of relativism, there needs to be

(Think of the contrast of the cosmological beliefs of a primitive

villager with those of a university astronomer.)

All that is required,

Williams says, for systems of belief to be exclusive of each other, is

contrasting concepts: "real confrontations" and "notional
confrontations." (Williams 138)

A real confrontation between two

systems of belief occurs when some group of people which holds one
of the belief systems could "go over" to the other, provided that 1)
they could remain sane, and 2) they could acknowledge the
transition in the light of a rational comparison of the two systems of
belief. (Williams 139)

Notional confrontations are like real

confrontations in that some holders of at least one of two systems of
belief are aware that the systems exclude one another.

But in a

notional confrontation there is no "real option" of going over to the
other system of belief.

An astrophysicist cannot go over to the

cosmological beliefs of a primitive villager because the transition
could not be acknowledged as rational; a psychiatrist cannot go over
to the delusional beliefs of her schizophrenic patient without losing
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her sanity; and a German businessman cannot go over to the beliefs
of a medieval Samurai, because there is no way of living the life that
accompanied them (perhaps he too would be considered insane).

Of

A

real confrontathm may become a notional confrontation for the same
person at a different time, and vice versa.

No sharp line divides real

and notional confrontations; it is a matter of degree. (Williams 139)
In real confrontations, Williams says, we use a "vocabulary of
appraisal," i.e., true vs. false, right vs. wrong, acceptable vs.
unacceptable, etc. (Williams 141)

confrontation." (Williams 141)
With all this background, Williams is finally prepared to say
what the truth of relativism in ethics is, and is not.

course, confrontations between some systems of belief are notional
confrontations for some people and real confrontations for others.

[system of belief] when it is standing in purely notional

Relativism, with regard to a given type of [system of belief], is
the view that for one whose [system of belief} stands in purely
notional confrontation with such [a system of belief], questions
of appraisal of it do not genuinely arise. This form of
relativism, unlike most others, is coherent. The truth in
relativism--which I shall state, not argue for--is that for some
ethical outlooks at least this standpoint is correct. (Williams
142)

We must use some vocabulary of
Williams claims this formulation of relativism protects two

appraisal in real confrontations, because real confrontations present
us with live choices and we need to be able to think and express our
feelings about those choices.

We can

use the vocabulary of appraisal

in notional confrontations, and, since confrontations form a

truths.

First, sometimes, i.e. in a real confrontation, we need to have

a way to characterize and evaluate a system of belief not our own;
second, sometimes, i.e. in a notional confrontation, a system of belief

continuum from purely notional ones to purely real ones, we will

is so foreign to us that it is inappropriate to apply the language of

often use a vocabulary of appraisal for confrontations which lie

appraisal to it.

somewhere in the middle.

But for at least some distantly notional

confrontations of systems of belief, the language of appraisal is
inappropriate.

Williams writes, "While the vocabulary can no doubt

be applied without linguistic impropriety, there is so little to this use,
so little of what gives content to the appraisals in the context of real
confrontation, that we can say that for a reflective person the
question of appraisal does not genuinely arise for such a type of

The problem with "vulgar relativism," the view,

Williams says, "which combines a relativistic account of the meaning
or content of ethical terms with a non-relativistic principle of
toleration," is that it fails to see the difference between real and
notional confrontations and treats real confrontations as if they were
only notional. (Williams 142-143)
Beneath the complex machinery, in "the truth in relativism" we
again see Williams distinguishing between pluralism, the idea that
some conflicts of value are past rational discussion and evaluation,
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we all live in relationships with friends, family members, sexual

and relativism, the idea that all conflicts of value are past rational
discussion and evaluation.

partners, and/or enemies. (Kekes 51-52)

However, while Williams claims that at

Some evil ("complex evil"), Kekes says, derives not just from

least some value debates are rationally resolvable, he does not say
much about which he thinks are rationally resolvable, or how.

such universal human characteristics as the ones he lists, but also

In

from the particular conceptions people have of good lives.

contrast, John Kekes' Facing Evil can be read as an extended

For

example, self-actualization may represent a universal psychological

discussion of how, in one area of moral interest. moral relativism is

need, but a person's pursuit of self-actualization in some particular

false.
Kekes offers a particular conception of morality, which he calls

complex, since it is a frustration not merely of the basic universal

utilitarianism, and other forms of what he labels "choice-morality."

Facing Evil,

In

Kekes gives his attention almost entirely to the evil-

avoiding aspect of character-morality, a concern he thinks is greatly
underexamined by most ethical theories. (Kekes 3)
Kekes focuses not on all evil, but on what he calls "simple evil."
Simple evil is the undeserved violation of the minimum
requirements of human welfare.

"The minimum requirements are

universally human, culturally invariant, and historically constant
feaLures of human life." (Kekes 51)

Some evil

consists of the undeserved thwarting of such desires, but such evil is

"character-morality," in contrast and opposition to Kantianism,

Character-morality has evil-avoiding and good-producing aspects.

way--through art or music, let us say--is not universal.

As examples of the minimum

requirements Kekes mentions physiological requirements such as
food, drink, sleep, etc.; psychological requirements related to
universal human psychological characteristics such as the desire to
go beyond meeting physical needs by meeting them in ways we
count as desirable, and our capacities to think, remember, have
emotions, etc.; and sociological requirements created by the fact that

need, but also of the particular conception of a good life the person
has.

In regard to complex evil, as well as in regard to people's

various conceptions of goods, Kekes agrees with the pluralists.
contrast, simple evil is objective.

In

"Since morality is concerned,

among other things, with minimizing simple evil, there are some
objectively true or false moral judgments.

They are objective in the

sense that they concern factual matters, and whether the facts are as
judged is independent of the moral attitudes of the person judging.
Let us call this the thesis of the objectivity of simple evil." (Kekes 535 4)

Kekes gives other theses of character-morality, nine in all.
(Kekes 155-156)

They develop character-morality in a way

dramatically opposed to "vulgar relativism" as Williams described it.
If simple evil is the undeserved suffering of harm that violates a

universal, minimum need, then it is irrelevant whether the agent
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who caused the evil intended it--Kekes' second thesis.

"Whether

agents choose to cause evil has a bearing on our judgments of the
agents, but not on whether simple evil has been caused." (Kekes 155)
Taking his cues from examples and tragic literature, Kekes says that
people may cause simple evil through their habitual, unreflective
actions.

So simple evil is reflexive--the third thesis.

character traits that regularly issue in evil actions.

"Vices are

In evil people,

vices are dominant character traits resulting in enduring patterns of
.the vices of agents may result in their agents'

evil-causing actions.

themselves being evil." (Kekes 155)

embody some particular arrangement of goods are also
incommensurable. . . .
However, before we allow ourselves to be swamped by the
rhetoric [of relativism], we should remember that infanticide,
child prostitution, suttee, female circumcision and footbinding,
rampant disease, . . .torture, . . .beating,. .. corruption, and
political instability are also parts of other forms of life. Is it
really true that external moral criticism of these evils is always
illegitimate? . . .
The reason why the progression from pluralism to relativism
is illegitimate is that it involves disregarding the objectivity of
simple evil. . . .There are some things that are harmful for all
people, always, everywhere; as we have seen, human welfare
has certain minimum physiological, phychological, and social
requirements. . . . Consequently, relativism about simple evil is
mistaken. (Kekes 232-234)

Without an exposition or even a listing of all Kekes' theses, the
reader can see the direction he is heading.
desert.

Kekes believes in moral

A clear-eyed look at evil forces us to see that some people,

whether they choose to or not, habitually cause objective evil.

In its

Though far more explicit than Williams about how relativism is
false in regard to some moral judgments, Kekes adopts the same
basic position as Williams.

For both these writers, the pluralist

evil-avoiding aspect, morality should seek to minimize the damage

cluster is right, but . needs to be distinguished from relativism.

done by such people, a project Kekes goes on to theorize about.

some conflicts of values cannot be resolved rationally and some

At the end of his book, Kekes relates his study to the pluralist
cluster and to the relativism that is sometimes read off it.

While

conceptions of a good life cannot be appraised from within other
conceptions of a good life, it does not follow that no actions and forms
of life cannot be judged as evil, worthy of disrepute and avoidance.

It is widely, but by no means unanimously, accepted by those
who share our sensibility that there is no summum bonum, no
such thing as
best life for human beings. Let us call this view
pluralism . . . . I think that pluralists are right, although I have
not discussed the merits of their case here. The reason I
broach the topic now is that there is a tendency in our
sensibility to go on from pluralism to relativism, which
constitutes another obstacle to facing evil.
Relativists suppose that one consequence of the
incommensurability of goods is that the lives that aim to

a

Obviously, Williams and Kekes do not directly address the
problem of ordering loves or Adams' similar problem of integrating
motives.

Still, we would be on solid ground to say that in regard to

the visions of goods which people pursue, both would deny the
possibility of giving a rule for ordering loves.
plural and incommensurable.

Loves, like goods, are
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5. Therefore, to avoid simple evil a very large number of

A tension exists between this defense of the pluralist cluster

people need to be lovers.

and the denial of the possibility of love-ordering rules, a tension

6. People need a vision of love to pursue in order to grow

which points out something wrong in the thesis of the
incommensurability of goods.

as lovers.

We are now ready to see where that

7. Therefore, to avoid simple evil a very large number of

tension lies.

people need a vision of love.
Why We Need a Vision of Love to Avoid Simple Evil
Comments on the steps in this argument:
1. I make this as a generalization from empirical studies, which

Williams and Kekes defend the pluralist cluster by
distinguishing it from relativism.

In particular, Kekes says that while

the goods that people pursue are incommensurable, it is objectively
true that there are some evils which everyone ought to avoid.
Obviously, this defense of the pluralist cluster depends on the

provide overwhelming evidence of the detrimental effect of
emotional deprivation on infants.

includes psychological characteristics among the universal minimum
requirements of all good lives.
2. This follows from #1 and Kekes' definitions of simple harm

possibility of distinguishing between the goods that people may
pursue and the evils they must avoid.

Consider, then, the following

argument, which assumes Kekes' definition of simple evil.

Kekes, as noted above, explicitly

(violation of a universal minimum requirement of good lives) and
simple evil (undeserved simple harm).
3. Kekes writes, "the only acceptable moral reason for

1. Every human infant has a need to be loved.
2. Therefore, if an infant is undeservedly not loved, she
has suffered simple evil.
3. There is an enormous number of infants, none of whom
deserve not to be loved.
4. Only a very large number of lovers will be able to love
the infants and prevent them from suffering simple evil.

overruling the presumption against simple harm being undeserved is
that by doing so the general concern of morality is better served."
(Kekes 56-57)

And, "What makes individuals deserving is that they

have certain characters or they have acted in certain ways." (Kekes
57)

I take it, then, that no infants are undeserving of love.
4. This proposition is a matter of practical, not logical, necessity.

A defender of the pluralist cluster might suggest that even the
requirement of a "very large number" of lovers leaves open the
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Kekes seems never to consider the possibility of a "deep
possibility that for some other people there is no need to love infants

prescription."

and therefore no need for a vision of love.

deep prescription would enforce actions necessary to all good lives.

However, similar (though

Consistent with his description of deep prohibitions, a

more complicated) arguments could be constructed beginning with

It would seem that deep prescriptions represent objective moral

the needs of children, adolescents, adults, or the aged to be loved.

truth as much as deep prohibitions, though in a more complicated

5. Taken as a group, these arguments (based on the needs of
infants, children, adolescents, adults and the aged to be loved) make
it probable that virtually all people need to be lovers, if we are to
avoid simple evil.

No one can rightly think that a deep prohibition, e.g. "do not

torture innocent human beings," does not apply to him.

However,

one could recognize a deep prescription, e.g. "give adequate food to
infants," and rightly think that the prescription should be fulfilled by

6. In chapter six, I hoped to have shown, rather than argued,
that this proposition is true.

way.

Moral pilgrims need a goal to admire

and pursue; would-be lovers need a vision of love.
7. This proposition follows from the others.

other people and not himself.

So, while deep prescriptions represent

objective moral truth, they do not apply to every person at all times.
I do not claim that my argument is a refutation of Kekes' and
Williams' defense of pluralism.

If there were a deep prescription

which applied, as deep prohibitions do, to every person at all times,
If this argument is sound, the evil-avoiding and good-

producing aspects of morality cannot be so neatly separated as
Williams and Kekes seem to think.

Interestingly, when Kekes

considers violations of the minimum requirements of good lives. he
does so only in regard to what he calls "deep prohibitions." (Kekes
172-179)

and if that prescription was tied to some particular vision of the
good, then their defense of pluralism could be refuted.

My argument

does not assume or establish such a prescription.4 I only claim that
my argument shows that the objective evils

which we must avoid

cannot be so neatly divided from the goods that we may pursue as

He stresses that deep prohibitions, against such things as

murder, torture, mutilation, and enslavement. represent objective
moral truth.

"For deep prohibitions are of simple evil, and they

define simple moral situations.

The objectivity of our moral

judgments depends on our ability to identify such situations..
Whether a prohibition is deep depends solely on whether it protects
a minimum requirement of human welfare." (Kekes 177)

Kekes seems to think.
Objective, simple evil can occur not only through what people
do, but through what they fail to do.

My argument shows that unless

a very great many of us pursue love, simple evil will occur.
4 I think there is such a prescnpuon, the great commandment. However, I
doubt that . it can be established by argument, and many readers will not agree
to assume it.
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before us an image of something admirable, which we can pursue.

Therefore, the goods that we pursue are interwoven with the

We order our loves by pursuing the admirable thing.

avoidance of objective evil.

We return, then, to the question put aside earlier.

Logically, there is an ambiguity in my argument, but an
innocent one.

Someone could object that "love" is used in two senses

need to be lovers.

The love that infants need, it could be claimed, is

a hard-to-specify group of behaviors by others which produce in the

health, nutrition, safety, etc., but the focus here is on emotional and
The love which lovers give or have, on the

other hand, is a complex of emotions, intentions and beliefs internal
to the lover.

This objection may be logically astute (I

But not all visions of

the good or of love have equal claim on our attention. If life lived in
pursuit of some vision of a good neglects the love of infants, then

of all good lives, including those which pursue a vision which
In general, at a minimum a vision of the
Beyond

the many nonmoral goods writers like Wolf and Adams have
described.

create a hierarchy of goods so that the need of infants to be loved

Ultimately, there may be one unifying good, and only a

vision of that good would perfectly harmonize all goods, thus rightly

(and other deep prescriptions, if they are found) will be rightly

ordering all loves.

placed above, say, the good of computer game success.

We need to hear again stories which place

pursuit of which would help order his loves.

that, we look for a vision of the good rich enough to promote all of

If the goods that we pursue are

connected to the evils which we must avoid, then perhaps we can

what we are to love.

No doubt Buddhist or Hindu thinkers could tell

good must be rich enough to promote all deep prescriptions.

At this point, philosophers of a certain sort would seek to

grow as lovers we need a vision of love, not a rule which tells us

Sovereignty of Good.

neglects the love of infants.

do not say it is), but it is psychological nonsense.

The reader of chapter six will not expect such a move here.

instance, offers a non theistic version of a platonic good in The

promotes the love of infants, for the love of infants is a requirement

infants to "be loved" in the relevant sense without any, or at most

fashion a rule for ordering loves.

Iris Murdoch, for

that vision of the good is defective when compared to one that

The objector could conclude that it is possible for

few, people "being lovers."

It is not.

stories which would give the moral pilgrim a vision to pursue, the

child a sense of self-esteem and well-being (and, more basically,

psychological well-being).

monotheistic vision of the good, like Robert Adams', the only way to
integrate motives or order loves?

when I say that all infants need to be loved, and therefore people

Is a

To

In the less-than-ultimate world that we have, we

may expect many visions of love (this is what is right about
pluralism), even though not every story will yield an even minimally
adequate vision of love (this is what is wrong about pluralism).
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part of a healthy community.

We are only saying here that healthy

community can help some; this is enough to motivate an exploration
of the topic.
How do communities help would-be lovers?
to exhaust the topic, here are three suggestions.

Without claiming
Communities 1) help

heal the narcissistic wounds which prevent us from seeing each
other, 2) flesh out the stories through which we are given moral
vision, and 3) support individuals in their specific projects of love.
In explaining these assertions I will refer repeatedly to the work of
the psychiatrist, M. Scott Peck, and the theologian/philosopher,
Stanley Hauerwas.

To a lesser extent, some observations by a poet,

Robert Bly, will mix into the stew.

In The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, Peck
says, "there is no adequate one-sentence definition of genuine
community." (Peck 60)

He then tries to give his readers an idea of

his subject by describing various facets of community.

According to
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Dr. Peck, true community is marked by inclusivity, commitment,
consensus, realism, contemplation, safety, brokenness, gracious
conflict, and an imprecise something he calls "spirit."

Fortunately, he

supplements this list of somewhat abstract qualities with many
stories of communities.

I will try to imitate this admirable policy of

illustrating with cases rather than giving a verbal definition of

own lives and in the lives of friends, that people often live behind
false selves.

We internalize the lie, "I am nothing unless I am united

with the perfect other," "I am nothing unless I am always and
completely good," or "I am nothing unless I am succeeding."

We need

to replace the lie with the truth, "I am somebody, and I can get
better."
Consider this simple thesis.

community.

A community can help a wounded

person believe that she is somebody, even though she is not
perfectly good, completely successful, or connected to the perfect
other.

A Home for the Wounded

If this is true, then we have a wa.y in which a community can

help a person learn love.
We have all suffered narcissistic wounds.

While very young,

we faced the challenges of seperateness, vulnerability and limitation.
The world was not the perfect oyster it had seemed when we learned
to walk and mother was God and we were one with mother.

Though

the rapprochement with reality was painful, most of us came through
those crises, and--unlike the extreme narcissist--we have made a
fairly realistic adjustment to the world.
hurt.

But the old wounds still

We sometimes feel the desire to cover them up and live in a

false self.

To the extent that we do, we are unable to love.

So far, this just recapitulates the psychoanalytic theory
presented in chapter one.

Note that we need not accept this picture's

universalizing tone ("We have all suffered. . ."), nor its explanation of
the etiology of narcissism, in order to accept the working description
it gives of problems faced by would-be lovers.

We can see in our

However, not all groups of people, not even

those which are sometimes called "communities," do this.

What

marks the difference between the community which helps heal
wounds and the false community which does not?

Examples will

help.
I spent four unhappy years in a rural high school in
Washington state.

(The school no longer exists, as the school district

was consolidated into a neighboring district.)

I do not mean that I

was unhappy all the time; away from school, many good things
happened to me in those years.

But virtually every day of my

attendance at this school was marked by an intense awareness that
did not fit in.

I wanted to be liked by other students at the school,

but I felt excluded as not quite acceptable.
As happens sometimes in small country schools (I suppose it
happens in big schools as well), the student body had united in a
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nearly universal disdain for academic achievement.

Study was to be

endured, not celebrated; if someone applied himself, asked questions.
and showed interest in school work, he was suspected of currying
favor with the principal and teachers, the warden and guards of our
little prison.
success.

So I could not win my peers' approval by scholastic

Brought up in a teetotalling religious tradition, I either

lacked the courage to rebel against my parents' values or was wise
enough to see the emptiness of teenage drinking parties.

So I could

not win approval b)I joining in a primary social gathering of my
peers.
Athletics remained.
enough in sports.

Perhaps I could be accepted if I was good

But I failed to rise above mediocrity in football,

basketball, or track, even though I went out for all three each of my
high school years.

Of course, had I "succeeded" in sports, whatever

my own doubts about my worth.

Nevertheless, in retrospect this

analysis seems incontrovertible.
Second, my high school experience was not unique.

Though felt

most acutely in the teenage years, for many people the need for
acceptance remains unmet for a lifetime.

Sadly, millions can identify

with the constant fruitless search for the approval of one's peers.
I remember high school days, basketball and school plays
And the tension you could feel out in the hall.
I was searching for my one and only but behind my laughter I
was lonely,
And I wanted to go out with you, but I was too afraid to call.
And won't you tell me that it's different now since I sat in your
place?
Won't you tell me there's less loneliness and fear?
Or is it still the same old story, the groups and the grades and
the search
for glory--anything to keep us from dealing with our tears?

acceptance I would have won thereby would not have eased my
pain.

I would have been trapped in the performance syndrome, in

which the narcissistic style pushes for ever more success.
"Martin," in chapter one.)
what we do.

(Cf.

We long to be loved for who we are, not

Some of us hid in grades, some hid in athlete's glory,
Some hid behind a cigarette, some hid inside their clothes.
We were silently assigned our own social territory
And some of us found no refuge at all, and I was one of those."
(Don Eaton "High School Days")

In the end, I graduated as valedictorian of a small class,
In 1973, I entered George Fox College in Newberg, Oregon.

still feeling rejected and lonely.
Two comments should be made at this point.

First, I would not

Within months I became aware of a profound change in my life.

have said, at the time, that I played sports in order to win approval.

Brad Smith, the Resident Assistant on my floor in the residence hall

I was only dimly conscious of how pained I was by exclusion, and I

where I lived, worked hard to demonstrate to each of the men on the

was unaware how that pain drove me to sports.

floor that he accepted him without reservation.

Nor did I see that

my driven desire to be accepted by my peers stemmed from from

I met a similar

attitude of acceptance and approval in nearly everyone on campus.
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I felt no "tension out in the hall." I could relax. I began to feel like I
was somebody.

This need not prevent us from seeing that some communities are far

I began to deal with my tears.

College was clearly an emotionally more healthy place for me
than high school. Why?

honored, the social life did not include alcohol use, etc.

Not all communities are long-lived like a college.

1967.

But my

M. Scott Peck says that true communities are marked by

To the contrary, a

At George Fox, a deliberate and

concerted effort was made to extend welcome to new students.

In one weekend of intense interaction, twelve

community.

Three incidents of the weekend which Peck relates

illustrate the inclusive nature of community.

person has to demonstrate his unworthiness or threat to the
community in order to be excluded.

(Peck 33-41)

psychiatric professionals experienced the hard work and rewards of

Communities include people just because they

are people; they do not have to prove their worth.

Peck tells of

his experience in a marathon therapy group led by Mac Budgely in

acceptance at college was not merely a matter of natural affinities.

(Peck 61)

more welcoming and productive of self-esteem than others.

Obviously, in college I felt much more

comfortable with the values of the group; academic success was

inclusivity.

school was not perfectly awful, nor was George Fox perfectly good.

I

First, Peck tells of an experience much like that of the ancient
mariner (cf. chapter two).

One of the members of the group disliked

Peck's East Coast mannerisms and clothing.
this Midwesterner's

~oorishness

and cigars.

In return, Peck dispised

In the wee hours of the

morning, the boor fell asleep, snoring obnoxiously.

received the acceptance I always struggled for in high school--and it
seemed I did not have to do anything to get it.

Of course, the

. Wa~e upon wave of fury built up in me. The waves
mtens1fied as I looked at the ashtray next to him with its f 0
sta~e-smelling dead cigars, their chewed ends still wet with ~~s
saliva.. My hatred became pure white hot, utterly unforaiving
and nghteous.
"'
. But ~en a mo~t odd thing happened. Just as I was looking at
h~m with such disgust, he turned into me.
Or did I turn into
h1m? In any .case, I suddenly saw myself sitting in his chair,
my head rolling back, the snores coming out of my mouth.
The waves of fury, disgust, and hatred turned instantly into
waves of affection and caring. And stayed that way. (Peck 34)

challenge to a community's inclusiveness comes when an individual
challenges the group's ways of thinking or acting; perhaps some
other student, with different needs, would not have experienced
George Fox as a healing community.

Perhaps I benefitted from a

fortunate fit between my needs and the college milieu.

Such things

are hard to judge, but it was the college's policy to foster an
accepting community, and at least one student was helped by that
policy.

This chapter intends to explore ways community helps one

In comparing my high school to my college, it becomes clear
that real groups only approach the ideal of true community.

My high

love.

It may also be that love makes community possible; this
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possibility will not be explored in this chapter.

Suffice it to say that

Peck's changed attitude toward the Midwestern psychiatrist

even reach consensual decisions without making each other conform
to a particular mode.
How does the inclusivity of community help a person learn to

contributed to the inclusivity of the group as it became a community.
Second, later in the weekend, after much good feeling
developed in the group, Peck tells how he began experiencing
unaccountable depression.

When he reported this to the group, most

of the other members accused him of damaging the wonderful
process the group was experiencing.

If he was depressed at such a

time, he must be seriously disturbed.

Maybe he should leave the

One of the group members suggested that Peck was the voice of

speaker.

At this, most of group began attacking the

Finally, though, group denial broke down and everyone

began admitting that he was angry, tired, etc.

Once it was able to

express and come to grips with depression, the group returned to
high spirits.

Accepting the unwelcome message of the "misfit"

enabled the group to be a community.
Third, near the end of the weekend, a division arose among the
group members over the significance of what they were
experiencing.

Some of the men expressed their insights in spiritual

terms, while precisely half of the group rejected all such religious
talk.

Unconditional acceptance undermines the narcissistic lie.

A

person does not have to do or be or have a connection if she is
already somebody.

The style of psychotherapy known as "client

centered" draws much of its power from the "unconditional positive
regard" which it offers to each client.

For many patients, the

therapist's actual words or suggestions matter very little; the thing
that draws them back to the weekly hour of therapy like bees to

marathon session.

the group's depression.

love?

Recognizing the problem, though, the group rapidly resolved it,

not by trying to convert the other side, but by affirming the worth of
the group in spite of its division.

They could accept one another and

nectar--and the thing that heals them--is the astonishing sense of
acceptance they get nowhere else.
Usually, a client sees her therapist once a week or less often.
Meanwhile, she lives in the "real world," which for many people
consists of family systems, work groups and social organizations
which do nothing to counteract the self-devaluing lie of narcissism,
or worse, add their own excluding and devaluing messages to her
picture of herself.

A healthy community, then, without the

advantage of the therapist's expertise and in spite of its occasional
shortcomings, can do what the therapist cannot do.

It can bring

healing into the rest of the week.
No matter what we call them, non-inclusive groups are not true
communities.

Consider again "Martha's" home church, discussed in

chapter one.

Martha had to earn her acceptance there by being a

"good" person.

she could not dress in certain ways or engage in
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certain activities, onb of which was sex.
inner city.

Think of a street gang in an

Boys and girls can only win acceptance in the group by

demonstrating they are "bad" people.

Initiation may involve wearing

"pseudocommunity") forces individuals to stifle themselves.

Budgely's marathon therapy group had to overcome its desire to
exclude Scott Peck in order to admit its own angers and depressions

certain clothes, participating in petty crime, providing sex to gang

and become a genuine community.

leaders, or assisting in more dangerous gang activities such as drug

feels safe to be who they really are.

In both the unhealthy church and the gang,

sales or gun fights.

continued acceptance of the individual is dependent on his or her

In a pseudocommunity no one
Again, we should take

"pseudocommunity" as an ideal type; neither hypocritical churches
nor criminal gangs are completely devoid of acceptance.
If someone does not feel safe to be who he is, he covers up

continued conformity to group norms."
As Peck notes, inclusivity is not an unconditioned value in
communities. (Peck 'pl, 158)

Mac

An order of monks or nuns might

with a false self which he hopes will win acceptance.

Now, it might

be argued that one of the marks of health in adults is that they have

welcome non-believers to visit them and worship and study with

the cognitive and emotional resources to sustain long term

them, but it could not admit them into the order.

performances, sometimes for good reasons, e.g. to keep a necessary

A much less

structured weekly support group could accept members (though it

job.

would not have any official list) from all sorts of religious or political

reinforce the false

persuasions, but even it could not be totally inclusive.

An alcoholic,

But too often group pressures to produce a false self only
~elves

we have from our pasts.

cannot feel who they are and they have no safe place where they can

for instance, who denied his condition and yet repeatedly showed up

learn to feel who they are.

at group meetings drunk, might need to be excluded for the group to

false love. For such people, a community can help.

survive.

Many people

Unfortunately, false selves can only offer

Behind the exceptions, though, stands the rule; healthy
Living Out a Vision

communities accept . people without striving to convert their thinking
\

or control their behavior.
A false community, whether a street gang, a college fraternity

In chapter six, I maintained that growth in love requires more

or an office steno pool, tries to stamp out individuality by converting

than the ability to pay attention to individual realities, as rare and

its members to one way of thinking or controlling them into one way

difficult as that skill is.

of acting.

something they can admire and pursue, and that such visions of

Sometimes, for instance, in some churches and social clubs,

the veneer of polite "community" (Peck, 86-90, calls it

I suggested that lovers need a vision of love,
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admirable things are best communicated by stories.

But how do we

Adults may try but never fully understand what this story
means to a three year old, combining as it does terror, despair,

learn stories?
Many parents have had the experience, on reading a bedtime
story to a toddler for the twentieth time (or fortieth, or sixtieth--

"jumped;" it was "hopped."

wolf."], and joyful relief.)
Obviously, then, we learn stories at our parent's knee.

children at a certain stage seem to have an insatiable desire for
repetition), of being corrected by their audience.

warning, admonition, humor ["'What a tummy-ache I have,' said the

The word was not

The wise pig did not merely deny the

I do not

want to question the importance of the nuclear family in passing on
stories and the visions they carry.

I want to suggest, though, that

wolf entrance to his house; he said, "Not by the hair of my chinny-

families--expecially isolated nuclear families--are not enough to

chin-chin."

communicate moral vision.

Precisely.

Parents should realize that, while for them

A crucial element in individuation is separation from parents.

bedtime stories might be a convenient way of getting the little
person into bed, for the child the stories are much more than that.

A child must psychologically leave home in order to become an adult

At the least, besides entertainment, stories nourish children's

on his own terms.

Unless we want to imagine that children can learn
'
to be healthy adults apart from their parents all by themselves

imaginations and shape their understanding of the moral world.
(Remember this one?

The loving mother sheep left her lambs

(remember Goldman's Lord of the Flies), a child will need others to

at home with the warning not to be taken in by the strategems of the

supply the stories which tell him what it is to be an adult.

wolf.

book, Iron John,

But the wicked and clever wolf dusted his feet with flour and

thus deceived the lambs.

Once the wolf fooled the lambs and entered

In his

Robert Bly writes that American culture faces a

particular crisis about boys in this regard.

"We know that our society

the house, he gobbled all the lambs save one, who hid behind the

produces a plentiful supply of boys, but seems to produce fewer and

clock.

fewer men." (Bly 180)

Fortunately, the greedy wolf ate so fast that he did not chew,

but swallowed the lambs whole.

Later, the littlest lamb and the

mother found the wolf lying gorged and asleep near the river.

They

Bly quotes the wisdom of tribes in New Guinea.

"A boy cannot

change into a man without the active intervention of the older men."

cut open his stomach, thus freeing the lambs, filled the stomach with

(Bly 15, 86, 87)

stones, and sewed it up.

passage which help children join the adult community outside their

When the wolf awoke and tried to stand, he

fell into the river and drowned.

nuclear family.

All over the world, traditional cultures have rites of

Sometimes the men of the village simply appear,

without warning, at a boy's door.

Until now the boy has lived with
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his mother, in the company of women and children.
take him away from home.

Throughout the ancient hunter societies, which apparently
lasted thousands of years--perhaps hundreds of thousands-and throughout the hunter-gatherer societies that followed
them, and the subsequent agricultural and craft societies,
fathers and sons worked and lived together. As late as 1900 in
the United States about ninety percent of fathers were engaged
in agriculture. In all these societies the son characteristically
saw his father working at all times of the day and all seasons of
the year.
When the son no longer sees that, what happens? After thirty
years of working with young German men, as fatherless in
their industrial society as young American men today,
Alexander Mitscherlich . . . developed a metaphor: a hole
appears in the son's psyche. (Bly 95)

The older men

There is no recourse; the mother may

put up a mock protest, but she cannot interfere with the way of men.
The older men take the boys of the village away to the forest; there
they teach them about religion, wisdom, women, courage and dignity.
They may subject the boy to silence, darkness, solitude or ritual
wounding.

He begins to learn the dances, songs and stories which

constitute the wisdom of the tribe.
initiation, he is a man.

When the boy has come through

Bly is willing to believe that, more often than

not, traditional initiation not only confers the status of adult, it
actually helps the boys achieve healthy individuation. (Bly 181-182)
In contrast, our culture has virtually no initiation, no rituals by
which the older generation can help boys break free from their
parents.

Bly says the main

images of father in our society are the object of ridicule (Dagwood
Bumstead, Homer Simpson), the dangerous and probably evil
stranger (Darth Vader--"dark father"), the bad-tempered fool (the
office worker who comes home unable to teach the son what he does

Even worse, boys in our culture do not bond with their fathers.
Part of the work of the older men is to help the boy individuate from
the father as well as the mother.

What is "father" to boys in our culture?

But how does one break away from

what he has never known?
Traditional cultures still in existence seem to have plenty of
father. In so-called traditional cultures, many substitute
fathers work with the young men. Uncles loosen the son up, or
tell him about women. Grandfathers give him stories. Warrior
types teach weaponry and discipline, old men teach ritual and
soul--all of them honorary fathers. (Bly 93)

all day), and the weak puddle of indecision (the liberated nonchauvinist who is unable to assert himself because it feels like
aggression). (Bly 99)

"father" has no content at all; products of single (female) parent
households and the urban underclass, their world includes no adult
men.
Bly thinks our culture needs to recover initiation, but initiation
cannot be carried out in an isolated nuclear family.
the "old men."

By the middle of the twentieth century in Europe and North
America a massive change had taken place: the father was
working, but the son could not see him working.

To a large and growing number of boys,

Initiation needs
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The Chambonnais were a community before the Trocmes

Communities can help replace the missing father in boys' lives,

As Sauvage put it in a televised conversation with Bill

and they can help the boys cross over into adulthood, but such

arrived.

communities need to be intergenerational entities. l

Bly could be

Moyers, they knew who they were.

read as simply suggesting that boys (and probably

girls, though that

Huguenots, who had experienced persecution, was distilled in the

Their clear identity as

is not his interest) need to be connected with older men in order to

stories passed down from generation to generation.2

achieve psychological health.

letter suggests that they understood their own stories to be rooted in

I want to add that psychological

growth makes possible, is made possible by, and sometimes just is
moral progress.

If a boy needs old men to become a man, he will

When Andre Trocme and Eduard Theis preached

Christian non-violent resistance to evil, they added something to the
cumulative story-telling of

need old men to become a lover.
To grow as lovers, we need a vision of love.

We will not hear

all the stories we need, if we want to have a vision of love, from our
parents.

the Biblical story.

We need to hear and see the stories in a wider community.

The Trocme

th~

community, but they did not reinvent

it.
I said in chapter six that we ought to multiply our stories of
lovers.

A living community does this in the best way.

In an

Perhaps the events in Le Chambon, which I described in chapter six,

intergenerational community we not only hear the old stories, we see

should be traced less to Andre Trocme's preaching than to something

them fleshed out in the lives of others.

he found already there when he arrived.

Pierre Sauvage quotes

from a 1934 letter Trocme wrote to a friend.

In 1947, Herbert Nicholson asked a young man, Paul
McCracken, to help him transport goats to Okinawa.

For McCracken,

it was the adventure of a lifetime; he experienced the unseaworthy
Here, the old Huguenot spirit is alive. The humblest peasant
home has its Bible, and the father reads it every day. So these
people, who do not read the papers but the Scriptures, do not
stand on the moving soil of opinion but on the rock of the Word
of God. (Rittner and Myers, 135)

liberty ship Simon Benson

(which split open on the succeeding

voyage), storms at sea, an unfamiliar culture in the Far East, and
Herbert Nicholson preaching love, hope and reconciliation in Japanese
and English.

Long afterward, in the 1980's, I knew Herbert Nicholson
I

as a kindly, leathery old man who walked with a stoop.
1 Perhaps this should be qualified. Peck (160-163) insists that genuine
communities have different life spans, and that some rightly pass away quite
quickly. So maybe I should say some communities need to be
intergenerational entities.
Whatever benefits a weekend community building
experience may have--and I am ready to admit it has many--such short term
communities can not initiate boys.
Only a long term intergenerational
community has the time for the wisdom of the old men to be passed to its boys.

But Paul

2 During the war, Roger Darcissac, a schoolteacher and friend of Trocme's,
collected a book of songs for young people. Included was a song praising and
mourning a pastor of Le Chambon who had been arrested centuries before
during the Catholic persecution of Huguenots. Cf. Hallie, p. 26.
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McCracken, then in:, his late fifties, remembered and told me about

mine." (Hauerwas 36, 37)

the man who visited the internment camps and took goats to

"fully mine" as the existentialist would like.

Okinawa. Paul also told me of his own father, who received a

myself with my will," as Murdoch quotes Stuart Hampshire as

dishonorable discharge from the Army during World War I because

writing. (Murdoch 5)

he would not train as a rifleman.

process of pursuing a moral vision, perhaps a good one, perhaps not.

And I add Paul's stories to the

None of my decisions in the past were
I can not "identify

I am a historical creature, engaged in the

stories I tell my sons; they are stories of love, which make a vision of

Hauerwas rejects the idea of the moral agent as pure chooser: ". . .to

love accessible.

be an agent means I am able to locate my action within an ongoing

Stanley Hauerwas, in The Peaceable Kingdom, writes, "The
nature of Christian ethics is determined by the fact that Christian

history and within a community of language-users." (Hauerwas 42)3
Just as communities need not be perfect to give enough

convictions take the·. form of a story, or perhaps better, a set of

acceptance to help heal narcissistic wounds, they need not be perfect

stories that constitute a tradition, which in turn creates and forms a

to flesh out a vision of love. Love, like good, is a perfectionistic

community." (Hauerwas 24)

Hauerwas thinks the project of

rationalistic ethical theory, which he calls the search for an
"unqualified ethic," which seeks to define morality in terms of the
non-specific ahistorical rational being, must be a failure.

More

importantly, to Hauerwas' mind, an unqualified ethic must make
central Christian beliefs irrelevant to ethics.

In an unqualified ethic,

every person is no less and no more than a rational being.

(This is

the picture of human nature we saw in Kant in chapter four.)

But

this is untrue not only to human nature, but to the stories of the
tradition.

To be a Christian, Hauerwas says, is to "grow into the story

of Jesus as the form of God's kingdom." (Hauerwas 30)
Like Iris Murdoch, Hauerwas distrusts the existentialist idea of
freedom in which I am only free in my present decision if I am free
of all "decisions" I made in the past which were less than "fully

3 This last phrase, "a community of language-users," raises a Pandora's box of
questions beyond the scope of this book:. In rejecting any unqualified ethic,
Hauerwas insists that we should speak of qualified ethics; he is most interested
in a Christian ethic, but others might be interested in a secular ethic or a
Muslim ethic. In each case Hauerwas would insist on the imponance of the
qualifier. How, then, do ethicists of each son talk: to each other about
morality? Do the adherents of a Jewish ethic and a Christian ethic live in the
same "community of language-users"? The defender of the search for an
unqualified ethic--an adherent of any of the standard rationalistic theories-might claim that a happy result of his position is that everybody lives in the
same moral community. This defender sees rational ethics as a defense against
relativism. If we allow someone's panicular history, including the tradition in
which he was nunured, to count in defining and interpreting his moral life,
are we not then committed to the idea that "right," "good" and other such words
mean different things to different people?
Similar questions sometimes arise for philosophers who speak of "forms
of life" and "language games" when dealing with epistemological questions.
Wittgenstein tried to imagine conversations between educated twentieth
century Europeans and tribal people from non-technological cultures.
Do
such people inhabit the same community of language-users? What about
modem, educated believers in God and modem, educated disbelievers: are their
seemingly intractable disagreements due to diverse communities of language
use?
In spite of the interest of these questions, they must be passed over. In
this chapter I am interested in community in so far as it incarnates a vision of
something morally admirable and pursuable.
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concept.

A wife may have loved her husband with exquisite joy, and

yet truthfully say she loves him better three years later.

So a

community, when it lives out a vision of love, points to a love which
always lies further on, beyond the love which has been enacted in

A moral vision tells me who I am by showing me what I can
In this they resemble initiation rites, which integrate

children into their curtural traditions and let them see what they can
become.

make them better, and bis magic has about run out.
In a society in which family has been reduced to the nuclear
family or less, in which there is in effect no older generation to
initiate its young, and in which pseudo-communities abound, we

the community's history.

become.

arranging meetings and developments in his patients' lives so as to

A moral vision and the initiation process are both

normative; they tell someone what he really is (in spite of

gain the ability to love?

How else can they

Nor should we be surprised that therapists

feel like lonely magicians whose magic supply may soon run dry,
since they are ambivalent about the normative aspects of their
science.
A community which accepts an individual for who she is, and

appearances), and therefore what he can be.
Interestingly, modern psychology both rejects and accepts the
normative aspect of initiation and moral vision.

should not wonder that people turn to therapists.

On one hand,

lives out the stories of a vision of love so that she can see it, may
greatly help her learn
to love.
t

psychology regards itself as a science, interested only in the neutral
empirical questions of how people behave and think.
side, psychology tries to be therapeutic.

Therapists interest

themselves at least as much in what people should do and think as
in what they do and think.

In its therapeutic mode psychology

substitutes for the old men and women of traditional societies who
intervene to help children grow up and who tell the stories which
give moral vision.

Thus, novelists have recognized the likenesses

between therapists and shamans.

The Good Apprentice,

Supporting Projects of Love

On the other

For example, in Murdoch's novel

Thomas McCaskerville, a psychiatrist,

repeatedly considers retirement from his practice, not just because of
age, but because he see himself in the role of magician, carefully

No one loves in the abstract, a point well made by Charles
Schultz when he put the self-contradictory words in Linus' mouth: "I
love mankind; it's the people I can't stand!"

If I want to be a lover,

at some point I get involved with other people (or beings, if loving
God is part of my goal).
I have to

lov~

somebody, a person with a history and a

particular combination of character traits.

Love, then, takes the form

of historically particular projects of love, i.e., friendships, romances,
mentorings, parentings, etc.

Sometimes we exercise a measure of
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According to the Judge of Kierkegaard's "The Aesthetic Validity

choice or will in entering a project of love (a person agrees to date
someone, knowing a romantic relationship may result; a couple plans

of Marriage," the aesthete, represented by Randall, does not

a pregnancy, knowing it will lead to parenthood), but often we

understand what love is.

simply find ourselves already engaged in a project of love (a child

marriage, can romance reach its fullest flower.

does not choose its parents, yet feels obligated to love them; when a

Kierkegaard criticizes this ethical stage, including the commitment it

monastic order merges two houses, the monks have no choice but to

requires, too.

try to love their new brothers).

for love to grow and develop.

Since projects of love are historical

Only in commitment, the bonds of

The Judge recognizes that marriage needs commitment
But what justifies an unconditional

and particular, they exhibit an ineliminable character of chanciness.

commitment?

Lovers know that this

happiness such a marriage may provide.

relationship will be different from all others;

Of course,

The Judge tends to justify it on the basis of the
In his Concluding

The chanciness

Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard indicates this is not enough.

of love can influence a person's choices in entering, or not entering,

Judge's ethical stage needs to be surpassed by a religious stage.

projects of love.

Allen agrees: ". . .Christians know that the fundamental foundation of

past experience cannot guarantee success this time.

The commitment-shy playboy is a stock figure of

The

fiction and film, but the fear that motivates him--that love carries

marriage is the same as the fundamental foundation of life, namely,

unforseeable risks--affects the choices of real people.

the conviction that our goal and end is beyond every merely human

Diogenes Allen uses a character from Murdoch's An Unofficial

Rose

to illustrate what Soren Kierkegaard called the life of the

aesthete. (Allen 68-82)

state and condition.

Our goal is instead the kingdom of God, which is

only partly realized at present." (Allen 82-83)
I want to generalize Allen's point about romance to all projects

Randall feels trapped in his marriage to Ann,

his respectable, dutiful, boring wife, who symbolizes his whole life,

of love.

encased in his old dreams.

adopt a child into our family?

The rose nursery garden which they

Should I give myself as mentor to this student?

built, their children, memories of early romance: none of this touches

on me as a friend?

Randall anymore.

whether the

So, when the chance comes, Randall flees to Rome

Should we

Should I let my acquaintance depend

In each case we may quite legitmately worry

relatio~ship

may not bring more pain and evil than

with his mistress, where he realizes that one day she will bore him

good.

A merely "ethical" response to these worries--that the risk is

too; this does not matter, since "There are lots of other beautiful

necessary in order to achieve a potential good only available by

women."

commitment to the project--cannot justify a commitment which
needs to be unconditional.
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Some projects of love (not all), as Kierkegaard saw in relation to
romance, need to be entered with unconditional commitment in
order to give the conditions in which our hopes for the projects can
be realized.

As examples, consider adoption and marriage.

An

adoptive parent must be able to say to a previously abused child
who is throwing a tantrum, "I love you.
will keep loving you."

or for worse."

No matter what you do, I

A bride or groom promises to love, "for better

Without the unconditional nature of the commitment,

Agreeing with Kierkegaard, Allen holds that an unconditional
commitment must be grounded in religious considerations.
So the only possible basis for the endurance and continuation
of the state of marriage is a quite 'arbitrary' element, arbitrary
from every human point of view, namely, a vow taken before
the eternal God. From either the aesthetic or ethical point of
view, a person who undertakes a pledge which binds her
unconditionally is utterly arbitrary and absurd. It is for this
reason that the Judge actually slipped over into the religious
category. (Allen 83)

the child or spouse lives on emotional tenderhooks.4 People have a
need to be loved for who they are, not what they do --if that is true,
at least some of us need to love other people unconditionally, on pain
of a basic human need going unmet.
But projects of love are historical and particular; they cannot be
cured of chanciness.

Knowing this, how can anyone enter a project of

love in the right way?

How can we make an unconditional

commitment to a spouse or a child when we are aware of the
statistics surrounding divorce and disrupted child placements?

I want to use the language of a moral vision to say something
similar. We take on projects of love in pursuit of some vision of love.
(Compare Allen's wording.

The Christian's "fundamental foundation"

is a "conviction" about a "goal and end.") Though I am aware of the
chanciness of marriage or adoption, I make the commitments
necessary to them, not because of some personal characteristic which
makes me think I am immune to chance, but because I admire and
pursue some vision of love.5
If I am right about this, that it is in pursuit of a moral vision

4 Someone might object that this insistence on unconditional commitment is
out of date, like traditional marriage vows. Marriages last as long as they are
good for the people in them. Similarly, adoptive parents should make realistic
commitments to their children; after all, the child may act so outrageously that
the placement has to be disrupted. Not all children are adoptable. Two
comments:
1. These objections miss the force of Kierkegaard's Judge. He knows that life
is chancy, but he argues that in marriage the best "odds" come to those who
commit.
2. In regard to adoption at least, the objection is simply wrong. If the
"realistic" parent adopts with the attitude that the placement is conditional, the
child will know it; no one is a good enough actor to hide the truth from the
child. Then, even if the placement is "successful"--the child lives with the
parent until its majority--the child will have been pushed into performing for
acceptance, a recipe for narcissism.

that people can make the unconditional commitments needed for at
least some projects of love, then communities have an important role

5 I want to leave undecided the question whether this move transfers all the

talk of moral visions in these last two chapters to a Kierkegaardian religious
stage. Some readers may think it does. Other readers may see moral vision talk
as a way of grounding the unconditional commitments of love without
resoning the division between ethical and religious.
Naturally, then, I will also bypass discussion of the interesting idea that all
moral visions, even those which produce evil {e.g. a vision devoted to racial
purity), belong to the religious stage.
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in supporting individuals in their projects of love.

Communities

Communities can support projects of love in at least two other

encourages.

philosophers ought to be interested in possible ways to

overcome weakness ,of will.

nurture the visions which enable certain commitments.

ways, both prosaic and obvious.

Obviously,

First, a community listens and

Second, community members can hold one another

John Wesley discovered--in the sense that no one told him

'

though many wise people in many cultures have also known it--a
simple device which can help overcome weakness of will.

If

someone tells other people whom she trusts what she thinks she

accountable to their vision.
Peck says that genuine community is marked by realism. (Peck

ought to do, it is far more likely that she will do it than if she kept
And if she meets with an accepting community on

64-65) In a healthy marriage, two minds working on the same

the matter secret.

problem give much better odds that a good solution will be found

a regular basis, she will be even more likely to fulfill the historically

than one alone; each one sees possibilities and issues that the other
does not.

Larger groups have an even greater advantage, says Peck,

provided they encourage individuality through acceptance.

In a

community I am free to be myself; I can say what I think and feel.
The pooled experience and wisdom of a group which shares my
vision of love becomes available to me when I tell them of the
struggles (which inevitably come) in my projects of love.

The other

particular requirements of her projects of love, because the group, by
its knowledge of her and its desire that she become what she
envisions, holds her accountable to her projects. So the founder of
Methodism instructed his followers to hold "class meetings," in which
believers were. to confess their sins to each other and pray for each
other on a weekly basis.
Accountability in a community carries the danger of legalism,

community members listen to me; then, knowing me intimately, they

perhaps especially in religious groups.

can encourage me to keep working at love's projects.

Peck, a genuine community must be inclusive; it must value people

Some moral philosophers have given attention to "weakness of

Remember that, according to

for who they are rather than what they do.

The ability of a

will," wondering why people sometimes know the thing they ought to

community to hold its members accountable to the shared vision is

do without doing it.

mirrored by the pseudocommunity's pressures on individuals to

Other thinkers have thought this phenomenon of

little importance to philosophy, since they envisioned the task of

conform to group norms and convert to group dogmas.

moral philosophy as giving rational explanations of right conduct

the difference in real life, where no community is perfect, but only

rather than practical advice, which they left to moralists.

on the way, requires practical wisdom.

Readers of

chapters three and four can predict which side I think is right.

Discerning

Nevertheless, I maintain that
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a community can help the individual in his projects of love by

hurts, flesh out a vision of love, and support projects of love.

holding him accountable to do the things he knows love demands.6

example, Peck thinks the most successful community in the country

The example of Wesley's class meetings shows something
obvious, to which I will draw attention.

Much of this chapter (and

is Alcoholics Anonymous. (Peck 77)

For

Some AA groups probably have

psychologically trained members, but most get along without any

this whole study, for that matter) has been couched in the language

serious study of psychological theory.

of psychology.

encourage acceptance and honesty in the group, characteristics which

Further, I suspect that the locutions of popular

psychology have entered my unconsidered speech at least as much
as into any other late twentieth century American's.?

AA procedures strongly

foster community and health.

We must
Conclusion

resist, though, the idea that healthy communities require the ability
to speak the language of psychology, at least in the forms we are
used to.

Wesley's followers (think of eighteenth and nineteenth

Perhaps the best way to end this chapter, and the book, is

century American farm families) confessed their sins to each other,

simply to indicate the interrelations between the theses made here.

prayed for each other, and--if we grant that at least some of the

In this chapter I have suggested that healthy communities aid

thousands of class meetings were healthy communities--helped each

would-be lovers by providing a place in which 1) narcissistic wounds

get better psychologically and morally.

They were "vulnerable;" they

can be healed, 2) stories of love told, and 3) projects of love

gave "unconditional positive regard;" they "processed feelings;" they

supported.

"held one another accountable;" etc.--without using any such

four main positive contentions of the book, i.e., that narcissism

psychological locutions.

inhibits love (chapter one) and that we need a vision of the

The moral pilgrim need not find a group that speaks the
language of therapists in order to find a community that can heal

The first two of these theses correspond to two of the

good/love to pursue (chapter six).

The other main positive ideas of

the book are that we learn to love by learning to see others
accurately and with compassion (chapter two) and that healthy

6 Again, do not read this "doing" in behavioristic terms. I may well confess to
my meeting a need to change an attitude or way of thinking. Later, they may
ask me how the matter is going. Knowing they may ask, I am more careful to
"do" what I am supposed to do. Real moral action may be entirely internal.
1 Consider: "What I hear you saying is . . ." "That's not where I'm at.• "She is
really into . . . " "Hey, you're ok" "And then his ~said ... (not another
person) Etc. I suspect that popular psychology has impacted our language and
thought as much as Freudian ideas changed the language and thought of
Europe's intelligensia in the first three decades of this century.

communities can help us learn to love (the present chapter).
Thus, the four main theses of the book relate to a simple
contention, that moral progress--in the sense of learning to love--is
possible.

The rest of the book--chapters three, four, five and seven--
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